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The End of Deportation
Angelica Chzaro

ABSTRACT
This Article introduces to legal scholarship a new horizon for pro-immigrant scholarship and
advocacy: deportation abolition. The ever-present threat of deportation shapes the daily lives of
noncitizens. Instead of aiming for a pathway to citizenship, most noncitizens must now contend
with dodging the many pathways to banishment. Despite growing threats to immigrant survival,
most pro-immigrant scholarship and advocacy that aims to reduce migrant suffering assumes
deportation as inevitable. The focus remains on improving individual outcomes by aligning the
process of deportation with due process and the rule of law. But considered from the point of
view of those facing deportation, even a fairly adjudicated deportation can prove devastating.
Moreover, none of the improvements in deportation management can eliminate the racialized
violence that defines the practice. While post-entry social control and extended border control
purportedly justify deportation, the stated goals of deportation law obfuscate its true character
as an indefensible act of violence. The underlying assumption that deportation can and should
continue indefinitely currently demarcates the outer limits of the arguments for addressing
deportation-limits that a commitment to deportation abolition would abandon. In an effort
to denaturalize the common sense of deportation, this Article explores the fundamental failures
that characterize the practice. By questioning commonly held assumptions about its inevitability,
critiquing reform proposals that reify its logic, and providing examples of interventions that
point toward the possibility of its demise, this Article opens the door to the end of deportation.
decarceral demands made by social movements.
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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2018, abolition entered the national conversation on
immigration. In response to the spectacular violence of the separation of migrant
parents and children at the U.S.-Mexico border, the call to "Abolish ICE" began to
gain steam.1 For the first time, the dissolution of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), the agency created in 2003 and tasked with internal
enforcement of immigration laws, became a matter ofpublic debate? Members of
U.S. Congress picked up the call, with at least one bill introduced to dismantle
ICE within one year, and with candidates for office aligning themselves with or
against the message.3 When pressed about their support for "Abolish ICE,"
progressive politicians tended to quickly distance themselves from the idea that
abolishing ICE meant abolishing deportations.4 Despite the sudden and startling
purchase the "Abolish ICE" campaign appeared to garner, the call was instantly
restricted and clarified to an ask for the reorganization of the deportation function
under a kinder, gentler bureaucracy.5 This debate exposed that while the tactics

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

See Tina Vasquez, Abolish ICE: Beyond a Slogan, N.Y. REV. Booxs (Oct. 10, 2018, 7:00
AM),
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/10/abolish-ice-beyond-a-slogan
[https://perma.cc/8XJU-3CFM]; Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks & Zoe Greenberg, Protests
Across U.S. Call for End to Migrant Family Separations, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/trump-protests-family-separation.html
[https://perma.cc/FP6J-5WJE].
See, e.g., Matt Ford, OK, Abolish ICE. What Then?, NEW REPUBLIC (July 18, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/aricle/149945/ok-abolish-ice-then
[https://perma.cc/HZ5U-SG37];
Ron Nixon, Agents Seek to Dissolve ICE in Immigration Policy Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/politics/ice-immigration-eliminateagency.html [https://perma.cc/G98Q-HN78]; Paul Waldman, Opinion, 'Abolish ICE' Is a
Good Thing. Even if Some DemocratsFear It and Republicans DemagogueIt, WASH. POST
(June
29,
2018,
11:19
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/plumline/wp/2018/06/29/abolish-ice-is-a-good-thing-even-it-scares-some-democrats-andrepublicans-demagogue-it [https://perma.cc/EX9V-56F2].
Establishing a Humane Immigration Enforcement System Act, H.R. 6361, 115th Cong.
(2018); see also Ella Nilsen, The List of Democrats Calling to Abolish ICE Keeps Growing,
Vox
(June
30,
2018,
2:26
PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/6/29/17518176/democrats-to-abolish-ice-movement-gillibrand-de-blasioocasio-cortez [https://perma.cc/3SE9-ZE66]; Alex Seitz-Wald, 'Abolish ICE!'Is the New
Rallying Cry for Progressive Democrats, NBC NEWS (June 22, 2018, 6:41 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/abolish-ice-new-rallying-cry-progressivedemocrats-n885501 [https://perma.cc/N2GS-S9RR].
See, e.g., Molly Hensley-Clancy & Lissandra Villa, Kamala Harris Wants You to Know
She's Definitely Not Callingfor Abolishing ICE, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 3, 2018, 3:38 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mollyhensleyclancy/kamala-harris- abolish-ice
[https://perma.cc/9D8Z-NS5S].
See, e.g., Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2018, 8:31 AM),
https://twitter.com/aoc/status/1031926879752802304
[https://perma.cc/E9CR-H7US]
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ICE uses to apprehend, incarcerate, and deport immigrants have grown
increasingly unpopular, the underlying logic-that the U.S. government should
have the right to continue deporting noncitizens-remains uninterrogated. By the
summer's end, it was clear that while ICE's continued existence was debatable,
deportation remained unimpeachable political common sense, even in the face of
the most explicit state violence and human suffering.
This is what I term the common sense of deportation. Found in both
scholarship and advocacy around deportation, it is the consensus that some level
of deportation is inevitable. Even pro-immigrant advocates take for granted the
continued existence of deportation as a necessary mechanism for enforcing
immigration laws.6 This common sense includes the idea that a functioning
immigration system requires deportation-that if a country wants to admit
noncitizens lawfully, then it must demonstrate its power to expel them.' It also
includes the notion, prevalent among many immigrant rights advocates and
attorneys, that saving some (deserving immigrants) from deportation presumes
continuing the deportation of (undeserving, unsafe) others.8 Because of the legal

6.

7.

8.

("#AbolishICE means not having an agency that incarcerates children and sexually assaults
women with impunity. It does not mean abolish deportation."); Elaine Godfrey, What
Abolish ICE' Actually Means, ATLANTIC
(July 11, 2018,
12:32 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/what-abolish-ice-actuallymeans/564752 [https://perma.cc/752X-VZEB] ("Now, it is time to do what Americans
overwhelmingly want: abolish the cruel, dysfunctional immigration system we have today
and pass comprehensive immigration reform (quoting Senator Bernie Sanders) ....
That will mean restructuring the agencies that enforce our immigration laws, including
ICE." (quoting Senator Kamala Harris)); Zaid Jilani &Aida Chavez, Calls to Abolish ICE
Are Becoming More Mainstream. Is Washington Readyfor the Conversation?,INTERCEPT
(June 27, 2018, 1:49 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/27/abolish-ice-alexandria-ocasiocortez [https:// perma.cc/Q2YW-5A9G] ("We're not saying that you have to abolish all
functions of ICE, but we used to have all those functions before ICE got created .... [W]hat
we're trying to say is that this is a moment when we're seeing the abuses of ICE with no
accountability, with more and more money that is being wasted instead of really looking at
the most cost-effective and humane ways .... " (emphasis added) (quoting Representative
Pramila Jayapal)).
See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring
Proportionality, and Imagining Graduated Sanctions, 30 J.L. & PoL. 465, 465 (2015)
("Substantial interior immigration enforcement will undoubtedly continue in the United
States, whether or not the legislative and executive branches can craft a legalization
program."). This concession by Daniel Kanstroom, one of the most trenchant critics and
scholars of the modern U.S. deportation regime, exemplifies the reach of the common sense
of deportation.
See, e.g., The Right Way to Deport People, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/03/02/the-right-way-to-deport-people
[https://perma.cc/3HNW-99WZ] ("In principle, deporting people who fall foul of
immigration rules is wise, even liberal. It is the corollary of a generous immigration systemproof that rules can be upheld and that a country can open its doors without losing control.").
See infra notes 341-357 and accompanying text.
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and political common sense of deportation, lawmakers interpreted the activist call
to "Abolish ICE" as calling not for the end of deportation, but for the reform of a
federal agency.9
That the U.S. government must and should deport somebody is a
fundamental premise of today's immigration law, the source of its common sense.
Deportation as currently practiced is familiar to any student or practitioner of
immigration law: Deportation (known formally as "removal") can be ordered by
an immigration judge after a procedure in which a person is found to trigger one
of the grounds of inadmissibility or deportability and cannot prove that they merit
relief.1 These proceedings are considered civil, not criminal, and thus deportation
is not considered punishment, but rather, one possible outcome of an adjudication
on the propriety of a non-U.S. citizen's presence within or at the borders of the
United States."
The common sense of deportation dictates that such proceedings should
continue into an indefinite future. It limits pro-immigrant efforts to asks for
reform that would allow more (but not all) noncitizens to escape triggering the
grounds of inadmissibility or deportability, and allow more (but not all)
noncitizens to prove theymerit relief." The common sense of deportation extends
to other forms of expulsions, including those which involve no process or very
limited process; these include expedited removal (expulsion of those who are
found within 100 miles of the border, within two weeks of their arrival),
reinstatement of removals (expulsion of those previously found removable in a
formal process), and Title 42 expulsions (expulsion of unauthorized migrants
arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border during the COVID-19 pandemic, ostensibly

9.

See Dean Obeidallah, 'AbolishICE'Isn'tAboutOpen Borders,CNN (July 2,2018, 11:07 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/01/opinions/abolish-ice-not-open-bordersobeidallah/index.html [https://perma.cc/9EM8-ED6X].

10.

T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, MARYELLEN
FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY

11.

12.

895 (8th ed. 2016). This common view of deportation obscures the fact that over 80
percent of deportations now occur outside of a legal proceeding. See infra notes 128-140
and accompanying text.
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) ("The order of deportation is not
a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied
to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of
enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the
conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its
constitutional authority and through the proper departments, has determined that his
continuing to reside here shall depend.").
See infra notes 341-357 and accompanying text.
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under public health justifications)." Most pro-immigrant advocates have
internalized the limits of the common sense of deportation, and it shapes efforts to
ameliorate the worsening conditions facing immigrant communities.
Arguments across the political spectrum remain locked in on defining whom it is
reasonable to deport and what are the appropriately humane technologies for
carrying out deportations.14 The common sense of deportation requires
participating in the ideological project of deportation as an acceptable outcome
for some portion of the population." It makes clear that in the twenty-first
century in the United States, being pro-immigrant does not mean being antideportation.
This Article disrupts the common sense of deportation, 16 drawing attention
to the limits of assembling scholarship and advocacy efforts around the
inevitability of deportation. By introducing deportation abolition as a possible
horizon for immigrant scholarship and advocacy, this Article pushes legal
scholarship to focus on what might be required to end deportation." In
questioning the validity of deportation, the Article analyzes the limits of

13.

14.
15.

16.

For a discussion of expedited removals, administrative removals, and reinstatement of
deportation, see generally Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows ofImmigrationCourt, 90
S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 181 (2017). Title 42 removals are explained in this primer: A Guide to
Title 42 Expulsions at the Border, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct. 15, 2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-title-42-expulsionsborder [https://perma.cc/D27F-QBTB].
See infra notes 341-357 and accompanying text.
I would argue that Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw's formulation of the illusion of necessity
created by law extends to the project of deportation. "Law ... embodies and reinforces
ideological assumptions about human relations that people accept as natural or even
immutable." Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, andRetrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,1351-52 (1988).
I draw from the Gramscian notion of common sense in positing a common sense of
deportation. See KATE CREHAN, GRAMSCI'S COMMON SENSE: INEQUALITY AND ITS NARRATIVES,

at x (2016) ("A key term here is senso comune (common sense), the term Gramsci uses for all
those heterogeneous beliefs people arrive at not through critical reflection, but encounter as
already existing, self-evident truths."). Citizenship theorist Linda Bosniak engages with the
notion of common sense in questioning accepted notions of citizenship, an argument I
extend to deportation: "Our dominant common sense continues to regard the status of
citizenship as properly rationed by states and, moreover, as legitimately employed by them as
an 'instrument of social closure' in the national space." Linda Bosniak, Status Non-Citizens,
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP 314, 322 (Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Baub6ck, Irene
Bloemraad & Maarten Vink eds., 2017) (quoting ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND
NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (1998)) (citation omitted).

17.

This Article builds on the modern abolitionist projects that have begun to be introduced to
legal scholarship. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and GroundedJustice, 62
UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1156 (2015); Csar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Abolishing
Immigration Prisons, 97 B.U. L. REV. 245, 245-46 (2017); Amna A. Akbar, Toward a
Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 405-06 (2018); Amna A. Akbar, An
Abolitionist Horizonfor (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1781-82 (2020).

68 UCLA L. REV. 1040 (2021)

1046

conventional legal scholarship and practice on deportation, and considers
whether deportation continues to deserve the presumption of legitimacy it
currently enjoys. 18
At the heart of deportation abolition is the notion that deportation only
expands and swells the indefensible and illegitimate uses of state force and should
be ended. Social movement organizations, such as the national Latinx
organization Mijente, have already begun to delineate the legal and policy battles
that prefigure the end of deportation.19 In "Free Our Future: An Immigration
Policy Platform for Beyond the Trump Era," Mijente offers an initial roadmap."
As a Latinx organization that prioritizes racial justice, Mijente has its roots in the
"#NotlMore" campaign that sought a moratorium on deportations under the

18.

19.

20.

This Article expands on the work of Linda Bosniak, who has denaturalized national
conceptions of citizenship in ways that this Article seeks to do for conventional deportation
scholarship and practice. See generally Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J.
GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 447,493 (2000) ("As someone sympathetic to the postnational project,
however, I am inclined to turn the tables and ask instead whether national conceptions
of citizenship deserve the presumptions of legitimacy and primacy that they are almost
always afforded. Posing the question this way denaturalizes conventional political
thought by treating the prevailing national presumption as worthy of interrogation in its
own right. In practical terms, it shifts the burden of justification to those who assume
without question that the national should continue to dominate our conceptions of
collective public life." (footnote omitted)).
Mijente is not alone in prefiguring deportation abolition in its work. Detention Watch
Network and its member organizations help lead campaigns in line with an abolitionist
politic, including Free Them All (demanding the immediate release of all people in
immigration custody), Communities Not Cages (demanding that all detention centers
be shut down), and Defund Hate (demanding divestment from the immigration
enforcement agencies and investment in "education, housing, green infrastructure and
health care programs that create thriving communities."). See e.g., FreeThemAll, DET.
WATCH
NETWORK,
https://
www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/freethemall
[https://perma.cc/E7RX-KDZ5]
(last visited
Jan. 1,
2022); #FirstTen to
#CommunitiesNotCages,
DET.
WATCH
NETWORK,
https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/take-action/communitiesnotcages
[https://perma.cc/YFZ3-MFDJ] (last visited Jan. 1, 2022); #DefundHate, DET. WATCH
NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/defundhate [https:// perma.cc/59XK8RBL] (last visited Jan. 1, 2022). The Immigrant Justice Network helps lead the New Way
Forward Campaign, which calls "for dismantling the systems that criminalize and
incarcerate immigrants." See New Way Forward for Immigrant Justice, IMMIGRANT JUST.
NETWORK, http://immigrantjusticenetwork.org/%newwayforward [https://perma.cc/8Z586GNW]. Puente Arizona has led the more than decade-long fight against police-Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) collaborations in that state, calling both for the abolition of
ICE and of the "police systems that profile and separate our communities." See Chinga La
Polimigra Campaign, PUENTE MOVEMENT, https://puenteaz.org/chingapolimigra [https://
perma.cc/V6KG-TLWC] (last visited Jan. 1, 2022).
MIJENTE, FREE

OUR

FUTURE: AN IMMIGRATION POLICY PLATFORM FOR BEYOND THE

TRUMP ERA (2018), https://mijente.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Mijente-ImmigrationPolicy-Platform_0628.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JR3-T399]. Prefiguring some of the
arguments made in this Article, I served as the primary drafter of this document.
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Obama administration. 21 Mijente's policy platform arose from its efforts in
summer 2018 to flesh out the emerging demand to "Abolish ICE"-and to
respond to the critique that the demand is vague and unrealistic-with policy
proposals. 22 The policy platform focuses on the agencies that carry out
immigration enforcement, with calls to defund and ultimately dismantle ICE, 23 to
defund the Border Patrol,24 to end all forms ofimmigration detention,25 and to end
the export of U.S.-style immigration policing to other countries. 26 The document
also addresses the Department of Justice's (DOJ) contributions to deportation,
with calls to repeal the laws criminalizing border crossing,2" to end "Operation
Streamline" (the federal strategy of mass criminal hearings for border crossers), 2
and to end all criminal prosecutions of migrants. 29 Finally, the document calls for
a ban on the use of the military for immigration control purposes, 30 for an end to
all immigration enforcement contracts between private companies and
governmental agencies, 31 and for the enactment of noncooperation policies at the
state and local level that eliminate any enforcement support to federal immigration
agencies.32
The platform brings together diverse sites of implementation of the
deportation machinery, while reorienting allegiance away from an unquestioning
attachment to the abstraction of the rule of law and toward the populations such
abstraction preserves as deportable 3 3 These interventions redirect advocacy

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Tania Unzueta, Maru Mora Villalpando & Angelica Chizaro, We Fell in Love in a
Hopeless Place: A Grassroots History From #NotlMore to Abolish ICE, MEDIUM
(June 29, 2018), https://medium.com/@LaTania/we-fell-in-love-in-a-hopeless-placea-grassroots-history-from-notlmore-to-abolish-ice-23089cf21711
[https://
perma.cc/T487-YMEL].
See MIJENTE, supra note 20, at 1.
Id. at 2, 8.
Id. at 5, 8.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 3, 9-10. For an overview on the call to decriminalize border crossings, see, generally,
Ingrid Eagly, The Movement to DecriminalizeBorder Crossings, 61 B.C. L. REv. 1967 (2020).
Id. at 3,11-12.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
This realignment toward people impacted by deportability and away from the rule of law
builds on the work of others across disparate fields of legal scholarship. See, e.g., DEAN
SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE

LIMITS OF LAw 224 (2011) (positing that relief for the violence facing the most vulnerable
transgender people will come from mass mobilization "led by those living on the sharpest
intersecting edges of multiple systems of control" and avoiding compromises that leave
the most vulnerable behind); Sameer M. Ashar, Deep Critiqueand DemocraticLawyering
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efforts toward those defined by their deportability, a population whose magnitude
is far greater than commonly assumed. The platform models an allegiance toward
those already living on U.S. territory (from recent arrivals to longtime lawful
permanent residents), those on their way (including those apprehended by
Mexican security forces and other U.S.-funded and trained border forces before
ever entering the United States), and those yet to come (including those whose
displacement has not yet occurred). The form of moral and ethical allegiance that
characterizes deportation abolition refuses arbitrary geographic and temporal
restrictions that the common sense of deportation both takes for granted and
reproduces. The Mijente policy platform is unabashed in its willingness to
envision the actual steps necessary to dismantle deportation, and creates a
pragmatic path toward the end of deportation.
By deportation abolition, I mean ending the practice of expulsions on the
basis of national origin. By extension, abolishing deportation would mean
abolishing deportability-the susceptibility to deportation that generates various
forms of migrant precarity, even if a person is never expelled."
Diagnosing the roadblocks to imagining an end to deportation is a necessary
precursor to deportation's downfall. This Article thus seeks to flesh out the
theoretical framework of deportation abolition necessary to support policy
demands that prefigure an end to the practice of expulsions on the basis of
national origin. Deportation abolition undoubtedly has implications for
broader debates, and as the first law review article exclusively devoted to this
subject, this will by necessity be an incompletely theorized argument.35 This is, in

34.

35.

in ClinicalPractice, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 201, 218 (2016) (arguing that legal educators are
required "to develop in ourselves and in our students the capacity of deep critique, of
thinking beneath and beyond liberal legalist approaches to social problems" and that such
work can only happen "through collaborative work with people, communities, and
thinkers at the margins of our social structure"); Akbar, Toward a Radical Imaginationof
Law, supra note 17, at 407-08 (focusing on the contribution of the Movement for Black
Lives platform, grounded in the experience of Black people impacted by police violence,
and observing that "the larger movement configuration in which the chapter-based Black
Lives Matter network functions . . . was having a far richer and more imaginative
conversation about law reform than lawyers and law faculty"); McLeod, supra note 17, at
1219 (describing a preventive justice framework focused not on addressing challenges to
rule of law values, but rather "prevention of interpersonal harm, along with other social
problems, that might operate without enlisting criminal law enforcement").
Nicholas De Genova & Ananya Roy, Practices of Illegalisation,52 ANTIPODE 352, 355 (2020)
("Deportability is inseparable from the disposability of migrant lives. There is the constant
threat of removal, of being coercively forced out and physically removed from the space of
the nation-state. This is an expulsion from life and living itself.").
Ayelet Shachar, The Multiple Sites of Justice: A Reply, in THE SHIFTING BORDER: LEGAL
CARTOGRAPHIES OF MIGRATION AND MOBILITY: AYELET SHACHAR IN DIALOGUE 215, 258

(Ayelet Shachar ed., 2020) ("'Incompletely theorized arguments,' to draw on Cass
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fact, the point. Positing the end of deportation as a desirable goal forces many
urgent questions, among them the question of the ideal function of national
borders in the twenty-first century. 36 While providing a definitive answer to this
question is beyond the scope of this Article, injecting deportation abolition more
explicitly into the conversation necessarily opens up space for new answers, and
especially for questions we have yet to imagine could be asked. For example, when
deportation is no longer taken for granted, a debate on whether the nation-state
survives an encounter with limits to its exclusion and expulsion powers becomes
possible.37
In order to open the door to the end of deportation, this Article proceeds in
four parts. Part I describes the need for a deportation abolition framework and
politics by describing the ways that deportability, as much if not more than the
possibility of inclusion, has become the central paradigm for the modern
immigrant experience in the United States. Part 0 examines deportation itself,
arguing that violence is at the heart ofthe practice. Moving past debates of whether
deportation constitutes punishment, this Part catalogues the forms of violence
inherent to the project, from the violence of the deportation process, to the
violence of the moment of deportation itself, to the violence that defines the life of
the deported.38 The cataloguing of violence supports the conclusion that violence
is not incidental to deportation, but rather that deportation is violence.
Confronting deportation as inseparable from violence interrogates our common
sense that deportation serves legitimate moral and political ends. When violence
is understood to be deportation's ultimate purpose, it focuses scholarship and
advocacy on ending it, not merely mitigating it.
Questioning deportation's inevitability involves tackling the goals most
commonly associated with the process of deportation. The belief that deportation
is needed to maintain social control over noncitizen populations admitted to the

36.

Sunstein's terminology, are vital for producing results and motivating action under
conditions where we lack full information or have not yet fully theorized all aspects of the
studied phenomenon." (footnote omitted)).
For a book-length treatment on the function ofborders across political, social, cultural, and
economic systems in the twenty-first century, with an analysis aligned with deportation
abolition, see HARSHA WALIA, BORDER & RULE, GLOBAL MIGRATION, CAPITALISM, AND THE
RISE OF RACIST NATIONALISM (2021).

37.

These debates are already happening in various disciplines. See, e.g., Sarah Fine, Monsters, Inc.:
The Fightback, in THE SHIFTING BORDER: LEGAL CARTOGRAPHIES OF MIGRATION AND
MOBILITY: AYELET SHACHAR IN DIALOGUE, supra note 35, at 99, 117 ("Here, then, is another

38.

seditious doctrine: we do not have to believe in the state's right to exclude. And to follow it
up with one more: without the right to exclude, the whole edifice would not collapse, just as
it has not collapsed in the absence of a belief in the state's sovereign right to prevent its own
citizens from leaving and returning.").
See discussion infra Part II.
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country, and that safety for the United States depends on the ability to deport those
who are dangerous to the wellbeing of the nation, constitutes part of the common
sense ofdeportation.39 Additionally, the beliefthat deportation is required in order
to retain control over the United States's territorial borders, and by extension, to
maintain sovereignty, underlies the common sense of deportation.40 These two
beliefs are frequently framed as the two primary goals of deportation: extended
border control and post-entry social control.41 As such, Part III addresses them,
arguing that neither sovereignty nor safety justify continuing the project of
deportation.
In dismantling the logic of safety as requiring deportation, Subpart III.A
questions the stability of "crime" as a category for the distribution of deportation.42
Along these lines, Subpart III.A suggests reorienting anti-deportation advocacy to
refuse the disposability of people who have had contact with the criminal justice
system, a proposition that has implications for challenging forms of banishment
beyond deportation.43 In addressing sovereignty, Subpart III.B challenges the
authority of the state-centered framework" that justifies deportation, drawing
attention to arguments being developed in Indigenous studies,45 as well as in
international law scholarship 46 that defy the coherence and stability of U.S.
constructions and interpretations of territorial sovereignty.
Part IV pushes back on the notion that deportation abolition constitutes an
unattainable utopia, arguing that the severity of deportation's violence requires a
practical exploration of its end, an exploration that has already begun with local
39.
40.

See discussion infra Subpart III.A.
See discussion infra Subpart III.B.

41.

DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:

42.
43.

44.

45.
46.

OUTSIDERS

IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5 (2007)

("For an appreciation of the complexity of the deportation system, it is useful to note that
there are two basic types of deportation laws: extended border control and post-entry social
control." (emphasis omitted)).
See discussion infra Subpart III.A.
Cf Jennifer M. Chacon, ProducingLiminal Legality, 92 DENy. U. L. REv. 709, 750 (2015)
("State and local actors throughout the United States have demonstrated a creative ability to
pair criminal justice system mechanisms with novel civil law tools to regulate and limit the
movement of their residents in ways that actually mimic deportation."). Kelly LytleHerndndez, Amnesty or Abolition? Felons, Illegals, and the Case for a New Abolition
Movement, BOOM: J. CAL., Winter 2011, at 54, 66 ("Today it is the criminal justice system
that renders the substance of citizenship, itself, unpredictable. In other words, a path to
citizenship for undocumented immigrants in an era of mass incarceration may not be as
valuable as it seems if pursued without a challenge to the inequities of mass
incarceration .... ").
See Bosniak, supra note 18, at 507 ("[B]oth the pervasiveness and the authority of the
state-centered framework in which we live radically limit our capacity to conceive of
concrete alternative arrangements.").
See infra notes 271-329 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 296-305 and accompanying text.
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experiments to challenge deportability.47 Part IV identifies ongoing struggles that
prefigure the end of deportation, focusing on an effort in Chicago to delete a gang
database that marks hundreds of thousands as potential targets for criminalization
and deportation. 48 It contrasts this effort with a commonly suggested reform to
address deportation's harms, the injection of proportionality review into
deportation adjudication.
Theorizing the end of deportation is not a comfortable project, as it flies in
the face of established norms and deeply rooted logics. But the current paradigm
of endless deportation commits us, at best, to facial improvements in a long term
project of managing the migration of the racialized poor through banishment.
Another horizon is possible, and this Article invites scholarship and advocacy that
move in a new direction, one which reorganizes responses to deportation toward
the goal of its downfall.

I.
A.

IMMIGRATION LAW IS DEPORTATION LAW

The Possibility of Exclusion Defines Immigration Law

Traditionally, immigration law as a subject of legal inquiry has been
understood as the study of the acquisition of membership and its corresponding
rights and privileges. One common approach is presented by a leading
immigration casebook, which embraces two related heuristics to describe
immigration law's relationship to membership. 49 The first models membership as
a series of concentric circles, with U.S. citizens in the innermost ring and categories
of noncitizens filling out the outer rings; it situates noncitizens seeking entry at the
farthest ring, followed by unauthorized migrants already in the United States,
various categories of temporary visa holders, and lawful permanent residents in
the circle closest to U.S. citizens.50 Membership rights are distributed according to
a person's assigned category.
The second model theorizes membership as existing along a chronological,
procedural continuum, with immigrants outside the United States seeking visas at
one end of the spectrum, and those who have achieved U.S. citizenship through
the process of naturalization at the other end of the line, with stops involving

47.

48.
49.

50.

See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1239 ("Abolition as an ethical and institutional
framework-as an aspirational horizon for reform-is not unduly or merely utopian, but
orients critical thought and reformist efforts toward meaningful and just legal, ethical,
and institutional transformation to which we might commit ourselves.").
See infra notes 358-365 and accompanying text.
ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN, MOTOMURA, FULLERTON & STUMPF, supranote 10, at 49.
Id.
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nonimmigrant visas and lawful permanent residence along the way.
Each of
these stops is thought to correspond with a further accumulation of the privileges
of membership."
These models have a common endpoint in mind: U.S. citizenship."
Questions of membership arise among those who question in which circle, or
along which point in the linear model, certain rights and privileges associated
with membership should attach to noncitizens. The daily practice of immigration
law consists of moving people from one point on the linear model to the nextfrom having no visa to having a visa granted at a U.S. consulate abroad, or from
having a nonimmigrant visa to having lawful permanent residence, or from
having lawful permanent residence to becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. For
those concerned with laws about immigrants (rather than laws about
immigration), the question that arises is which group of immigrants should
receive the rights and privileges associated with membership-for example, stateissued driver's licenses, access to public education, or access to state-funded food,
housing, and medical benefits."
In line with these two models, the construction of the United States as a
nation of immigrants tends to focus on those who have successfully achieved U.S.
citizenship.5 5 But the flipside of membership that culminates in U.S. citizenship,
at least in the immigration sphere, has always been deportation. Models of
membership take for granted that there is an edge to membership, beyond which
lie the excluded and the deported. The practice of immigration law has thus also
been the practice of sorting noncitizens between those who can be properly kept in

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.

See id.
See, e.g., NAT'L IMMIGR.

L. CTR., INCLUSIVE POLICIES ADVANCE DRAMATICALLY IN THE STATES

(2013),
https://www.nilc.org/news/special-reports/inclusive-policies-advance-2013
[https://perma.cc/DKC8-5U2K].
55.

See,

e.g.,

THE NAT'L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG'G, & MED., THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

INTO AMERICAN SOCIETY 1 (Mary C. Waters & Marisa Gerstein Pineau eds., 2015) ("The
United States prides itself on being a nation of immigrants, and the nation has a long
history of successfully absorbing people from across the globe."); Immigrant
Contributions, Sacrifices Underscore That U.S. Is a 'Nation of Immigrants', NAT'L
IMMIGR. F. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://immigrationforum.org/article/immigrant-contributionssacrifices-underscore-u-s-nation-immigrants [https://perma.cc/YWE5-ALEJ] ("Embracing
our identity as a nation of immigrants is a fundamental part of what makes America great."
(quoting Ali Noorani, Executive Director of the National Immigration Forum)); Mary
Giovagnoli, Removal of 'Nation of Immigrants' From USCIS Mission Ignores Agency's
Mandate and American
History,
IMMIGR.
IMPACT
(Feb.
26,
2018),
http://immigrationimpac.com/2018/02/26/removal-nation-immigrants-uscis-mission
[https://perma.cc/EK5H-EZUP] ("USCIS is, at its heart, in the business of creating new
Americans, and if it forgets that, then it forgets a critical part of its mission.").
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an outer circle, far from U.S. citizenship, and those who can be included in the
inner circles. Immigration lawyers are thus concerned not just with moving
someone along from a less secure status to a more secure one, but with defending
those who face being removed from the possibility of U.S. citizenship altogether.
The sheer realities facing immigrants in recent decades, with historic
numbers of deportations, and a seemingly permanent population of
undocumented people numbering in the millions, lead to a notion of the United
States not as a nation of immigrants, but as a "deportation nation," 6 or perhaps

more precisely, as a nation ofdeportables." A model that more accurately captures
the experience of noncitizens in the United States in the twenty-first century might
replace the concentric circles model of membership with one in which there are
two side-by-side circles-one consisting solely of those who are U.S. citizens since
birth, and one circle that holds everyone else, including naturalized U.S. citizens,
those with no status, those headed to the United States, and those with lawful
permanent residence. 58 This conception makes clear that for everyone but those
born a U.S. citizen, the possibility of exclusion and deportation defines their
relationship to the United States as much as, if not more than, the possibility of
membership. 59 Likewise, the linear/procedural model might be amended under
this conception to show all the different locations where movement along the
continuum from less status to more status can also result in a very different result:
deportation.
This inversion of the usual inclusion model to one focused on exclusion is
more than just a descriptive tool; it is borne out by the history of immigration
enforcement in the U.S., by the actions of the Trump administration, which
brought to bear increasing deportation infrastructure developed since the 1990s,
and by the Biden administration's continuation of the Trump agenda, particularly

56.
57.

58.

KANSTROOM, supra note 41.
See Miriam Jordan, Is America a 'Nation of Immigrants'? Immigration Agency Says No,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/us/uscis-nation-ofimmigrants.html [https://perma.cc/84MQ-G53R].
Indigenous scholar and historian Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz problematizes the notion of a
"nation of immigrants" altogether, arguing that "[t]he nation of immigrants myth erases
the fact that the United States was founded as a settler state from its inception and spent
the next hundreds years at war against the Native Nations in conquering the continent."
ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIz, NOT "A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS": SETTLER COLONIALISM,
WHITE SUPREMACY, AND A HISTORY OF ERASURE AND EXCLUSION xxii (2021).

59.

In pointing to the possibilities of buying one's way into membership in the United States
(and other migrant-receiving nations) through visas that cater to the wealthy, Ayelet
Shachar introduces an important exception to this rule. Ayelet Shachar, Beyond Open
and Closed Borders: The Grand Transformation of Citizenship, 11 JURIS. 1, 6 (2020)
(" [W]ealthy migrants wishing to deposit their capital in these very same countries find
fewer and fewer restrictions to fast-tracked admission.").
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in regard to border expulsions. 60 The call for deportation abolition is a call to
disrupt this enduring pattern.
In The DeportationMachine, scholar Adam Goodman presents the case for
U.S. history as one of expulsions, with deportation in its various forms "a central
feature of American politics and life since before 1900, and particularlyin the postWorld War II era."61 Based on extensive archival research, he estimates that nearly
57 million people have been deported from the United States since 1882,
problematizing the notion of the United States as "a nation of immigrants" given
that the United States deported a greater number of people in the twentieth
century than it welcomed permanently. 2 Goodman estimates that over 90 percent
of deportations in the United States have been via voluntary departure, a
euphemistically-named administrative process that parallels the criminal system's
reliance on plea bargains, 63 and which typically occurs after an immigration
enforcement agent encounters an individual, coerces them into agreeing to leave,
and then physically removes them or confirms their imminent departure.64
While voluntary departures have dominated the United States's history of
expulsions, in recent decades they have been far outstripped by formal
deportations (or removals). The number of formal deportations rose from
23,000 in 1986 to a record 433,000 in 2013, even as voluntary departures
drastically decreased (from 1.58 million in 1986 to under 179,000 in 2013).65
Even as the practice of voluntary departure as a practice of expulsion decreased,
the consequences of formal deportations have become more dire, with
60.

Carly Goodman,Angry That ICE Is RippingFamiliesApart? Don'tJust Blame Trump. Blame
11,
2018),
Too,
WASH.
POST
(June
Clinton,
Bush
and
Obama,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/06/ 11/angry-that-ice-

is-ripping-families-apart-dont-just-blame-trump-blame-clinton-bush-and-obama-too
[https://perma.cc/CL3B-CFMN].
61.

62.

63.

ADAM GOODMAN, THE DEPORTATION MACHINE: AMERICA'S LONG HISTORY OF EXPELLING
IMMIGRANTS 6 (2020).
GOODMAN, supra note 61, at 1. See also TORRIE HESTER, DEPORTATION: THE ORIGINS OF U.S.

POLICY 181 (2017) (estimating that "[b]etween 1966 and 2011, the federal government
voluntarily removed or, under the nomenclature of today, 'returned,' over forty-one million
people. For more than four decades, the United States had consistently deported close to
one million people per year").
In the criminal system, researchers estimate that 90 percent of cases are resolved
through plea bargains, an "informal and unregulated process by which prosecutors and
defense counsel negotiate charging and sentencing concessions in exchange for guilty
pleas and waivers of constitutionally guaranteed trial rights." RAM SUBRAMANIAN,
LEON DIGARD, MELVIN WASHINGTON II & STEPHANIE SORAGE, IN THE SHADOWS: A
REVIEW

64.
65.

OF

THE

RESEARCH

ON

PLEA

BARGAINING

1

https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/in-the-shadows-plea-bargaining.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LQX-H789].
GOODMAN, supra note 61, at 1-4.
Id. at 167.

(2020),
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incarceration in the form of immigration detention becoming a central part of
the process of expulsion for many. Scholars have traced the origin of the
modern deportation regime to 1988, with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act and the creation of the "aggravated felony" category, which subjects
noncitizens to almost-assured deportation if they are convicted of a broad
category of offenses.66 Two 1996 laws, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), cemented the targeting of so-called
"criminal aliens,"67 expanding the category of aggravated felony to encompass
many more offenses. This had the effect of rendering immigrants with minor
convictions related to stop-and-frisk policing practices and the War on Drugs
subject to detention and deportation, in part by making detention retroactively
mandatory for persons with certain convictions.6 8 These laws drastically inflated the
deportation machinery: the creation ofmandatory detention laid the groundwork
for the dramatic expansion of the immigration detention system, while the
removal ofdiscretion from immigration judges, the foreclosure of access to federal
courts, and the creation of deportation procedures that bypassed the immigration
courts laid the groundwork for the increased numbers of formal removals. 69
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, a
response to the events of September 11, 2001, reorganized the deportation
function under a new agency, one which received vast influxes of funding, in part
by merging national security and domestic immigration policy.70 The merger of

66.
67.

68.

69.

70.

KANSTROOM,supra note 41, at 227-29.
Throughout this Article, I use the term "criminal alien" to refer to the population ofnoncitizens
whose contact with the criminal justice system renders them a priority for deportation. As with
my previous work, this Article seeks to problematize the unquestioning use of the concept of
the "criminal alien", and the use of quotes contributes to that goal. See Angelica Chazaro,
Challengingthe "CriminalAlien" Paradigm,63 UCLA L. REv. 594 (2016).
WALIA, supra note 36, at 52. Since the passage of the 1996 laws, immigrant communities
impacted by the laws have organized in resistance, with "Fix 96" a consistent rallying cry. See,
e.g., ACLU Joins "Fix '96" Campaignfor Justicefor Immigrants, ACLU (July 28, 1999),
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-joins-fix-96-campaign-justiceimmigrants?redirect=immigrants-rights/aclu-joins-fix-96-campaign-justice-immigrants
[https://perma.cc/JV8J-PGKK]; Fix '96: End the Mass Criminalization of Immigrants,
IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/fix-96end-mass-criminalization-immigrants [https://perma.cc/FC8E-N4EY].
See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact of the 1996 DeportationLaws and
the Limited Scope of ProposedReforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936, 1936-38 (2000) (discussing
impact of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)); see also Koh, supra note 13, at 19699 (describing effect of the 1996 laws on expedited removal).
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 441-462, 116 Stat. 2135, 2192
(2002).
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immigration and security led to the federal government empowering local law
enforcement to act as immigration agents through expanded use of 287(g)
agreements (wherein DHS deputized non-federal police officers), and to the
creation of the "Secure Communities" program." Secure Communities, created
under Bush and vastly expanded during the Obama years, fully merged
immigration databases with criminal legal system databases.72 This combination
of factors contributed to the rise of formal removals, which reached a peak under
President Obama (he was subsequently dubbed "the deporter-in-chief' by
activists seeking to bring attention to the high rates of arrests and deportations).73
The 1996 laws found their full expression during the Obama years, bolstered by the
unprecedented funding that led immigration enforcement budgets to outpace the
budgets of all other federal enforcement agencies combined.74 By 2015, the
immigration enforcement machinery was a well-honed tool of mass expulsion,
and it was this "turbocharged" tool which was handed to the Trump
administration.75
President Trump ran his 2015 campaign on explicit anti-immigrant
rhetoric, 76 and returned to this rhetoric repeatedly during the 2018 midterm

71.

WALIA, supra note 36, at 58 (2021); see also Huyen Pham, 287(g) Agreements in the Trump
Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1253, 1257-73 (2018) (explaining 287(g) agreements and use
under Bush and Obama administrations).

72.

See NAT'L IMMIGR. L. CTR., UNTANGLING THE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WEB 4-5 (2017),

73.

https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Untangling-Immigration-EnforcementWeb-2017-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHE6-LC22].
RANDY CAPPS, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, JULIA GELATT, JESSICA BOLTER & ARIEL G. Ruiz SOTO,
REVVING UP THE DEPORTATION MACHINERY:

74.

75.

76.

ENFORCEMENT AND PUSHBACK UNDER

TRUMP 14 (2018) (noting that "[p]eak removals from the U.S. interior occurred during
FY 2009-11 (exceeding 200,000 annually), while ICE arrests peaked at more than
300,000 each year during FY 2010-11."). See FY2015 ICE ImmigrationRemovals, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T (Jan. 7, 2021), www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2015
[https://perma.cc/9WSC-4VJ7].
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE COST OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER SECURITY
2
(2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
the_cost_ofimmigration-enforcement andborder_security.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8XXB6RD] (noting that since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
2003 the agency's budget has nearly tripled, from $3.3 billion to $8.3 billion).
Marisa Franco & Carlos Garcia, The DeportationMachine Obama Builtfor President Trump,
NATION (June 27, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-deportationmachine-obama-built-for-president-trump [https://perma.cc/GBC2-QMTV].
Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donaldtrump-announces-a-presidential-bid [https://perma.cc/F5XR-V84C] ("When Mexico
sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not
sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing
those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists.
And some, I assume, are good people.").
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elections." The rhetoric was matched with action from Trump's very first days in
office, with attempts to implement changes at every level of the immigration
bureaucracy rolled out at a relentless pace, as discussed below.78
Pro-immigrant advocates met many of the changes with swift action, with
the courts becoming a bulwark against some of the more blatantly
unconstitutional attempts. 79 In part as a result of the legal pushback, a large
proportion of the forty-three million foreign-born people in the United States did
not technically have their ability to stay in the country legally compromised by the
changes. But the changes nonetheless heightened their precarity, rendering clear
that the relationship between foreign-born people in the United States and the
country in which they reside is defined as one between an always potentially
deportable subject and DHS-the most highly armed and resourced federal law
enforcement agency in recent U.S. history.80
While a global review of Trump's immigration policies is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is useful to briefly discuss how Trump-era deportation policies
further revealed deportation (rather than potential membership) as the central
organizing premise ofimmigration law.81 Three practices exemplify this trend: the

77.

78.
79.

80.

John Fritze & David Jackson, Donald Trump Hammers on Immigration, Caravan in
Final Rallies Before Midterm Election, USA TODAY (Nov. 3, 2018, 10:30 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11 /03/midterm-elections2018-donald-trump-hammers-immigration-message/1881561002 [https:// perma.cc/4B3CQR7P]; Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, As Midterm Vote Nears, Trump Reprises
a Favorite Message: Fear Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/1 1/01/us/politics/trump-immigration.htm
[https://perma.cc/6GFK-EWAN].
See Jennifer M. Chacon, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 25467(2017).
Ana Campoy, Pro-immigrantAmericans Are Beating Trump Back With a Flood of Lawsuits,
QUARTZ (July 28, 2018), https://qz.com/1330683/aclu-and-other-organizations-are-shapingdonald-trumps-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/5EQV-KRUT]; e.g., Ms. L. v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enft, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018); Darweesh v. Trump, No.
17 Civ. 480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
Marisa Franco & Paromita Shah, Opinion, The Departmentof Homeland Security: The
Largest Police Force Nobody Monitors, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2015, 6:15 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/ 19/the-department-ofhomeland-security-the-largest-police-force-nobody-monitors
[https://perma.cc/W8QCA77L]; see AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 74; see DORIS MEISSNER, DONALD M. KERWIN,
MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & CLAIRE BERGERON, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 2-3 (2013).

81.

For one review of immigration-related executive actions during the Trump era (which
numbered in the hundreds) through the summer of 2020, see SARAH PIERCE & JESSICA
BOLTER, DISMANTLING AND RECONSTRUCTING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A
PRESIDENCY
(2020),
https://
UNDER
THE
TRUMP
CATALOG
OF
CHANGES

www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-immigration-system-changes-trump-presidency
[https://perma.cc/53CJ-PNPG].
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creation of a denaturalization office staffed by dozens of attorneys charged with
stripping U.S. citizenship from foreign-born U.S. citizens;8 2 the placement of
people who apply for lawful status into removal proceedings;83 and the refusal to
exempt any noncitizens in the United States from potential deportation.8 4
1.

Ramp to Deportation: Denaturalization of U.S. Citizens

Ground level immigration officers proved themselves ready to implement a
deportation-first agenda even before Trump took office. The unions that
represent Border Patrol and ICE employees took the unprecedented step of
endorsing the presidential candidacy of Trump,85 and on-the-ground reports
noted an increase in repressive immigration enforcement activity immediately
following Trump's election.8 6 The synergy between the Trump administration's
deportation policies and the willingness ofthe immigration workforce to carry out
the policies rendered them particularly effective in increasing deportability.
While the Trump era has ended, DHS's workforce remains essentially
unchanged, with only political appointees shifting while frontline agents
committed to a deportation-first mission remain in place. 87
The 2002 reorganization of the Immigration and Naturalization Service into
DHS officially divided the benefits-granting branches of the immigration
bureaucracy from those focused on enforcement.8 8 The benefits-granting
functions were reorganized under U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

87.

88.

See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
National Border Patrol Council Endorses Donald Trump for President,NAT'L BORDER
PATROL COUNCIL (Mar. 30, 2016), https://bpunion.org/press-releases/national-borderpatrol-council-endorses-donald-trump-for-president [https://perma.cc/ X3ZV-SQ9T];
ICE
Union Endorses
Trump,
POLITICO
(Sept.
26,
2016,
8:12
AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/immigration-customs-enforcement-unionendorses-trump-228664 [https://perma.cc/EV59-GPWR].
Franklin Foer, How Trump Radicalized ICE, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772
[https://
perma.cc/M834-Z2E9] ("When Trump prevailed in the election, the soon-to-be-named
head of ICE triumphantly declared that it would finally have the backing of a president who
would let the agency do its job. He's 'taking the handcuffs off,' said Thomas Homan, who
served as ICE's acting director under Trump until his retirement in June [2018] .... ").
See Jennifer Lee Koh, Executive Defiance and the Deportation State, 130 Yale L.J. 948
(2021); Robert Knowles & Geoffrey Heeren, Zealous Administration: The Deportation
Bureaucracy, 72 RUTGERS U. L. REv. 749,753-55 (2020); Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals?
Discretion, Sorting, and BureaucraticCulture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL.
REv. L. & SOC. JUST. 195,209-25 (2014).
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 441-462, 116 Stat. 2135,
2192 (2002).
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(USCIS), which processes applications for, among other things, lawful permanent
residence and naturalization. 89 The function of enforcing the immigration laws at
the border and in the interior was redistributed between Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and ICE, respectively. However, the division between these two
wings of the immigration bureaucracy (benefits-granting and enforcement) has
been porous since DHS's founding. For example, one common way long term
lawful permanent residents face deportation is by applying for naturalization
through USCIS, having some long-ago criminal infraction disqualify them
from citizenship, and then being referred by USCIS to ICE for deportation
processing. 90 But the Trump administration's actions further contributed to
the collapse of the wall between the functions of granting status to noncitizens
and deporting noncitizens.
Nowhere was this clearer than in the creation of a USCIS denaturalization
task force, focused on the revocation of U.S. citizenship. The denaturalization
office reviews people whose citizenship presumably exempts them from the harms
of deportability-naturalized U.S. citizens.91 While denaturalization is not new in

89.

90.

91.

For those residing abroad and seeking to enter the United States, the Department of State's
consular offices perform a similar function. See, e.g., Immigrant Visa Process, U.S. DEP'T
usSTATE: BUREAU CONSULAR AFFS., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
visas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-process.html
[https://perma.cc/A7JD-2CKN]
(last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
See Hassan Ahmad, A Quiet Change in US Policy Threatens Immigrants Who Apply for a
Change in Status, QUARTZ (July 20, 2018), https://qz.com/1323136/a-uscis-immigrationpolicy-change-threatens-non-citizens-with-deportation-if-they-lose-status
[https://perma.cc/658S-SPFX].
Amy Taxin, US Launches Bid to Find Citizenship Cheaters, AP NEWS (June 11, 2018),
https://apnews.com/1da389a535684a5f9d0da74081c242f3
[https://perma.cc/6N6Z-XQKV]
("Cissna said the cases would be referred to the Department of Justice, whose attorneys could
then seek to remove the immigrants' citizenship in civil court proceedings. In some cases,
government attorneys could bring criminal charges related to fraud ....
[Cissna]
declined to say how much the effort would cost but said it would be covered by the
agency's existing budget, which is funded by immigration application fees."); see also
Masha Gessen, In America, Naturalized Citizens No Longer Have an Assumption of
Permanence, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ourcolumnists/in-america-naturalized-citizens-no-longer-have-an-assumption-ofpermanence [https://perma.cc/W2ZN-GWG2] ("[T]he new task force doesn't reflect a
change in the law . . .. [I]t builds on the legacy of the Obama Administration, which set in
motion the process of reexamining old naturalization files."); Patricia Mazzei,
Congratulations, You Are Now a U.S. Citizen. Unless Someone Decides Later You're Not,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/us/denaturalize-citizenimmigration.html [https://perma.cc/23KD-MRJ7] ("The number of denaturalization
cases... has also gone up: They averaged 11 a year from 1990 to 2017 and rose to
approximately 15 in 2016 and about 25 in 2017, according to the Justice Department.
About 20 cases have been filed so far this year .... "); Brittny Mejia, Under Trump, the
Rare Act of DenaturalizingU.S. Citizens on the Rise, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2018, 7:30 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-denaturalization-20180812-
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the practice ofU.S. immigration law, only 305 denaturalization cases were pursued
between 1990 and 2017, with the DOJ filing an average of eleven cases per year.92
In 2017 and 2018, USCIS identified about 2500 cases for possible
denaturalization and referred over one hundred cases to the DOJ for
prosecution. 93 By reviewing thousands of approved naturalization applications
for any perceived discrepancies that might trigger denaturalization (and
presumably, deportation), USCIS officially signaled the permanent deportability
of any foreign-born national, even those who have made it through the
gauntlet of naturalization.94
The fact that the citizenship application asks a noncitizen whether they have
ever violated any U.S. law (whether or not they were arrested) points to the
breadth of the denaturalization threat. 95 When a government official can make
a discretionary determination that any violation of any law at any point (even if
those laws are no longer in force) 96 could lead to denaturalization, the instability
of naturalized citizenship still constitutes a state of permanent deportability.
While the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Maslenjak v. United States97 limits
the potential impact of the denaturalization task force by holding that citizenship
cannot be revoked over minor misstatements, the government's assertion that
even a failure to disclose a speeding violation is enough to revoke citizenship years
later sends a chilling message, particularly for those who cannot afford to mount a
defense.9 8 ICE's 2018 budget request included three hundred extra agents who

92.

93.

94.

95.

story.html [https://perma.cc/7BK9-7UA5] ("A [USCIS] team in Los Angeles has been
reviewing more than 2,500 naturalization files for possible denaturalization, focusing on
identity fraud and willful misrepresentation. More than 100 cases have been referred to the
Department of Justice for possible action.").
Adiel Kaplan, Miami Grandma Targeted as U.S. Takes Aim at NaturalizedImmigrants With
Prior Offenses, MIA. HERALD (July 12, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/local/immigration/article214173489.html [https://perma.cc/ 3PAM-RVS2].
Frank Cissna, Remarks at Annual Immigration Policy Conference, C-SPAN, at 29:25
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?452248-3/frank-cissna-remarks-annualimmigration-policy-conference [https://perma.cc/U8RA-MNG7].
See Seth Freed Wessler, Is Denaturalizationthe Next Frontin the Trump Administration's
War
on Immigration?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/magazine/naturalized-citizenship-immigrationtrump.html [https://perma.cc/2LGP-VUNY].
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM N-400,
APPLICATION

96.
97.
98.

FOR

NATURALIZATION

14

(2019),

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/

default/files/document/forms/n-400.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UTA-SM8U].
See Gessen, supranote 91.
137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
Adam Liptak, U.S. Can'tRevoke Citizenship Over Minor Falsehoods,Supreme CourtRules,
N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/ us/politics/supremecourt-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/AS23-65Q5] ("A government lawyer, in
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would be tasked with, among other things, rooting out "citizenship fraud,"99 an
addition of resources that sought to further entangle USCIS and ICE in the joint
task of targeting foreign-born U.S. citizens. Whatever the outcome of
denaturalization processes, their existence is enough to strike fear into the hearts
of the approximately twenty-three million foreign-born U.S. citizens0. and serve
as a constant reminder of those individuals' proximity to deportability.
2.

Ramp to Deportation: Referrals to ICE of Applicants for Lawful Status

The expansion of deportability was also extended to those who believed that
they might qualify for a route to eventual citizenship under the existing limited
pathways. In June 2018, a policy memorandum entitled "Updated Guidance for
the Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices to Appear (NTAs) in Cases
Involving Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens" was sent to field office directors
who supervise the adjudication of the hundreds of thousands of applications for
lawful permanent residency and other benefits received by USCIS each year.10 1
The memo directed USCIS to vastly expand the cases in which they issued a
"Notice to Appear," the charging document that places a noncitizen in removal
proceedings. 10 2 This directive extended to categories of applications
previously exempt from such a requirement, including applicants for relief
under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994103 and applicants for relief
under the U visa (a form of relief for people who were victims of a crime and
suffered substantial harm).0 4

99.

100.

101.

102.
103.
104.

response to questioning, said that failing to disclose a speeding violation could be enough to
revoke citizenship even years later.").
Mejia, supra note 91 (reporting on ICE's efforts to "root out citizenship fraud");
Mazzei, supra note 91 (explaining that the additional three hundred ICE agents would
investigate "marriage, visa, residency and citizenship fraud").
Jeanne Batalova, Brittany Blizzard & Jessica Bolter, Frequently Requested Statistics on
Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20200217054005/https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/fre
quently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states
[https://perma.cc/2VPV-E6XT].
Policy Memorandum from the Off. of the Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immgr. Servs., PM602-0050.1, Updated Guidance for the Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices to
Appear (NTAs) in Cases Involving Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens (June 28, 2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM602-0050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/A692-DDA2] [hereinafter NTA Memo].
See id. at 3.
Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (repealed 2019).
See USCIS to Continue Implementing New Policy Memorandum on Notices to Appear,
2018),
https://
SERVS.
(Nov.
8,
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGR.
www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-continue-implementing-new-policy-memorandum-
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For those applying for lawful status-particularly those who have had no
previous contact with immigration authorities-the process has always been
fraught, precisely because USCIS was presumed connected to ICE and because
applications for status were a known pathway to deportation. 15 But with the
immigration agencies making clear that referral to deportation would be the likely
outcome of denied applications, deportability increasingly defined the experience
of even noncitizens who might have the requisite familial or employment
relationships or histories of victimization that could facilitate their pathway to
citizenship. For populations used to organizing their lives around avoiding
deportability, this move may have acted as a deterrent for beginning a legalization
process. This step lends credence to the claim that alienage (and its attending
deportability), not the possibility of legalization, defines the experience of
noncitizens in the United States. 10 6
The effect of the NTA memo was heightened by the issuance of a second
memo in July 2018-one which made clear that any mistake on an application for
an immigration benefit, however trivial, could lead to its denial. This second
memo rescinded Obama-era guidance, issued in 2013, that directed USCIS to
issue a Request for Evidence (RFE) or Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) in cases
when an applicant could cure the deficiency in the application for an immigration
benefit by providing further information. 10 7 The 2013 memo was issued the same
fiscal year ICE reached a record 438,421 deportations, 108 exemplifying Obama's
legacy. Even as the Obama administration attempted to facilitate pathways to
notices-appear [https://perma.cc/Q3WA-9TLG]; see also NTA Memo, supra note 101, at
9 n.20.
105. See Stuart Anderson, New USCIS Policy Will Carry Harsh Consequencesfor Applicants,
FORBES
(July
11,
2018,
12:15
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/
sites/stuartanderson/2018/07/11/new-uscis-policy-will-carry-harsh-consequences-forapplicants/#1f5508494615 [https://perma.cc/GB37-UCFP] ("In the past, USCIS has
generally referred matters of potentially removable foreign nationals to ICE to
determine whether removal proceedings should actually be initiated by issuing a Notice
to Appear.") (quoting Jennifer Minear, director of the immigration practice group at
McCandlish Holton).
106.

See LINDA BOSNIAK,

THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY

MEMBERSHIP 130 (2006) ("[L]egalization must necessarily be understood as an exception
to the norm, a deviation from the usual prerogative of closure.").
107. Policy Memorandum from the Off. of the Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., PM602-0163,
Issuance
of
Certain
RFEs
and
NOIDs
1-3
(2018),
http://web.archive.org/web/20180719202921/https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCI
S/Laws/Memoranda/AFM_10_Standards_for_RFEs_and_NOIDs_FINAL2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9VL-ZS23].
108. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants Reach
Record High in 2013, PEw RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/ facttank/2014/ 10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013
[https://perma.cc/Z98M-PLTL].
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membership to those who might be eligible (hence the opportunity to respond
to an RFE or a NOID before being denied an opportunity to obtain lawful status),
it simultaneously drastically increased immigration enforcement, building the
very infrastructure that the Trump administration subsequently used to great
effect.109
In contrast, the Trump administration had no interest in opening pathways
to membership to people born outside the United States, and these two memos
showed that impulse in action.1" By denying immigrants the chance to correct
even minor mistakes in applications, and then referring denied applicants to
removal proceedings, the Trump administrationmade clear that its priorities were
not adding potential new U.S. citizens to this country, but facilitating pathways to
removal for all the foreign-born people living in the United States.
Despite the rescission of these memos by the Biden administration, the
writing remains on the wall-deportability, as well as the executive branch's at-will
expansion of deportability-is a central feature of the U.S. approach to
immigration.1 " Biden's entry into office did nothing to erase the Notices to
Appear issued during the Trump era, and as a result 1.3 million people had
active deportation cases pending before the immigration courts by the start of

109. See ICE Apprehensions Half Levels of Five Years Ago, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 12, 2018),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/517
[https://perma.cc/HV36-5LSW]
(discussing high levels of arrests by ICE during the Obama administration.); see also
Kevin R. Johnson, Lessons About the Future of ImmigrationLaw From the Rise andFall
of DACA, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 343, 350 (2018) ("From the outset of the Obama
presidency, the administration sought to demonstrate a firm commitment to
immigration enforcement."); cf President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in
Address to the Nation on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/
remarkspresident-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/SRS5-Z3JQ] ("[W]e're going
to keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. Felons, not
families. Criminals, not children. Gang members, not a mom who's working hard to
provide for her kids. We'll prioritize, just like law enforcement does every day.").
110. In fact, the Trump administration has actively supported limiting the pathways to lawful
immigration status, as exemplified by its support of the RAISE Act, a bill that would
create "majorcuts to family immigration" according to analysts. Julia Gelatt, The RAISE
Act: DramaticChange to Family Immigration, Less So for the Employment-Based System,
MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Aug. 2017), https:// www.migrationpolicy.org/news/raise-actdramatic-change-family-immigration-less-so-employment-based-system
[https://perma.cc/465C-TKCV].
111. See Memorandum from David Pekoske, Acting Secy', U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Troy Miller, Senior Officer Performing the Duties of the Comm'r, U.S. Customs
Border
Prot.
et
al.
2,
5
(Jan.
20,
2021),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/21_0120_enforcement-memo_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 52H66A6B] (stating that "[t]he memoranda in the attached appendix are hereby rescinded and
superseded," and listing the two 2018 Notice to Appear memos).
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2021 (542,411 were pending when Trump took office). 1 2 Given the
tremendous backlog in the courts, this population exists in a limbo defined in
large part by their pending deportation proceedings, which may not be resolved
for many years.1 3
3.

Ramp to Deportation: Continuity Between the Trump and Biden Era

For those who are neither naturalized citizens nor potential applicants for
legalization, the Trump administration wasted no time in making clear that
deportability should define their lives-that they were deportable for any
reason or for no reason at all. As one of his first acts as President, Trump issued
a number of punitive executive orders on immigration enforcement. These
included a January 25, 2017 executive order1 4 and a corresponding February 2017
implementing memo 1 1 5 that expanded the categories of noncitizens considered a
priority for deportation and clarified that no noncitizen could be considered
immune from deportation efforts. In a change from the enforcement mandates of
the Obama administration, the order and memo made clear that the federal
government would no longer exempt "classes or categories of removable aliens
from potential enforcement." 116 The effect of this memo was an increase in
apprehensions, detentions, and attempts to deport noncitizens living inside the
United States," and an increase in the percentage of people with no previous law
enforcement contact (who were previously considered low priority) facing
deportation. 18 The 2017 order and implementing memo laid bare what many
112.

113.
114.
115.

116.
117.

118.

The State of the Immigration Courts: Trump Leaves Biden 1.3 Million Case Backlog in
Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR. (Jan.
19, 2021), https://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/637/#f1 [https://perma.cc/ZJB3-72XU] ("When President Donald
Trump assumed office, 542,411 people had deportation cases pending before the
Immigration Courts. At the start of 2021, that number now stands at 1,290,766-nearly
two and a half times the level when Trump assumed office just four years ago. Waiting in
the wings are another 300,000+ cases that President Trump's policy changes have decided
aren't finally resolved, but have not yet been placed back on the active docket.").
Id.
Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan,
Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-theImmigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CU2-JLZ9].
Id.at2.
Kristen Bialik, ICEArrests Went Up in 2017, With Biggest Increasesin Florida,Northern Texas,
Oklahoma, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/02/08/ice-arrests-went-up-in-2017-with-biggest-increases-in-floridanorthern-texas-oklahoma [https://perma.cc/H3DK-KKEF].
John Bowden, ICE Arrests of Immigrants With No Criminal Convictions Rises: Report,
HILL (May 18, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://thehill.com/latino/388280-ice-arrests-of-
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immigrants have always known-that they should shape their lives around the
possibility of deportation-even as it sharpened deportability by abandoning any
semblance of restraint around who is considered appropriately deportable.
It would be tempting to view the Trump era as somehow anomalous in
terms of its relationship to expanding deportability. However, such an
analysis would require viewing Trump's rhetoric and actions as somehow
divorced from the broader continuum of U.S. immigration policy and
enforcement. The Trump administration's many actions enhancing deportability
were a logical outcome of a decades-long buildup of agency budgets and personnel
focused on immigration enforcement, with authority to deport sanctioned by
bipartisan statutory reforms that far preceded the Trump administration's arrival
on the scene. The end of the Trump era has doubtlessly brought a sense of relief to
immigrant communities, but in the words of Mijente in January of 2021, a more
radical transformation is needed, given that "Joe Biden's current plan-a de facto
return to the Obama years-would mean more desperation, more deportations,
and more death."119
The continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations comes into
starkest relief when considering the use of Title 42-an obscure public health
statute dating to the 1940s. In the name of protecting the United States from
COVID-19, Title 42 has been used to carry out border deportations, or mass
expulsions, throughout 2020 (the end of Trump's administration) and into 2021
(the time of this writing).1 2 At the end of Biden's first hundred days in office, proimmigrant advocates estimated that his administration had overseen 300,000
deportations, the majority of them under Title 42.121 Section 265 of U.S. Code

immigrants-with-no-criminal-convictions-higher-year-over-year-report
[https://
perma.cc/MU4P-8ZAH].
119. Undoing Trump's Immigration Policies Won't Be Enough.
We Must Dismantle the
Immigration Caging and Deportation Machine., MIJENTE (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://mijente.net/2021/01/undoing-trumps-immigration-policies-wont-be-enough-wemust-dismantle-the-immigration-caging-and-deportation-machine
[https://
perma.cc/G4QZ-MQPR].

120. Molly O'Toole, Biden PromisedChange at the Border. He's Kept Trump's Title 42 Policy
to Close It and Cut Off Asylum, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2021, 5:12 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-03-19/a-year-of-title-42-both-trump-andbiden-have-kept-the-border-closed-and-cut-off-asylum-access
[https://perma.cc/ 7MTYLDV4].
121. See Jake Johnson, With 300,000 Deportedin First 100 Days, Rights Group Warns Biden
'Well on Track to Repeat' Obama Failures, COMMON DREAMS (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/04/27/300000-deported-first-100-daysrights-group-warns-biden-well-track-repeat-obama [https://perma.cc/ C56C-S7WA];
ICE and CBP Abuse Tracker, UNITED WE DREAM, https://unitedwedream.org/protectimmigrants-now/biden-stop-deportations-now
[https://perma.cc/CF5L-QJAQ]
(live
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Title 42 permits the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
to prohibit entry into the United States when the director believes that "there is
serious danger of the introduction of [a communicable] disease into the United
States."12 2 The law, as adopted in 1944, was written to apply to anyone arriving in
the United States-including U.S. citizens-and was never meant to distinguish
between noncitizens who could enter and those who could be expelled.1 23 Even
before the COVID-19 pandemic, Trump's immigration advisor, Stephen Miller
(who has documented white-nationalist sympathies), had pushed the president to
use public health laws to facilitate expulsion of migrants arriving at the Southern
border.12 4 The pandemic provided the opening to proceed with this expansion of
deportability, with the issuance of a March 30, 2020 emergency regulation to
implement Title 42 authorizing CBP officers to deport migrants arriving at the
U.S.-Mexico border.12 5 The result has been expulsions with virtually no process,
echoing the voluntary departures that characterized the beginning ofthe twentieth
century. A leaked memo ordering the implementation of Title 42 by CBP officers
states, "[t] o the maximum extent possible all processing will be done in the field,"
then goes on to state, "USBP [Border Patrol] will capture a subject's biographical
information and archive data appropriately." 126 This memo, which effectively

122.

123.
124.

125.

126.

tracking the number of confirmed deportations and expulsions under President Biden and
totaling that number at 484,962 as of May 20, 2021) (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
42 U.S.C. § 265 (2018).
Q&A: US Title 42 Policy to Expel Migrants at the Border, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 8,
2021, 4:15 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/08/qa-us-title-42-policy-expelmigrants-border [https://perma.cc/BMV4-RES5].
See Caitlin Dickerson & Michael D. Shear, Before Covid-19, Trump Aide Sought to Use
Disease
to
Close
Borders,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
3,
2020),
https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/us/coronavirus-immigration-stephen-miller-publichealth.html [https://perma.cc/SEG4-UPYX]; Katie Rogers & Jason DeParle, The White
Nationalist Websites Cited by Stephen Miller, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/us/politics/stephen-miller-white-nationalism
html
[https://perma.cc/K6BA-U2GC]; Michael Edison Hayden, Stephen Miller's Affinity for
White Nationalism Revealed in Leaked Emails, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/ 11/12/stephen-millers-affinity-whitenationalism-revealed-leaked-emails [https://perma.cc/B5C9-VK3A].
Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Suspension of Introduction of
Persons Into United States From Designated Foreign Countries or Places for Public
Health Purposes, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 71).
Memorandum from Dir., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention to U.S. Customs & Border
Prot. 1, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6824221-COVID-19-CAPIO.html
[https://perma.cc/B5R6-ZV73]; see also Dara Lind, Leaked Border Patrol Memo Tells Agents
to Send MigrantsBack Immediately-IgnoringAsylum Law, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 2, 2020,
6:30
PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/leaked-border-patrol-memo-tells-
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directs border agents to ignore well-established international law norms
allowing arriving migrants to request asylum, has contributed to mass
expulsions that the Biden administration has not seen fit to halt despite public
health experts urging an end to the practice on the basis that "[t]here is no public
health rationale for denying admission to individuals based on legal status.""'
4.

Ramp to Deportation: Expulsions Without Due Process

The continued use of Title 42 by the Biden administration (a virtually
procedure-free deportation) demonstrates that beyond laws and policies making
deportability the norm for noncitizens, the practices through which individuals
are deported themselves call for new paradigms. Pro-immigrant advocates have
not yet caught up to the reality that more courtroom process-whether in the form
of assigned counsel, of more competent counsel, or of adoption of mandatory
proportionality review-will not necessarily address the ways the majority of
deportations take place. Efforts to alleviate deportation centered on a more just
process make one big assumption-that people facing deportation will have access
to a moment when their case will be heard by a judge, and that that moment
will be one when an attorney is allowed to stand at their side to help them share
those arguments more powerfully. The problem is that in recent years the vast
majority of people who have faced deportation have had no corresponding legal

agents-to- send-migrants-back-immediately-ignoring-asylum-law
[https://perma.cc/6ZRB-8JZY].
127. Public Health Experts Urge U.S. Officials to Withdraw OrderEnablingMass Expulsion
of Asylum
Seekers,
COLUMB.
SCH.
PUB.
HEALTH
(May
18,
2020),
https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/public-health-now/news/public-healthexperts-urge-us-officials-withdraw-order-enabling-mass-expulsion-asylum-seekers
[https://perma.cc/8VRW-XYMV] (publishing a letter signed by over fifty public health
experts, sent to Alex Azar, the secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services, and Robert Redfield, MD, the director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention); see also Joanna Naples-Mitchell, There Is No Public Health Rationalefora
17,
2020),
Seekers, JUST SECURITY (Apr.
Categorical Ban on Asylum
https://www.justsecurity.org/69747/there-is-no-public-health-rationale-for-acategorical-ban-on-asylum-seekers [https://perma.cc/5TU8-XZDD]; Lucas Guttentag
Stefano M. Bertozzi, Opinion, Trump Is Using the Pandemic to FloutImmigration Laws,
N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/11/opinion/ trumpcoronavirus-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/5XZN-FJT4]; Yael Schacher & Chris
Beyrer, Expelling Asylum Seekers Is Not the Answer: U.S. Border Policy in the Time of
27,
2020),
https://
INT'L
(Apr.
COVID-19,
REFUGEES
www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/4/26/expelling-asylum-seekers-is-not-theanswer-us-border-policy-in-the-time-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/PZ27-3ZRX].
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procedure that would allow for such an opportunity. 12 Title 42 is no exception,
with Border Patrol officers rounding up recently arrived migrants encountered at
the U.S.-Mexico border, fingerprinting them "in the field," and driving them
across the border to Mexico, without a chance to ever see a judge or consult an
attorney.
Immigration scholar Jennifer Koh has compellingly laid out the case for
focusing on "shadow removals"-herterm for the forms of deportation that do not
require the person deported to ever step foot in a courtroom, and thus are
happening in the shadows of the immigration court. 129 Koh's review of data shows
that most deportations are happening in forms that Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia
refers to as "speed deportation" (expedited removals,"' administrative removals,
and reinstatement of removals), in proceedings when noncitizens are subject to
swift deportation, usually without access to an attorney, and with severe
restrictions on judicial review and few if any checks on due process placed on them
by federal courts."' Koh found "[e]xpedited removal (for noncitizens seeking
entry at the border) and reinstatement of previously executed removal orders,
which are implemented entirely by frontline immigration officers with no
immigration court oversight, accounted for between eighty-three to eighty-four
percent of all removals in fiscal years 2013 and 2014,"132 and the numbers went up
to 85 percent in 2015 and 2016.133
Koh's work reveals that the standard narrative of deportation as taking place
as part of a legal proceeding-a narrative which currently shapes much of the
advocacy, scholarship, and organizing around improving the outcomes for
immigrants facing deportations-misses out on the fact that "[i]mmigration
court adjudication has ... become the exception ratherthan the norm.""4 Koh's
work describes the deportation landscape based on what is actually happening to
people who face removal rather than focusing on the problem of deportation
through the lens of what parts of the process are most amenable to intervention by
lawyers. Her assessment calls for a response that rises to the challenges she

128. In 2015 and 2016, nearly 85 percent of all removals were expedited and did not involve
courtroom hearings.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See BRYAN BAKER, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION

ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS:
2016
9
(2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/EnforcementActions_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S7U-T78W].
See generally Koh, supra note 13.
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6 (2014).
Koh, supra note 13, at 194.
Jennifer Lee Koh, Anticipating Expansion, Committing to Resistance: Removal in the Shadows
ofImmigration CourtUnder Trump, 43 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 459,460 (2017).
BAKER, supra note 128, at 9.
Koh, supra note 13, at 193.
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describes-one that questions deportation altogether, rather than trying to pull the
majority of people facing deportation out of shadow removals and into the formal
removal context. Her focus on shadow removals reveals a system of mass
deportation that largely avoids contending with the legal advocacy around
deportation-most of which focuses on deportation proceedings that happen
before an immigration judge. In making the case for the need for engaging with
deportation abolition, this reality of modern deportation procedures is a necessary
starting point.
The nearly one million noncitizens residing in the United States with a final
deportation order pending against them135 sit at the toxic intersection of increased
policies of enforcing deportability and the lack of deportation procedures that
characterize the modern deportation regime. These noncitizens include a mix of
former lawful permanent residents and people who have never held lawful status.
Some ofthem have appeared before an immigration judge and lost their cases. 136
Some never appeared before an immigration judge, either because they never
received notice of their hearing, or because they chose not to submit themselves to
the court's authority, and received orders of removal in their absence. 13" Some
have been checking in with ICE regularly and were granted deferrals on their
removals under previous administrations, while others have been off the federal
government's radar for years. 138 Some cannot be lawfully deported because their
birth countries will not issue the necessary authorizations.13 9
What most of them have in common is living with a sentence of deportation
that could be executed at any moment. Because they have final removal orders,
they are unlikely to ever see a judge before they are taken from their lives and
banished to their countries of nationality. 140 This population forms the potential

O.

Madan, ICE Targets a Million People Who Have FinalDeportationOrders
in the U.S., MIA. HERALD (June 18, 2019, 5:31 PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article231687048.html
[https://perma.cc/X3XS-UZMP].
Vivian Yee, MigrantsConfront Judgment Day Over Old DeportationOrders, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/us/migrants-facing-old-deportationorders.html [https://perma.cc/V6DR-7YKV].
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (providing for removal orders in absentia); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.26 (2020) (detailing procedure for hearings in absentia).
E.g., Shannon Dooling, Under Trump Administration, Some Vietnamese ImmigrantsFace
Uncertain Fate, WBUR (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/ 02/21/vietnamimmigrants-deportation-rules [https://perma.cc/PA4K-KDPB].
E.g., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Press Release, DHS Announces Implementation of Visa
Sanctions (July 10, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/07/10/dhs-announcesimplementation-visa-sanctions [https://perma.cc/J5PP-NC38].
Wadhia, supra note 130, at 5 ("While both ICE and CBP play a significant role in apprehending
and processing noncitizens for removal, ICE bears responsibility for executing removal orders.

135. Monique

but Remain

1 36.

137.
1 38.

139.

140.
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foundation for amass deportation strategy, limited onlyby the resources necessary
to track down and physically detain and deport them. From the point of view of
this one million (and of their family members, friends, coworkers, and others who
count on them continuing to live in the United States), the law has authorized their
removal, and more legal process is unlikely to assist them. Legally, they have been
deported, but physically they are still here. They require a politics that responds to
their reality, and that politics is one of deportation abolition.

II.
A.

DEPORTATION

IS VIOLENCE

Beyond Deportation as Punishment-Deportation as Violence.

Deportation, in the legal sense, is most commonly framed as an
administrative process of adjudicating a person's ability to remain present in a
country where they were not born, finding that presence unauthorized, and
removing that person, most commonly to the country of their birth.141 The case
law defining the appropriate procedures to accompany deportation has, for over
one hundred years, reinforced that deportation is not to be viewed as a
punishment, but rather, the civil end to a civil process.142 Still, U.S. courts have
been unable to deny the harm of deportation, despite their ability to maintain that
those deported do not merit the heightened protections assigned to those facing a
consequence legally recognized as punishment.143 Nearly one hundred years ago,
the Supreme Court described deportation as potentially resulting in the loss of "all
that makes life worth living.""4 In 2010, the Court came closest to piercing the
fiction that deportation is not a punishment when finding that "deportation is an
integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part-of the penalty that
maybe imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.""5

In this way, when ICE apprehends, detains, and processes noncitizens for speed removal, it serves
as the police, jailor, and judge." (footnote omitted)).
141. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The line of cases beginning
with Fong Yue Ting, which has not been overruled, establishes as accepted precedent
that deportation is not considered punishment, but in instead treated as a method of
enforcing the return of noncitizens to their countries of origin. Id. at 730.
142. Id.
143. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE: HOW THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM FALLS
SHORT

OF

AMERICAN

IDEALS

OF

JUSTICE

2

(2013),

https://www.americanimnigrationcouncil.org/
A87Z[https://perma.cc/
sites/default/files/research/aic_twosystemsofjustice.pdf
JN37].
144. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (upholding the nonpunitive nature of
deportation while noting that it may take away "all that makes life worth living").
145. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (footnote omitted).

The End of Deportation

1071

The debate about whether deportation constitutes punishment rightfully
dominates one strain of legal writing and thinking around deportation, 146 gn
that a Supreme Court holding of deportation as punishment would result in an
application of the constitutional protections currently available to criminal
defendants to those who live at risk of deportation. Such a holding would surely be
a watershed event, which would better reconcile the actual practice of deportation
with the governing legal theory, and which might temper of some of the worst
excesses of the harms of deportation.14 1
The focus on punishment, however, obscures the fact that neither the
caselaw nor legal commentary engages with deportation as violence. Such an
elision merits examination. Violence is central to deportation, and addressing
deportation requires inserting violence, not just punishment, into the debate. The
dispute around deportation as punishment limits the discussion to considering
whether and to what degree the practice should be tempered to comport with the
rule of law. That is, if deportation is a punishment, more process is due, and if is it
not, the current lack of protection for those facing deportation suffices. In
contrast, the focus on deportation as violence, rather than punishment, allows for
questioning the civility of both the process and end of deportation. Reading
deportation as violence opens the door to the argument that deportation is no
longer a tool of immigration enforcement. Rather, immigration enforcement
appears to be the tool by which the violence of deportation is enacted and
expanded. In sum, violence is not incidental to deportation-it is not an
occasional, or even regular, add-on to deportation. As explained below,
deportation is violence.
Ruth Wilson Gilmore's description of violence as "the cause of premature
deaths" provides a useful starting point for defining the violence of deportation. 148

146. See, e.g., Beth Caldwell, Banished for Life: Deportation of Juvenile Offenders as Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 34 CARDOzO L. REV. 2261 (2013); Special Legislation Discriminating
Against Specified Individualsand Groups, 51 YALE L.J. 1358, 1363-64 (1942) (criticizing U.S.
Supreme Court decisions holding that deportation is not punishment, and concluding that
"[i]n fact deportation is clearly punishment"); Angela M. Banks, ProportionalDeportation,
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651 (2009); Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as
Punishment: Immigration Status and the CriminalProcess, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417 (2011);
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About
Why HardLaws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1890 (2000).
147. See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the
Constitution's CriminalProcedureProtectionsMust Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 345
(2000) (saluting the development of courts interpreting deportation as punishment in
certain immigration proceedings and therefore applying constitutional limitations that
help guarantee the proportionality and necessity of the punitive deportation).
148. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference: Notes on Racism and
Geography, 54 PRO. GEOGRAPHER 15, 16 (2002). I offer Gilmore's definition for purposes
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Defining violence in this manner elucidates the ways in which deportation
distributes life chances on the level of populations, and how susceptibility to
deportation (deportability) maps on to race, class, gender, and other vectors of
identity.149 Gilmore's definition of racism as "the state-sanctioned or extralegal
production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature
death"15 only highlights the inextricable link between violence, racism, and
deportation. Thus, working toward the abolition of deportation necessarily
involves a reckoning with deportation as malicious and illegitimate state violence
(the subject of this Part). Interrogating, delegitimating, and ultimately ending
deportation will also require a reckoning with the structures and foundation ofthe
United States as a nation-state (a subject introduced-but byno means resolvedin Part III.B.).
Even with Gilmore's definition of violence in hand, describing deportation as
violence risks abstraction. Naming the perpetrators of deportation violence helps
ground this analysis. There is a specific subset of people who are tasked with
carrying out the violence of deportation, and their work can most aptly be
described as "[v]iolence work."151 The deportation violence worker relies on the
threat ofviolence to carry out the arrests, detentions, and removals that constitute

of this argument, acknowledging that there is no agreed upon definition of violence, in or
outside of legal scholarship. Jonathan Simon explains that:
Violence is "notoriously difficult to define"-it encompasses not only direct
assaults leading to injuries, minor or serious, but all circumstances under which
force or fear is used to accomplish some other untoward or unlawful end; and
yet, at the same time, it "has the ideological value of appearing quite simple,
straightforward and clear-cut."
Jonathan Simon, Law's Violence, the Strong State, and the Crisis of Mass Imprisonment
(forStuart Hall), 49 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 649, 655 (2014) (quoting STUART HALL, CHAS
CRITCHER, TONY JEFFERSON, JOHN CLARKE & BRIAN ROBERTS, POLICING THE CRISIS:
MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER 300 (1978)). For another exploration of

violence as related to immigration enforcement, see Stephen Lee, Family Separation as
Slow Death, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2319 (2019).
149.

See RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION CONTROL: ENFORCING THE BOUNDARIES OF
BELONGING 3 (Mary Bosworth, Alpa Parmar & Yolanda Vazquez eds., 2018) ("Historically,

constructions of threat and law and order responses to such threats have formed along race
lines. Stereotypical notions of suspicion, criminality, and inferiority are assigned to migrants,
reinforcing common-sense justifications of racial differences that are already deeply
embedded within cultural value systems. Racial profiling, fears about national security and
processes of 'othering' convene within concerns about mobility." (citations omitted)).
150.

RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 28 (2007).

151. Micol Seigel, Violence Work: Policing and Power, RACE & CLASS, Apr.-June 2018, at 15, 26
(defining violence work as "work that relies upon violence or the threat thereof.... It
doesn't mean the work is always violent. It is not intended to indict the people who are
police officers as bad people, vicious in personality or in their daily routines. It is about
what their labour rests upon and therefore conveys into the material world.").
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the nuts and bolts of deportation. Deportation violence workers range from the
immigration judges whose legal interpretations "signal and occasion the
imposition of violence upon others,"" to the ICE and CBP agents tasked with
carrying out the act of expulsion (often without the immigrant ever making it
before an immigration judge, as discussed in the previous Part), to the employers
and local law enforcement officers whose interactions with immigrants are infused
with the threat of deportation,153 and even beyond the United States's geographic
borders, to the foreign agents increasingly tasked with interdicting migrants who
will never make it to the United States, but will nonetheless be subject to its
enforcement practices.154
For the most part, the violence of deportation remains hidden in plain
sight. Immigration detention facilities dot the landscape, with former Walmarts
transformed into camps for children facing deportation,155 county jails
transformed into ICE holding facilities through agreements between county
sheriffs and federal officials, 156 and ICE offices situated in anonymous downtown
highrises in major cities.157 In her book Are Prisons Obsolete? noted abolitionist
Angela Y. Davis speaks ofhow the ongoing existence of prison is taken for granted,
even as people fear facing the realities prisons produce. 158 "Because it would be too
agonizing to cope with the possibility that anyone, including ourselves, could

152. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
153. Eisha Jain, The InteriorStructure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1485
(2019) ("The vast majority of the undocumented population ... are keenly aware that key
institutions have the ability to trigger immigration enforcement. Employers wear two hats:
they are simultaneously employers and immigration screeners. Police likewise fulfill their
community role as police officers while simultaneously wielding the power to trigger
immigration screening."). While Jain considers the interior structure of immigration
enforcement a much more salient force in immigrants' lives than the act of deportation itself
(which most immigrants will never experience), I would argue that the threat of deportation,
even in the absence of its fulfillment, is part of the violence of deportation.
154. Shachar, supra note 35, at 215, 217 ("The shifting-border framework reveals the reach and
grip of law and legal institutions engaged in expanding the domain of state power in
migration control. To preserve their control in a world that is both interdependent and
turbulent, states are proactively creating new legal spaces of exclusion and engaging in ever
closer cooperation with trusted partners, including other nations, corporate service
providers, and supranational and international organizations.").
155. Manny Fernandez, Inside the Former Walmart That Is Now a Shelter for Almost 1,500
Migrant Children, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/14/us/family-separation-migrant-children-detention.html
[https://
perma.cc/8N7Y-MJKE].
156. Jennifer M. Chacon, PrivatizedImmigration Enforcement, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 39 (2017).
1 57. See Protestors Gather Outside ICE Office in Downtown Seattle, KING 5 NEWS (July 26, 2018,
7:05
PM),
https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/seattle/protesters-gatheroutside-ice-office-in-downtown-seattle/281-577635271 [https://perma.cc/ HGG5-HWJG].
158.

ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 15 (2003).
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become a prisoner, we tend to think of the prison as disconnected from our own
lives."159 Similarly, the unbearable reality of deportation, of becoming separated
from "all that makes life worth living,"160 functions to distance the actual, lived
violence of deportation from the legal writing and legal practice surrounding it.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the case law discussing the myriad forms of
violence facing asylum seekers in their own country.161 These decisions often
describe in detail the grisly ends that may befall the asylum seeker, and either
regretfully justify returning the asylum seeker to violence or offer a reprieve from
the violence with a grant of asylum. But these decisions ignore that it is the very
fact of deportation carried out by U.S. officials-the outcome if asylum is deniedthat creates the space for violence, that in a sense, is the violence.162 They also
ignore the violence that usually surrounds the asylum seeker, not in some far-off,
human rights-violating land, but on U.S. soil, particularly if they are detained as
they await adjudication of their claim.163
Davis describes the prison functioning "ideologically as an abstract site into
which undesirables are deposited, relieving us of the responsibility of thinking
about the real issues afflicting those communities from which prisoners are drawn
in such disproportionate numbers."164 The same forces are at work with
deportation. While the parameters of which sectors of the noncitizen population
should be considered undesirable remains under intense debate, deportation (and
its attendant violence) is justified, across the political spectrum, as the proper and
fitting end for undesirable noncitizens. In legal scholarship, deportation is rarely
described as violence. Instead, terms like the "[i]mmense [s]ocial [c]osts" of

159. Id.
160. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922).
161. See, e.g, Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (detailing the
multiple beatings and rape of a Mexican citizen on the basis of his sexual identity);
Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2015) (involving rape and sexual
assault by on-duty Mexican police officers and military personnel of a transgender
woman of Mexican descent); Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2013) (recounting
severe beatings and harassment over multiple years by police of a homosexual citizen of
the Philippines); Benyaminv. Holder, 579 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (documenting the female
genital mutilation of an Indonesian infant); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2007)
(discussing jailings and beatings of natives of Bangladesh who participated in organized
demonstrations); Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding evidence that a
native of Guatemalan was tied up by guerillas and left to die in a burning building).
162. See Eddie Bruce-Jones, Refugee Law in Crisis: Decolonizing the Architectureof Violence, in
RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION CONTROL: ENFORCING THE BOUNDARIES OF

BELONGING, supra note 149, at 176, 182-83 (rejecting the notion that refugee law is
benevolent and instead explaining that receiving states subject refugees to violence by
deporting them).
163. See id.
164. DAVIS, supra note 158, at 16.
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deportation, 165 the "potentially lethal harms,"166 the "disastrous consequences" or
"destabilizing effects" of deportation, 167the "dire penalties," 168 and the "aftermath"
of deportation 169 are used. In a similarly restrained vein, the suggested remedies to
mass deportation tend to be limited to managing and tempering it, not to ending
it. This hesitation can be linked not just to pragmatism on the part of
academics or policymakers, but to the unwillingness to do as Davis exhorts us
to do-to imagine the unbearable reality that we ourselves could face the end of
"all that makes life worth living,"170 to imagine that the power of the state could
be used to separate us from our children, our homes, our work, our freedom. 17 1
In other words, actually facing the violence of deportation and deciding that it is
unacceptable, as applied to us or anyone else.
The extra step in the deployment of deportation as violence in the separation
of parents from their children pierced the facade of civility in the deportation
debate.17 1 In 2018, this resulted in nationwide protests and news coverage
broadcasting recordings of the piercing screams of children separated from their
parents. 17 1 In brief, it unmasked and rendered unacceptable one aspect of the

165. Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, Mass Deportations Would Impoverish US Families and
Create Immense Social Costs, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 1, 1 (2017); cf MEISSNER,
KERWIN, CHISHTI & BERGERON, supra note 80, at 134 ("But others argue that these levels of
removals have imposed heavy social costs on children, families, and communities of
those removed, as well as on the individuals themselves .... " (emphasis added)).
166. Kevin R. Johnson, The Beginningof theEnd: The ImmigrationAct of 1965 and theEmergence
of the Modern U.S.-Mexico Border State, 34 IMMIGR. & NAT'Y L. REV. 3, 18 (2013) ("For
obvious reasons, especially the ... potentially lethal harms that may result .. . unauthorized
immigration is generally much less preferable than lawful migration for prospective migrants."
(emphasis added)).
167.

JOANNA DREBY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW TODAY'S IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICIES
IMPACT CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 9,21 (2012).

168. Jason A. Cade, EnforcingImmigrationEquity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661,665 (2015).
169.

DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA

(2012).
170. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922).
171. See DAVIS, supra note 158, at 15-16.
172. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Separated at the BorderFrom Their Parents:In Six Weeks,
1,995
Children, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/15/us/politics/trump-immigration-separation-border.html
[https://
perma.cc/BN67-YRUG]; Laura Bush, Opinion, Laura Bush: SeparatingChildren From
Their Parents at the Border 'Breaks My Heart,' WASH. POST (June 17, 2018, 5:45 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/laura-bush-separating-children-from-theirparents-at-the-border-breaks-my-heart/2018/06/17/f2df517 a-7287-11e8-9780bldd6a09b549_story.html [https://perma.cc/5F6R-PHY4]; Editorial, Seizing Children
From Parents at the BorderIs Immoral. Here's What We Can Do About It, N.Y. TIMES (June
14,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/opinion/children-parents-asylumimmigration.html [https://perma.cc/KLY3-QS7F].
173. Ginger Thompson, Listen to Children Who've Just Been SeparatedFrom Their Parentsat the
Border, PROPUBLICA (June 18, 2018, 3:51 PM), https://www.propublica.org/ article/children-
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violence of deportation. This moment marked a break, with people who do not
live with the fear of deportation nonetheless able to connect with one aspect of its
violence and make calls for the immediate reunification of parents and children.
For some, this led to a demand to end altogether the existence ofthe agency viewed
as responsible for enacting such violence, with the call to abolish ICE escalating
parallel to the exposure of family separation as a tactic of deportation.7 It thus
exemplifies the possibilities of considering deportation as inextricably linked to
violence-such a move opens the door to a radical rethinking of the utility of the
very agencies charged with carrying out deportation.
For most deportations, there is some final order of removal issued by a U.S.
government authority, and a time and place can be pinpointed to mark any
particular individual's deportation. Theorizing deportation as violence invites the
reader to look beyond those documents and those specific moments. Defining
deportation as violence across both time and space highlights the way in which
deportation constitutes an ongoing harm. It is violence that does not stop as long
as it remains a possible outcome for a population.
The violence work of deportation can be organized in many ways, but can be
broadly divided into the following categories, roughly mapping onto both
temporal and spatial divisions: (1) the violence ofthe deportation process itself and
the violence that follows deportation as experienced by those deported and by their
families and communities, and (2) the violence that the ongoing threat of
deportation creates for disparate populations, including those within and outside
the borders of the United States.
1.

Deportation as Violence: The Violence of the Deportation Process and
Its Aftermath

The violence inherent to deportation includes the violence that accompanies
being identified and apprehended by immigration authorities. The death of a
sixteen-year-old forced by Border Patrol agents to drink liquid
methamphetamine, and 149 cases in which unaccompanied minors reported
threatened or actual physical or sexual abuse by border guards, exemplify this

separated-from-parents-border-patrol-cbp-trump-immigration-policy
[https://perma.cc/7EWQ-SD5D].
174. See Ron Nixon & Linda Qiu, What Is ICE and Why Do Critics Want to Abolish It?, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/us/politics/fact-check-iceimmigration-abolish.html [https://perma.cc/8WJE-UW6M].
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violence.17
Once detained, immigrants face unrelenting violence in various
forms, including sexual abuse by guards, 176 medical neglect leading to suffering
and in many cases death,177 failure to provide basic food or minimal hygiene
supplies (including toilet paper),178 and the use of violent carceral techniques,
including regular strip-searches and regular use of solitary confinement, 17 9 a
form of torture. Those who protest the violence of deportation through hunger
strikes face force feeding, another recognized form oftorture. 180 Children detained
while facing deportation live under the threat of constant violence, with caretakers
threatening punishment and continued incarceration if the children, including
siblings, touch or hug each other for comfort.181
Violence permeates the act of deportation itself. The violence of
deportation flights was exposed when in December 2017, a plane full
of immigrants was returned to the United States after a failed deportation
flight to Somalia. Those on the plane reported forty-eight hours of abuse,
including being shackled, forbidden from standing or moving, denied use of the
bathroom, and instances of ICE agents beating, kicking, choking, pushing, and

175. See Brian Ross, Brian Epstein, John Carlos Frey & Pete Madden, Life andDeath at the Border,
TYPE
INVESTIGATIONS
(July
29,
2017),
https://www.typeinvestigations.org/
investigation/2017/07/29/life-death-border [https://perma.cc/X4AU-TS4E].
176. Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Chances Are High That if You're Abused in Immigration Detention,
No
One
Will
Care, THINKPROGRESS
(Apr.
12,
2017,
12:01
PM),
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/dhs-33000-complaints-abuse-civic-cfl 54614c006/
[https://perma.cc/P5JV-W6SG] (stating that ICE "received anywherebetween 1,016 and 2,573
sexual abuse complaints from people in DHS detention" in a six year period).
177. AM. CIv. LIBERTIES UNION, DET. WATCH NETWORK & NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR.,
FATAL NEGLECT:

HOW ICE IGNORES

DEATHS IN DETENTION

3

(2016), https://

www. aclu.org/sites/default/files/field-document/fatal_neglectacludwnnijc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43MV-TZL8] (detailing basic failures by medical providers in detention
centers which "contribute[] to the death of immigrants in federal immigration custody with
alarming frequency").
178.

OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONCERNS ABOUT ICE
DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT DETENTION FACILITIES 7-8 (2017), https://

www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-12/OIG-18-32-Dec17.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/4RTP-NLZ3].
179. See id. at 4, 6-7.
180. Report: ICE Force-Feeding El Paso Detainees on Hunger Strike, DALL. MORNING NEWS
(Jan.
31,
2019,
5:49
AM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/
2019/01/31/reportice-force-feeding-el-paso-detainees-hunger-strike-nose
[https://
perma.cc/BN8U-JQCD].
181. Michael E. Miller, Immigrant Kids Held in Shelters: 'They Told Us to Behave, or We'd Be
There
Forever',
WASH.
POST
(July
15,
2018,
12:11
PM),
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigrant-children-held-in-shelters-they-told-us-tobehave-or-wed-be-here-forever/2018/07/14/635f4cee-86b4-11e8-8f6c-46cb43
e3f306_story.html?utm_term=.bl5ddb69eldb [https://perma.cc/6EHL-XSKP].
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threatening to kill the passengers.182 One person on the flight described these
actions as "inhumane,like we were slaves or something."183 Others have reported
being placed in "body bags" during their deportation, and subjected to electric
shocks with Tasers. 184
This violence is systemic and unaccountable by design, with 97 percent of the
809 complaints lodged against the Border Patrol in a three-year period resulting
in no action taken. 185 Seventy-eight percent of those complaints involved physical
abuse or excessive force. 186 ICE failed to keep records of sexual abuse that occurred
prior to 2014,187 and in 2017 the agency asked the National Archives and Record
Administration to approve a timetable that would allow it to "routinely" destroy
records related to sexual assaults, solitary confinement, and deaths in custody. 188
Under the Obama administration, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano ordered CBP to change its definition of corruption to erase sexual
assaults and murders from official statistics required to be reported to Congress. 189
182. Amrit Cheng, ICE Abused Somalis for 2 Days on a Plane and Now Wants to Send Them
Into Harm's Way, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 10, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/iceabused-somalis-2-days-plane-and-now-wants
[https://perma.cc/8WYK-KEJA];
Class
Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief & Class Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 5, Ibrahim v. Acosta, No. 1:17-cv-24574-DPG (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2017) ("When
the flight was [grounded] in Dakar for 23 hours, ICE officers and contract guards beat, kicked,
choked, pushed, straightjacketed, threatened to kill, and berated people on the plane. ICE
and contract guards also denied Plaintiffs/Petitioners and the others bathroom use, forcing
people to try to urinate in bottles or on themselves.").
183. Cheng, supra note 182 (quoting Rahim Mohamed).
184. Aviva Stahl, South Asian Migrants Say They Were Put in 'Body Bags'for Deportation
From US, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us[https://
news/2016/may/27/south-asian-migrants-body-bags-deportation-us
perma.cc/BK7U-H8QH] ("According to detainees who witnessed the bags being used, to
place a detainee in a so-called body bag, a group of ICE officers would first pin them to
the ground, sometimes face-down. The detainee's body would then be tightly wrapped
in the security blanket and fastened with a series of Velcro belts. Limbs restrained, the
deportee could then be carried on to the plane.").
185.

186.
187.
188.

189.

DANIEL E. MARTINEZ, GUILLERMO CANTOR & WALTER A. EWING, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL,
NO ACTION TAKEN: LACK OF CBP ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESPONDING TO COMPLAINTS OF

ABUSE 1 (2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
No%20Action%20Taken_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5D44-2XM8].
See id. at 9.
Lee, supranote 176.
Victoria L6pez, ICE Plans to Start DestroyingRecords of Immigrant Abuse, Including Sexual
Assault and Deaths in Custody, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (May 29, 2018),
https://www. aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/ice-plansstart-destroying-records-immigrant [https://perma.cc/HT8M-76UG].
Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became America's
Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement Agency,
POLITICO MAG. (Nov.-Dec.
2014),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-greenmonster-112220 [https://perma.cc/67CL-L3PP].
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Such violence was characterized as "'non-mission-compromising."' 190 State
attempts to obscure the violence of deportation gives credence to the idea that
deportation is violence. When murders and sexual assaults are not considered
mission-compromising but part of the cost of doing Border Patrol business, when
sexual assaults are not recorded for years, and when the authorities seek to destroy
the records of assault that do exist, all the while continuing to deport at high rates,
it becomes clear that in the United States violence and deportation are intimately

linked.
The violence does not end with the act of deportation. Both those deported
and those left behind are subjected to a shortened life span. Children and partners
left behind suffer physical and mental breakdowns, as well as the loss of jobs and
homes. 191 Those deported fare no better, with many deported to violent deaths or
other extreme forms of harm.19 2 Some are subject to legal or extralegal violence,
with harassment by police and gang members common to people deported to
Central America, and others incarcerated upon their arrival in their countries of
origin.193 Many report depression and suicidal thoughts.194 For others,
particularly those living in geographic proximity to the United States, attempted
return to the United States is almost a certainty from the moment of removal,

190. Id.
191.

RANDY CAPPS, HEATHER KOBALL, ANDREA CAMPETELLA, KRISTA PERREIRA, SARAH HOOKER
& JUAN MANUEL PEDROZA, URB. INST. & MIGRATION POL'Y INST., IMPLICATIONS OF
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN

IMMIGRANT FAMILIES, at vi (2015) (finding that children with one or more deported parent
suffer from distress that resembles that of children with incarcerated parents, including
"psychological trauma, material hardship, residential instability, family dissolution,
increased use of public benefits, and, among boys, aggression"); see also Luis H. Zayas
Laurie Cook Heffron, Disrupting Young Lives: How Detention and Deportation Affect
US-Born Children of Immigrants, AM. PSYCH. ASS'N (Nov. 2016), http://
www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/newsletter/2016/11/detention-deportation
[https://perma.cc/R9FP-PRJP] ("Children whose parents were detained or deported (whether
the child returned to Mexico or stayed in the U.S.) were more likely to report depressive
symptoms, negative mood, physical symptoms and negative self-esteem. All children in the
study showed probable anxiety disorders, including separation anxiety disorder.").
192. Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/1 5/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence
[https://perma.cc/QP4E-DJ9W] ("In the past decade, a growing number of immigrants
fearing for their safety have come to the U.S., only to be sent back to their home
countries-with the help of border agents, immigration judges, politicians, and U.S.
voters-to violent deaths.").
193.

SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, EXILED HOME: SALVADORAN TRANSNATIONAL YOUTH IN THE
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE 154 (2016); see Daniel Kanstroom, Post-DeportationHumanRights

Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or Necessity?, 3 STAN. J. C.R. &C.L. 195,218-21 (2007).
194. See COUTIN, supra note 193, at 157; see also Beth Caldwell, Reducing the Deportation's
Harm by Expanding Constitutional Protections to Functional Americans, 37 WHITTIERL.
REV. 355, 358-62 (2016) (discussing traumacaused by deportation).
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trapping them in an unending cycle of deportation violence as they return, are
apprehended, incarcerated, and redeported (often after serving time in federal
prison for the crime of unlawful reentry195).
2.

Deportation as Violence: The Violence of the Ongoing Threat of
Deportation

Most immigrants in the United States are not facing imminent
deportation. 196 And yet, deportability, the susceptibility to deportation that
defines the immigrant experience, brings violence into migrants' everyday lives.
The state's violence extends far beyond the state's actual capacity to deport to
render a much broader swath of people as vulnerable to the violence of
deportability. In the words of Nicholas de Genova, susceptibility to deportation
renders migrant labor "a distinctly disposable commodity," such that removing
the tactic of deportation from the state's arsenal would serve to undermine
migrant vulnerability.197 De Genova and Ananya Roy call deportability "a key
dimension of migrant illegality" pointing to the ways in which immigration law
ensures "the availability of a workforce who carry, with their very existence,
extraordinary encumbrances and always potentially punitive consequences and
repercussions, including the ever-looming horizon of deportation."198
It is the "ever-looming horizon of deportation" that enables both public and
private actors to increase migrant exposure to harm.199 Those who are
undocumented and employed experience violence in the workplace at much

195.

See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, PROSECUTING PEOPLE FOR COMING TO THE UNITED STATES (2021),

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/prosecutingpeopl
e_for_coming_to_theunited_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7A6-FPNB].
196. Eisha Jain, supra note 153, at 1474 (describing deportation as the tip of a much larger
law enforcement pyramid, explaining that "removal numbers capture the tip of the
iceberg, but they do not begin to capture the impact of immigration enforcement on those
at the bottom, who remain present and aware of the possibility of removal").
197.

NICHOLAS DE GENOVA, WORKING THE BOUNDARIES: RACE, SPACE, AND "ILLEGALITY" IN
MEXICAN CHICAGO 247 (2005).

198. De Genova & Roy, supra note 34, at 354.
199.

CECILIA MENJIVAR & LEISY ABREGO, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS, LEGAL VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF

IMMIGRANTS
3,
6
(2012),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/MenjivarLegalViolenceReportpdf
[https://perma.cc/4N52-RPKZ]
(describing "legal violence" as the fear created by immigration enforcement, and examining
the primary sectors of everyday life (the family, the workplace, the school) to examine the
production of legal violence through immigration enforcement threats). See also Jain,
supra note 153, at 1484 (arguing that both public and private actors, beyond ICE and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents, play a key role in interior immigration
enforcement: "While police and employers are the most common enforcement agents, they
are far from alone. Other sites of enforcement include schools and courthouses.").
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higher rates than those with legal work status. Undocumented immigrant women
in particular are "routinely abused, forced to work hours that are unpaid and
subject to other injustices .... Like other immigrant women, undocumented
workers are subject to sexual abuse by employers or male co-workers and often do
not feel they are able to take any legal action."2 00 Undocumented farmworker
women face very high levels of sexual violence, exacerbated by their
deportability. 201 Even beyond these forms of workplace violence, the constant
threat of deportation has the impact of ensuring the precarity of migrant labor.202
Thus, the violence of deportation includes the nearly-guaranteed exploitation of
undocumented workers, given their employers' ability to trigger immigration
enforcement.2 03
The uncertainty and chronic vulnerability of deportability also has
devastating health impacts. It affects the short- and long-term health and brain
development of children who live with the "toxic stress" of a parent's
deportability.204 Immigrants living with deportability are less likely to seek out
services necessary for their survival because of fear of interaction with state
agencies, with documented drops in rates of accessing health care and food
assistance among deportable populations.2 0 They are also less likely to seek out

200.

201.

202.

203.
204.

205.

AUNA HUSAIN & LESLYE E. ORLOFF, IMMIGRANT WOMEN, WORK, AND VIOLENCE STATISTICS 4

(2015), https://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/CULT-RCHImmigrantWomenWorkViolenceFactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UAW-HUFK].
See Jose R. Padilla & David Bacon, Opinion, Protect Female Farmworkers, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/how-to-protect-femalefarmworkers.html [https://perma.cc/D47H-2QTC].
HARSHA WALIA, UNDOING BORDER IMPERIALISM 66-74 (2013) (discussing labor precarity
as "the legalized, state-mediated exploitation of the labor of migrants by capitalist
interests" and positing that the denial of lawful status to migrants "ensures legal control
over the disposability of the laborers, which in turn embeds the exploitability of their
labor.")
Jain, supra note 153, at 1485.
Sarah Elizabeth Richards, How Fearof Deportation Puts Stress on Families, ATLANTIC (Mar.
22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/03/deportation-stress/520008
[https://perma.cc/FEV5-BNXQ]; see also Olga Khazan, The Toxic Health Effects of
Deportation
Threat,
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
27,
2017),
https://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/01/the-toxic-health-effects-of-deportationthreat/514718 [https://perma.cc/2PN8-87H9]; Fernando Stein, AAP Statement on
Protecting Immigrant Children, AM.
ACAD. PEDIATRICS
(Jan.
25, 2017),
https://web.archive.org/web/20170128024140/https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-theaap/aap-press-room/Pages/AAPStatementonProtectingImmigrantChildren.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S3SC-GAWZ] ("Indeed, fear and stress, particularly prolonged exposure to
serious stress-known as toxic stress-can harm the developing brain and negatively impact
short- and long-term health.").
Jacqueline Hagan, Brianna Castro & Nestor Rodriguez, The Effects of U.S. Deportation
Policies on Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88 N.C. L. REv.
1799, 1814 (2010) ("'[Staff] in county and city health clinics that provide preventive and
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assistance for other forms of violence they experience, including interpersonal
violence.20
3.

Deportation Violence Is Not an Aberration

The line between the violence of officially sanctioned practices and of
unofficial practices that nevertheless pervade deportation processes is fluid,
and deportation violence oscillates between these two categories. Sometimes the
state attempts a practice such as separating parents from their children at the
border, calling it a legitimate and even necessary use ofviolence. 207 Then, following
an outcry (when the public finds it unacceptable), the state will reverse course and
decide to (at least temporarily) order its replacement with a less obviously violent
tactic (in this case, with detention of parents with their children).20 ' Other times,
as in the case of sexual assault, the categorization of sanctioned/unsanctioned
depends on how normalized the practice has become. For example, the practice
of an armed guard ordering a person who is detained and awaiting a deportation
process to strip naked could in any other setting be considered sexual violence,
but is considered an accepted practice of confinement within the carceral

nutritional services, such as pre-natal care, immunizations, and Women, Infants, Children
dietary supplements,' reported a decline in their immigrant clients. According to several
health workers, immigrants were withdrawing from any government-funded services for fear
of deportation." (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Jacqueline Hagan,
Nestor Rodriguez, Randy Capps & Nika Kabiri, The Effects of Recent Welfare and
ImmigrationReforms on Immigrants'Access to Health Care, 37 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 444,
457 (2003))).
206. James Queally, FearingDeportation,Many Domestic Violence Victims Are Steering Clear
of Police and Courts, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2017, 5:00 AM),
http://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-undocumented-crime-reporting-20171009story.html [https://perma.cc/5UAN-8HQS]; see also Cora Engelbrecht, Fewer Immigrants
Are Reporting Domestic Abuse. Police Blame Fear of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (June 3,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/us/immigrants-houston-domesticviolence.html [https://perma.cc/4GRK-XC5S]; Rob Arthur, Latinos in Three Cities Are
Reporting Fewer Crimes Since Trump Took Office, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 18, 2017),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/latinos-report-fewer-crimes-in-three-cities-amid-fearsof-deportation [https:// perma.cc/Z5Z9-2JUK].
207. See Linda Qiu, Kirstjen Nielsen Justifies Family Separation by Pointing to Increase in
Fraud. But the Data Is Very Limited, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/nielsen-family-separation-factcheck.html
[https://perma.cc/T76H-FCED].
208. David Nakamura, Nick Miroff & Josh Dawsey, Trump Signs Order Stopping Family
Separation at Border, but Families Won't Be Immediately Reunited, CHI. TRIB. (June 20,
2018, 11:42 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ politics/ctmigrant-family-border-separation-20180620-story.html
[https:// perma.cc/U694MQG2].
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setting.2 09 By contrast, the well-documented practice of rape of immigrants
detained by ICE and CBP is categorized as an unauthorized practice of sexual
violence (even as the practice continues).'
Naming and categorizing forms of deportation violence runs the risk of
precisely the kind of theoretical distancing that this engagement with violence
seeks to avoid. The litany of violence above is offered to invoke the idea that the
violence of deportation is not an aberration, but rather one of its defining
features. Confronting deportation as inseparable from violence interrogates our
common sense that deportation serves legitimate moral and political ends. 2
These forms of violence are not merely human rights violations that can be
remedied through reforms that create humane management of deportation.
When violence is understood to be deportation's ultimate purpose, it focuses
scholarship and advocacy on ending it, not merely mitigating it. In considering
what it would take to end this and other forms of violence, Soya Jung offers the
following: "Surviving the modern world has not demanded much of us in the way
of universal empathy. In fact, it has increasingly required us to consent to the
inevitability of someone else's dehumanization or absolute elimination."2
The
catalogue of deportation violence serves as an invitation to refuse this form of
consent, and to consider instead the possibility that all ofthese forms ofviolencesanctioned and unsanctioned-could end. While deportation and violence may
be inseparable, deportation is not inevitable.
III.

CHALLENGING THE GOALS OF DEPORTATION

If deportation is illegitimate state violence coded as legitimate, the question
then becomes, what purposes does deportation serve?
Questioning the
inevitability of deportation thus requires questioning its purported uses. An
examination of laws, literature, and the popular rhetoric surrounding deportation
reveals concerns with border control (and by extension, sovereignty) and with
safety/security animating much of the conversation. Along these lines, leading

209. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318,330-38 (2012).
210. Letter from Rebecca Merton, Nat'l Indep. Monitor, & Christina Fialho, Co-Founder/Exec.
Dir., Cmty. Initiatives for Visting Immigrants in Confinement, to Thomas D. Homan, Dir.,
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft et al. (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.endisolation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/CIVIC_SexualAssault_ Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY4BW8TX].
211. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1164 (describing the project of abolition as one of rejecting "the
moral legitimacy of confining people in cages"). The project of deportation abolition requires
rejecting the moral legitimacy of deportation, in part through exposing deportation as an
illegitimate exercise of state violence.
212. Soya Jung, The Enduranceof the ColorLine, 2 OTHERING &BELONGING 50,61 (2017).
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deportation theorist Daniel Kanstroom posits "[e]xtended border control" and
"post entry social control" as the "two basic, primary goals for interior
enforcement by removal and related mechanisms."" While many question the
effectiveness of these goals, particularly as measured against the human rights
abuses their pursuit engenders, both practitioners and theorists stop short of
questioning their legitimacy." For the most part, those who do address
deportation through the lens of these goals bemoan the distance between the stated
goals and the reality on the ground. To begin to theorize the end of deportation, it
is necessary to theorize not just the limitations of post-entry social control and
extended border control, but also their legitimacy as governance goals.
A.

Challenging the Goals of Deportation: Post-Entry Social Control

In considering post-entry social control as a goal of deportation, this Part
focuses on the logic that makes such a goal necessary-the logic of enhanced safety
through deportation. To state plainly the accepted logic: If there are people
territorially present in the United States who pose a threat to the homeland, and
those people were not born in the United States, then the United States can and
should prioritize their apprehension, detention, and deportation. The trend ofthe
last thirty years has been to use an individual's contact with the criminal justice
system as a proxy for their level of threat.215
1.

"Crimmigration"Scholarship Has Not Yet Renounced the Deportation
of "Criminal Aliens"

This increase in distribution of deportations along the lines of migrant
criminality has led to a vigorous scholarly response. An entire literature of
"crimmigration" has sprung from the convergence of immigration and criminal
law regimes. 2 16 Among other critiques, this literature tracks the importation of
213. Kanstroom, supranote 6, at 474 (emphasis omitted).
214. E.g., id. at 475 ("For purposes of this Article, however, I will tacitly accept the basic legitimacy
of the nation-state. This acceptance implies the basic legitimacy of some forms of border
control and therefore of extended bordercontrolremoval.").
215. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justicefor Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126, 1128 (2013) ("The deportation of 'criminal aliens' is
now the driving force in American immigration enforcement." (footnote omitted)).
216. Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, CrimmigrationResistance and the Case of Sanctuary
City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 539, 563 (2017) ("For some time now, scholars,
activists and commentators have expressed deep concern about a phenomenon that Juliet
Stumpf dubbed a decade ago the 'crimmigration crisis."' (quoting Juliet Stumpf, The
CrimmigrationCrisis:Immigrants, Crime and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367,376-77,
379 (2006))).
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criminal lawnorms into the immigration sphere (and vice-versa)," the expansion
of criminal prosecutions of acts of migration,2 1 ' the rise of an immigrant
incarceration system to house "criminal aliens" awaiting deportation, 219 and the
pitfalls of all of these developments.
Despite the deep critiques of the convergence of immigration and criminal
law, the logic of safety through deportation keeps many immigration scholars and
advocates from questioning deportation, because for many, there are still people
considered indefensible and for whom deportation is thus a desirable outcome. 22
The logic of safety through criminalization of migration also determines how
immigration enforcement resources are deployed,2 21 what legislation is deemed
tenable 2 2 2 and how on-the-ground practices of immigration enforcement (and
the resistance to them) are shaped.223 Thus, confronting this logic is key to opening
the door to the end of deportation.
For now, the politically palatable position that deportation is an acceptable
outcome for those marked as criminal is the norm, with few full-throated defenses
of the "criminal alien." 224 When the media reports on the murder of a U.S. citizen
by a noncitizen (particularly when the noncitizen had precarious status or prior
deportations), the usual response is that (most) immigrants are not criminals.2 5

217. See Annie Lai, ConfrontingProxyCriminalization,92 DENV. U. L. REV. 879 (2015) (describing
state-level criminalization of immigrants, with state and local governments punishing
conduct linked to the social and economic survival of unauthorized immigrants).
218. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281-83 (2010)
(explaining the increase in criminal prosecution of immigration-related offenses in the
federal criminal system); Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, NaturalizingImmigration
Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1471-75 (2015) (describing state uses of criminal
lawmaking authority to prosecute immigration-related offenses).
219. Hernandez, supra note 218, at 1453-55 (describing growth in immigration detention, and
how detention has become a defining feature of the immigration system).
220. See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, Essay, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36,43 (2015)
("Many noncitizens with serious criminal histories should be deported").
221. See, e.g., Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individualswho-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQ6S-LL3N]
(establishing
guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion for a subset of immigrants).
222. See Rebecca Sharpless, "ImmigrantsAre Not Criminals":Respectability, ImmigrationReform,
and Hyperincarceration,53 Hous. L. REV. 691, 698 (2016).
223. See Ines Valdez, Matt Coleman & Amna Akbar, Missing in Action: Practice, Paralegality,
and the Nature of Immigration Enforcement, 21 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 547,547-49 (2017).
224. Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing CriminalAliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of
Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 372 (1999) ("It is hard to think of any public
policy that is less controversial than the removal of criminal aliens.").
225. Eg., Alan Gomez, Mollie Tibbetts Murder Case: HereAre the Factson Immigrants Committing
3:54
PM),
TODAY
(Aug.
22,
2018,
Crimes
in
US,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/08/22/mollie-tibbitts-murder-reignites-
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Few are willing to jump into a defense of not deporting the person who has
allegedly killed or raped or otherwise caused physical harm to another.226 Yet for
much of U.S. immigration history, this is precisely what happened-noncitizens
were arrested and were not deported. As recently as 1984, only one thousand
people were deported on criminal grounds,"2 as compared to 138,669 "criminal
aliens" deported in 2016.228 The elaborate mechanisms that have developed in the
past three decades to promulgate the deportation of people with criminal system
contact have rightly led to a rich and necessary literature decrying this
development, a literature that nonetheless accepts deportation of those who are
"regarded as legitimately positioned at the crossroads of our criminal and
immigration enforcement systems." 229 This literature tends to concede the
inevitability of the distribution of immigration enforcement around alleged
criminality, even as it decries the racially biased impact of the criminal system, the
immigration system, and the compounded system of deportation the two have
created.
Currently, the deportation literature tends to highlight the harms of
deportation to those who are considered to have more of a right to be in the United
States when pointing to the harms of increased "criminal alien" deportations.
While the unlawful deportations of U.S. citizens and the lawful but nonetheless
unsettling deportations of longtime lawful permanent residents both shock the
conscience, the frequent analyses of the harms of deportation as experienced by
these two groups points to a hierarchy of suffering along membership lines.23 0 The

226.

227.

228.
229.
230.

debate-over-immigrant-crime/1060792002 [https://perma.cc/6GPH-ZSY3];LuisGomez,Are
Crime and Immigration Connected? Not So, Research Says, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 7,
2018, 3:35 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/the-conversation/sd-arecrime-and-immigration-correlated-20180307-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/JGN4YJXE].
See Sharpless, supranote 222, at 694 ("[T]hese claims implicitly rely upon a sense of injustice
that immigrants and our immigration system have become entangled with criminals and
our criminal system. The critique risks being understood as legitimizing the category
criminal, the stigma it carries, and the use of deportation as a crime control measure. Largely
absent is a defense of people regarded as legitimately positioned at the crossroads of our
criminal and immigration enforcement systems.").
MARGARET H. TAYLOR & T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DEPORTATION OF CRIMINAL AHENS: A
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (June 1998) (unpublished manuscript), https://
web.archive.org/web/20210721141731/http://archive.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Depor
ation%200fb/o20criminal%20aliens%20a%20geopolitical%20perspective.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9KR-9GDX].
FY 2016 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2016 [https://perma.cc/98V6-WGZY].
Sharpless, supranote 222, at 694.
See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 169 (focusing on harms to former lawful permanent
residents); Bill Ong Hing, Re-examining the Zero Tolerance Approach to Deporting
Aggravated Felons: RestoringDiscretionaryWaivers and Developing New Tools, 8 HARV.
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more a person is seen to belong to the United States (as demonstrated by their
naturalization or obtaining lawful permanent residence), the more outrageous
their deportation. This would seem to be accepted as so obvious as to merit limited
commentary. The commentary instead focuses on how to roll back the harms of
the criminal immigration convergence so that those with formal membership
claims can avoid deportation.
For those without formal membership claims, the conversation becomes
how to move more of the population into full membership (through deferred
action, comprehensive immigration reform, and so on), and how to make sure that
in the meantime, any deportation proceeding they face is a fair one. The question
of why we are resigning the most criminalized sectors ofthe immigrant population
to banishment is rarely discussed. The idea that U.S. citizens should never face
banishment and that noncitizens are never fully exempt from banishment has
become common sense-the debate has become how best to expand or limit the
deportations of noncitizens, not whether they should be occurring at all.
Thinking outside of deportation-thinking beyond anyone's banishmentrequires letting go of an investment in the paradigm of membership through
proximity to U.S. citizenship. Membership and belonging are premised on
exclusion (and policing the exclusion) of those who do not make it into the inner
circle, and such an exclusion, in the United States, has always been distributedwith
violence, along racial lines.231 In twenty-first century immigration law, the political
cost for immigrant inclusion has been accepting the deportation of criminalized
others."' A politics of deportation abolition would refuse any immigrant's
deportation-and thus, would challenge the vision of immigrant integration
that has always been premised on not every immigrant being able to integrate,
and on the deportation of those who are marked as unsuitable for membership
because they are considered a safety threat given their contact with the criminal
legal system.

L. & POL'Y REV 141 (2014); Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful
Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013); Bryan Lonegan, American Diaspora: The
Deportation of Lawful Residents From the United States and the Destruction of Their
Families, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 55 (2007).
231.

232.

See generally CHANDAN REDDY, FREEDOM WITH VIOLENCE: RACE, SEXUALITY, AND THE US

STATE (2011) (arguing that the nation-state's claim to provide freedom from violence depends
on its systematic deployment of violence against peoples perceived as nonnormative and
irrational).
See Angelica Chizaro, BeyondRespectability: Dismantling the Harms of "Illegality,"52HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 355, 358-59 (2015).
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2.

Under Scrutiny: The Category of Crime

Dismantling the logic of safety through deportation begins with confronting
the meaning of crime itself. The instability of crime as a category to which we
should ascribe meaning, much less organize the bulk ofimmigration enforcement
around, has come under increasing examination. In questioning the concept,
Micol Seigel writes:
[W]hat is crime? The concept has sustained intense scrutiny from
critical criminologists. They have pointed out that crime-and law,
which defines crime-are deeply contingent, reflecting the biases of
their time, and they challenge the equation of "harm" and "crime" by
pointing out the intense harm inflicted by actions never designated
crime such as war, pollution, or systemic medical neglect. These
challenges render "crime" conceptually incoherent. It certainly
survives as a category of experience for participants or police, but critical
thinkers cannot maintain it as a category of analysis. 233

Likewise, deportation triggered by criminal contact remains an important
category of experience for the millions who have been deported as a result of a
criminal record, but as Seigel contends, its stability as a category of analysis is
limited, precisely because crime itself is an incoherent category.
This line of thinking has begun to permeate immigration scholarship, with
Annie Lai and Chris Lasch calling for more scholarship that interrogates
"whether strategies of penal control like detention and militarized policing are in
fact productive responses to crime, for example, or whether the term 'criminal
threats' has a definite meaning that has integrity."2 4 Rebecca Sharpless further
undermines the concept of crime as a stable category of analysis, drawing
attention to the relative underenforcement of white-collar crime
(disproportionately committed by white people) and the way that police enforcing
drug laws "bypass college campuses and wealthy neighborhoods."2 35
3.

Under Scrutiny: Race and Anti-Blackness

The very instability of crime has led to a rich and fruitful critique of how
criminal enforcement is meted out, with scholars pointing to how arrest,
conviction, incarceration, and, by extension, deportation are distributed in race-

233. Seigel, supra note 151, at 17 (footnote omitted).
234. Lai & Lasch, supra note 216, at 587.
235. Sharpless, supranote 222, at 718.
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specific ways, rather than on the basis of conduct.2 3 6 Pointing to post-1965 laws
and enforcement programs primarily targeting people from Latin America, Kevin
Johnson has argued that "over the last fifty years, the United States replaced the
Chinese exclusion laws of the 19th and 20th centuries with legislation akin to the
Mexican exclusion laws of the new millennium." 2 ' The statistics on deportation
bear this out. Eighty-nine percent of people deported in 2012 were categorized as
male.2 38 Non-Latin American immigrants, despite constituting 20 percent of the
undocumented population, account for less than 2 percent of deportees. 239 Finally,
nationals from four countries-Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvadormade up 90 percent of deportees in 2017.240
While the statistics demonstrate that young, Latin American men are
disproportionately subject to deportation, understanding the racial distribution
of deportation means considering not only the absolute numbers of those deported,
but also the way that deportability functions through anti-Blackness and
criminalization. Black immigrants, both undocumented and with status, are
disproportionately targeted for both criminal and immigration enforcement, with
devastating results. While Irish deportations went up 30 percent between 2016
and 2017 (with eight more deportations in 2017 than in 2016), Haitian
deportations jumped 1699 percent (from 310 in 2016 to 5578 in 2017)." One out
of every twelve Jamaican and Dominican male lawful permanent residents has
been deported since 1996,242 the year that laws expanding the deportability of those
who have had contact with the criminal system were enacted.2 43 Despite being

236. See, e.g., LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS,
AND THE NATION (2d ed. 2013); Yolanda Vizquez, ConstructingCrimmigration:Latino
Subordinationin a "Post-Racial"World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2015); Yolanda Vizquez,
Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the
Incorporation of Immigration Law Into the CriminalJustice System, 54 How. L.J. 639
(2011).
237. Johnson, supra note 166, at 11.
238. Tanya Golash-Boza, Racializedand Gendered Mass Deportationand the Crisis of Capitalism,
22 J. WORLD SYS.-RSCH. 38, 39 (2016).
239. Id.
240. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/
REPORT
15-18
(2017),
OPERATIONS
documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J49-QVKJ].
241. See John Burnett, Undocumented Irish Caught in Trump's ImmigrationDragnet, NPR
(Jan. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/578930256/ undocumentedirish-unexpectedly-caught-in-trumps-immigration-dragnet
[https:// perma.cc/959LXGFC]; U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, supra note 240.
242.

TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA, DEPORTED: IMMIGRANT POLICING, DISPOSABLE LABOR, AND
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 264 (2015).

243. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 21, 22, 28, 34, 40, 42, 49 & 52 U.S.C.); Illegal
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only 7 percent of the noncitizen population in the United States, Black noncitizens
make up 20 percent of those facing deportation on criminal grounds. 244 These
numbers suggest that while the sheer numbers of Mexicans and Central
Americans deported dwarf those of Jamaicans, Dominicans, and Haitians, the
experience of deportability is specifically exacerbated by anti-Black bias in the
criminal justice system.245
Contending with safety, particularly when discussing safety through
deportation of criminals, means contending with the idea that in the United
States criminality has historically been defined through proximity to Blackness.
Blackness became tethered to criminality in part through non-Black immigrants'
claims to whiteness; successive waves ofimmigrants sought to distance themselves
from African Americans and fought to be recognized as white, with successful
integration predicated on proximity to whiteness. 246 Sharpless has sharply
critiqued the "we are not criminals" rallying cry of the immigrants' rights
movement, stating "[i]f 'criminal' is code for 'Black,' ... we can understand the
contemporary immigrant/criminal distinction as yet another immigrant claim to
whiteness."247 The erasure of Black immigrants makes this point particularly
salient. The focus on the disproportionate removal of Latin American immigrants
in the deportation literature occludes that many Latin American immigrants,
including those from Mexico and Central America, are Black, and that immigrants
deported to the Caribbean are disproportionately Black. If the alleged safety
produced by deportation can be understood as an expression of racial animus
toward immigrants of color, grounded in anti-Black racism, then deportation
along the lines of criminality becomes less defensible.
As Alina Das shows in her study of the historical antecedents of criminal
deportation, racial animus has always driven deportation. 24 Das cites the racial
animus at the root of laws initially rendering people with criminal convictions

244.

245.

246.
247.
248.

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
Jeremy Raff, The 'DoublePunishment'forBlack Undocumented Immigrants, ATLANTIC (Dec.
30, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/the-double-punishmentfor-black-immigrants/549425 [https://perma.cc/P5NK-T8W7].
Likewise, transgender people, people with disabilities, and others who live at the
intersections of various modes of state surveillance are more likely to be vulnerable to the
depredations of both deportability and deportation, whether or not their numbers are
reflected in the statistics compiled yearly by ICE. See generallyPooja Gehi, Struggles From
the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Impact on Low-Income Transgender
People of Color, 30 WOMEN'S RTs L. REP. 315 (2009).
See Sharpless, supra note 222, at 739.
Id.
Alma Das, Inclusive Immigrant Justice: Racial Animus and the Origins of Crime-Based
Deportation,52 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 171 (2018).
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deportable, tying that animus to the drafting of laws and their enforcement on
working class immigrants of color.2 4 9 Yolanda Vizquez brings the analysis up to
the present, exploring how the "federal laws enacted and policies put into place
[from the 1980s on] not only created the 'criminal alien' but developed mechanisms
for federal, state, and local courts and law enforcement to assist in the location,
arrest, and transfer of non-citizens into ICE custody," and describing how these
mechanisms, while facially neutral, are racially targeted in terms of location,
implementation, and enforcement.25" Others have traced how the post-9/11
measures targeting Muslims and Arabs ultimately directed many aggressive
enforcement measures at undocumented Mexican immigrants in the name of
protecting national security. 251 The combination of nativism and racial animus
continues to contribute to the expansion of the category of whom it is considered
appropriate to deport, even when criminal records are not at play.
4.

Under Scrutiny: Narratives of "Violence"

Revealing that deportation on the basis of criminality is at its core grounded
in racism may not be enough to invite abandoning the fantasy that deportation
brings safety. Even those who strongly critique crime-based deportations tend to
hedge when considering the figure of the truly "violent" immigrant, conceding
that a person with few ties to the United States who has seriously harmed others
could be justifiably deported/deportable. These arguments also usually include
the proviso that most immigrants do not commit crimes, which is empirically
provable, and thus a tempting argument to make.25 2
While it can be shown that immigrants are not more likely to commit crimes
than their U.S.-born counterparts, and that in fact they may be less likely to do so,
this does not resolve the question of whether contact with law enforcement
justifies deportation. Millions of people whose contact with the criminal justice
249. See id.
250. Yolanda Vizquez, Enforcing the Politicsof Race and Identity in Migrationand Crime Control
Policies, in RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION CONTROL: ENFORCING THE BOUNDARIES

OF BELONGING, supra note 144, at 142,151 (citation omitted).
251. Johnson, supra note 166, at 52.
252. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW
CRiM. L. REv. 157, 189-91 (2012). As the author plainly states, whatever else explains the
increasingly "blurred boundary between criminal justice and immigration enforcement" it
"cannot be understood as a response to the rising problem of crime committed by noncitizens.
[It] cannot be understood in that way because there is no such problem." Id. at 189. Sklansky
cites various studies pointing to falling crime rates across the United States, falling border
apprehensions, statistics that demonstrate that immigrants are "much more law-abiding than
native-born Americans," and below-average crime rates in border cities with high
undocumented populations. Id. at 190-92.
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system led to their apprehension by immigration authorities have in fact been
deported in the past three decades, and at least some part of this group have
harmed others. 253 Thus, even though immigrants are less likely to commit crimes,
the U.S. crime rate in general has gone down," and border towns full of
undocumented people are safer places to live than interior cities full of the U.S.born,2 55 the reality is that immigrants are coming into contact with law
enforcement and that these encounters are leading to their deportations. If we are
to argue that this should not be the case, then we must address the questionshould contact with law enforcement (currently the proxy for identifying those
who harm others) lead to deportation? The answer, I would posit, is no. Even if
individual immigrants come into contact with law enforcement, it should not
follow that this contact leads to deportation.
Accepting the deportation of people who may present a risk ofharm to others
is problematic on several fronts, not the least of which is that it requires accepting
the idea that one can quantify dangerousness in any sort of dependable way, when,
as explained above, controlling danger through policing crime has primarily been
a racialized project in the United States. Even if one were to accept that the arrest
and conviction of certain individuals marks them as irredeemably dangerous,
their subsequent deportation fails to "interrogate the deeply troubling premise that
U.S. citizens are more deserving of protection than other human beings."" 6 As
Allison Crennen-Dunlap and Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez have stated,
adopting reform proposals that accede to the deportation of "dangerous" people
"accepts that a person deemed dangerous should not be allowed to live among U.S.
residents, whom she might endanger, even though that same person could just as
easily endanger those living in the country to which she is deported (if indeed, she
is'dangerous')."" Thus defending safety through deportation means defending a
particularly toxic form of nationalism that takes as a given the differential value of
life based on place of birth. Further, the idea of deporting people perceived as

253. See Sharpless, supranote 222, at 697-98.
254. John Gramlich, 5 Facts About Crime in the US, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://web.archive.org/web/20191017044950/https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/01/03/5-facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/3GDN-6RPV].
255. Julian Aguilar & Alexa Ura, Border Communities Have Lower Crime Rates, TEX. TRIB.
(Feb. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/02/23/border-communitieshave-lower-crime-rates [https://perma.cc/9VCD-NDMH].
256. Allison Crennen-Dunlap and Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Pragmatics and
Problems, 69 FLA. L. REv. F 1, 9 (2017).
257. Id.; see also KANSTROOM, supra note 169. Kanstroom also questions the adoption of these
proposals, stating that "[c]riminal deportees-even assuming that they have in fact been
convicted of serious crimes-may no longer be 'our' problem. But they are still somebody's
problem. And the problem may get worse due to the effects of deportation itself." Id. at 41.
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dangerous also gives a false sense ofthe strength of imaginary national boundaries
in precluding those who have harmed others from making a return trip to the
United States. A return trip may be difficult, but it is by no means impossible,
particularly for those deported to Mexico or Central America (most of those
deported). In fact, for those who are attached to the United States by virtue of
family and other ties, their attempted return may be virtually guaranteed."'
Immigration scholars have begun the necessary pushback against the
presumed disposability of people who are considered appropriately deportable
because of their criminal convictions and perceived dangerousness. Annie Lai
and Chris Lasch point to the need to avoid a single-minded focus on advocacy to
delink immigration from crime control, warning that "leaving unquestioned the
outcomes of the system of crime control" risks "retrenching problems with the
broader system of crime control in the United States that affect noncitizens and
citizens alike" and means disavowing those immigrants "who do apparently
commit crime." 25 9 Rebecca Sharpless likewise warns that engaging in a limited
criminalization critique that accepts "that immigration enforcement can be
tethered to crime control (as long as it has the right focus) . . . leav[es]
unchallenged the edifice of the carceral state.""' She envisions an immigrant
justice movement that acknowledges that immigrant justice cannot be separated
from "the racial justice movement to dismantle the carceral state."61 She thus calls
for abandoning the effort to distinguish between immigrants and criminals, and
between people with serious and less serious conviction records, warning that such
distinctions distance the immigrant rights movement from movements for racial
justice, "furthering the harms of our carceral nation."2 " 2
Such efforts require questioning the goal of deportation as post-entry social
control, not just in the easy cases of a long term lawful permanent resident with one
shoplifting conviction facing deportation, but also in the harder cases, when a
person might have multiple convictions for violent crimes. Refusal to distinguish
between the deserving immigrant and the repeat offender in immigrant
scholarship and advocacy opens the door to considering an end to deportation
altogether by refusing to distribute survival along lines of criminality, lines which

258. Maria Martin, 'NothingforUs Here' DeportedGuatemalansPlanto Return to U.S., NBC NEWS
(Mar. 29, 2018, 5:41 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/nothing-us-heredeported-guatemalans-plan-return-u-s-n858231 [https://perma.cc/Z7L3-PETT].
259. Lai & Lasch, supra note 216, at 542-43 (emphasis omitted).
260. Sharpless, supranote 222, at 731.
261. Id.at731-32.
262. Id. at 732.
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reflect a commitment to racialized governance through crime,26 3 rather than a
commitment to safety.
Along these lines, shifting our horizon to refuse the disposability of people
who have had contact with the criminal justice system would require challenging
all forms of banishment-not just deportation-and linking deportation to the
naturalized practices of domestic banishment. 264 Banishment in the modern era
has moved beyond deportation-huge swaths of the U.S.-born population are
now removed from their communities and effectively expelled from society,
whether through prolonged prison sentences, the civil death that follows release
from prison, or the literal banishment orders deployed by both criminal and civil
authorities to require that individuals considered undesirable stay out of certain
designated areas. 265
Expulsions have become naturalized through mass
incarceration: Kidnapping people from their lives through arrest and prolonged
incarceration is something the United States does more than any other country at
any time in history.2 66 For immigrants, the banishment happens to take on a
separate, extra aspect-beyond the domestic forms of banishment and legal
liminality their contact with law enforcement might create, noncitizens face the
more ancient form of banishment-expulsion from the territory where they
reside.
Viewed in this light, immigrants have more in common-in terms of
making common cause-with those who are fighting to dismantle police
departments, decriminalize certain behavior, and abolish jails and prisons than
they do with those who insist that "immigrants are not criminals." The
BREATHE Act, a comprehensive legislative proposal for overhauling the criminal
legal system, authored by the Movement for Black Lives, shows social movement
actors already making these connections; the Act includes subsections repealing

263.

See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).

264. For an examination of modern modes of U.S. banishment, see generally KATHERINE BECKETT
& STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA (2010).
265. Chac6n, supra note 43, at 750. Given the way that banishment produces liminal legality in
both citizen and noncitizen populations, Chac6n encourages crimmigration scholars to
avoid exceptionalizing the convergence of immigration and criminal law. Id. at 757-58.
266.

See SASKIA SASSEN, EXPULSIONS: BRUTALITY AND COMPLEXITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 65

(2014) ("At present, 1 in 100 Americans is incarcerated in a U.S. state or federal prison or
detained in a local jail awaiting trial. When those on probation or on parole are added, the
total figure tops 7 million people-i in 31 Americans. And if all people with an arrest or
conviction record are counted, the number reaches 65 million people-I in 4 Americans.
That the United States criminal justice system now touches overall 25 percent of the
population is quite extreme compared with most Global North countries. If there was ever
an argument to be made for American exceptionalism, the mushrooming state and private
corporate prison complex would likely be the proof." (footnote omitted)).

The End of Deportation

1095

the laws that facilitate removal of people with criminal records, abolishing the
Border Patrol, abolishing ICE, and ending the practice of immigration detention,
seamlessly interspersed with other non-immigration specific proposals in the
section entitled Divesting Federal Resources From Incarceration and Policing and
Ending Criminal-Legal System Harms."'
Jennifer Chac6n uses the frame of "legal liminality" to conceptually link these
different struggles. 268 Connecting immigrant banishment with other forms of
internal banishment, she states:
The age-old punitive method of banishment is an increasingly common
form of contemporary social control, and it is not limited to the sphere
of immigration enforcement. The susceptibility of certain noncitizens
to banishment in the form of deportation is mirrored by the exposure
of other liminal populations to banishment in the form of spatial
exclusion and susceptibility to incarceration. In both instances, the
criminal justice system operates in tandem with civil systems of law to
effectuate the expulsion of individuals deemed undesirable.26 9

In this light, the expulsions that constitute a key part of deportation are not
exclusive to deportation-and are not even exclusive to noncitizens. This does not
make deportation any less traumatic or consequential-the deportation of
noncitizens to countries to which they do not wish to return is a form of
indefensible violence, as previously discussed. But it does point to the possibilities
of interventions that recognize expulsion and legal liminality as connected to,
rather than exceptional and different from, other banishment practices.
Theorizing deportation abolition becomes possible when considering deportation
not as an acceptable response to an individual wrongdoer's time in the United
States, but as part of a continuum of violent, unacceptable practices against entire
populations.
Indeed, the reach of the United States's banishment regime extends not just
geographically, but also across the population of immigrants in the United States
who will never be deported, but who nonetheless live with the threat of
deportation. The overlap of public safety and immigration organizes many
aspects of the lives of the deportable. Their interactions with law enforcement,
already fraught, take on a menacing cast, with banishment always a possibility.

267.

THE BREATHE ACT, SECTION 1: DIVESTING FEDERAL RESOURCES FROM INCARCERATION AND
POLICING & ENDING CRIMINAL-LEGAL SYSTEM HARMS, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES,

https://breatheact.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Section- 1-The-BREATHE-ActSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SEY-94U5].
268. Chac6n, supra note 43, at 742.
269. Id. at 711.
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Even if they initially escape the criminal system unscathed by immigration
consequences, the mark of law enforcement lingers permanently. It is not unusual
for a person arrested and convicted decades ago to have that contact with criminal
law enforcement retroactively trigger deportation.270 In the very act of trying to
terminate their deportability-by applying to become U.S. citizens-many long
term lawful permanent residents have instead been referred to deportation
proceedings. Unless an immigrant is able to naturalize, deportability on the basis
of contact with the criminal justice system is a life sentence, and thus every
interaction with law enforcement agents (and with civil authorities who cooperate
with immigration agencies) becomes fraught with the possibility of banishment.
Dismantling this trap requires an embrace of deportation abolition through an
unabashed rejection of the deportation of people marked as criminal.
B.

Challenging the Goals of Deportation: Extended Border Control

Extended border control, the second accepted goal of deportation, is widely
considered to be incident to sovereignty. Thus, any consideration of the end of
deportation must contend with the question of sovereignty. According to Daniel
Kanstroom, "[o]nce one accepts the basic legitimacy of the nation-state, then
deportation of noncitizens as a tool of extended border control is both logically
necessary and potentially legitimate so long as certain secondary questions are
properly accounted for." 7 Kanstroom makes clear that this does not open the
door to violations of basic rights: "It does not imply, of course, acceptance of
arbitrary or disproportionately harsh implementation of such enforcement.""'
The concerns that Kanstroom and other scholars, activists, and human rights
researchers frequently bring to light regarding the violence of extended border
control enforcement (particularly in proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border)7 . are
limited to the way extended border enforcement is carried out, not to its
legitimacy. ICE and CBP are frequently castigated for being unaccountable actors,
with the implication that an accountable immigration enforcement force would
enact deportations humanely-defending the United States's sovereignty while

270.

Cf Crennen-Dunlap & Herndndez, supra note 256, at 8 ("Thus, a migrant convicted of an
offense at age eighteen might find herself in removal proceedings at age sixty-eight. Under
the proposed reform, if that conviction was for a violent offense and involved five years'
incarceration, that individual would not be eligible for asylum regardless of what had
happened in her life during the fifty years since her offense.").
271. Kanstroom, supra note 6, at 476 (emphasis omitted).
272. Id. at 475.
273. For examples of this violence and the scholarship and advocacy reports covering it, see supra
Part II.
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maintaining at least some semblance of recognition of the dignity of the people
being apprehended and deported."'
To challenge deportation involves taking the analysis in a different direction,
and questioning not just the way that exterior border enforcement is carried out,
but the premise that sovereignty demands that deportations continue into an
indefinite future. Simply stated, we do not have to believe in the state's right to
deport.275 As philosopher Sarah Fine states, pointing to a previous era where
sovereignty was defined by a state's capacity to keep people from leaving its
borders, without deportation "the whole edifice would not collapse, just as it has
not collapsed in the absence of a belief in the state's sovereign right to prevent
its own citizens from leaving and returning."2 76 This Part does not purport to
provide a full accounting of the limits of the nation-state, but rather points to
arguments being developed across different fields that, when read together,
limit the salience of sovereignty as an excuse for the continued project of
deportation. Thus, the arguments below seek to reveal the arbitrary linkage of
immigration with sovereignty.
New frameworks that complicate U.S. sovereignty are sorely needed.
Spanish philosopher Daniel Innerarity has pointed to the need to expand the
debate about sovereignty beyond "rigid borders that continue colonizing a good
part of our political imaginary."2
Implicitly or explicitly calling national
sovereignty itself into question undermines the claim that deportation is a
necessary incident of sovereignty.
Linda Bosniak's work on alternative
conceptions of citizenship is instructive here. Bosniak considers these alternative
conceptions a critical tool to enable us to challenge the presumption that
"citizenship is appropriately (and necessarily) an enterprise located within the
bounds
of
the
modern
nation-state,
and ... any
alternative
conception . . . require[s] special justification."2 78
Likewise, the arguments

274.

For an example of an immigrant advocate calling for humane deportation, see Sonia
Nazario, Opinion, Do You CareAbout the Rule of Law? Then Act Like It, N.Y. TIMES (July
11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/asylum-immigration-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZHK-EE7X] ("What we should do is let asylum seekers cross our
borders and then release them-under supervision, monitored by case workers or even
ankle bracelets-while their claims are being processed .... If asylum seekers' claims are
rejected, they should be deported. In other words: be openhearted on the front end, giving
people a real chance at safety if they need it, and be tougher on the back end.").
275. Fine, supra note 37, at 117.
276. Id.
277.

DANIEL INNERARITY, GOVERNANCE IN THE NEw GLOBAL DISORDER: POLITICS FOR A POST-

SOVEREIGN SOCIETY 80 (Sandra Kingery trans., 2016).
278. Bosniak, supra note 18, at 453.
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presented in this Part seek to "invert the burden of justification" 279 inherent in the
notion that deportation (like citizenship) is incident to sovereignty. They seek to
force sovereignty to justify itself, both on its own terms and as an excuse for the
practice of deportation.
When viewed from the point of view of a person facing deportation (as
opposed to from the point of view of U.S.-born scholars and advocates), this
inverted burden makes the most sense, despite straining the political imaginary of
those who are already secure in their enjoyment of U.S. citizenship's promise. The
arguments in this Part begin the work of dismantling the defense of deportation as
a legitimate practice of sovereignty. This Part proposes that sovereignty as a
defense of deportation tends to occlude histories that led to the current
maldistribution of resources at the heart of modern migration patterns, that
sovereignty as a defense of deportation obscures the incoherence of the United
States as a bordered or boundaried nation-state, and that sovereignty as a defense
of deportation obscures the unjust advantages the United States enjoys as an
imperial power in the twenty-first century, thus making its defenders unwitting
participants in exercises of domination.
1.

Inverting the Burden: Settler Colonialism

Justifying deportation as incident to sovereignty in the United States requires
a return to nineteenth century legal arguments, made by Supreme Court justices
in the 1880s in a trilogy of cases that sought to justify the racist exclusion of Asian
nationals from the United States. 280 This is the usual starting point for discussions
of the right to deport when considered by immigration scholars, because the

279. Id.
280. Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, seeking to bar people of Chinese descent
from entering or remaining in the United States. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58
(1882) (repealed 1943). The Supreme Court upheld the Act, disguising its racist motivation in
a call for respect for sovereignty:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do
not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it
could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of
another power.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889);
see also Leti Volpp, The Indigenous as Alien, 5 U.C. IRvINE L. REv. 289, 290 (2015) ("These
cases- Chae Chan Ping, Ekiu, and Fong Yue Ting-established what is called 'plenary power'
over the regulation of immigration. This has meant that the political branches of the U.S.
nation-state have the power to exclude aliens, admit them on such terms as they see fit, and
deport them with little or no constraint from the judicial branch, as a legitimate exercise of
the powers inherent in nation-state sovereignty." (footnotes omitted)).
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Chinese exclusion cases are accepted to have established the "plenary power"
doctrine-the power by the political branches of the United States to exclude,
admit, and deport noncitizens on whatever terms they consider acceptable-as a
legitimate exercise of sovereignty of the nation-state. 21 As Sherally Munshi puts
it:
Of course, the crude nativism expressed in the Chinese Exclusion Acts
is no longer tolerated, but the conceptions of territorialsovereignty and
immigrant exclusion announced in the Chinese Exclusion Cases remain
a defining feature of our legal landscape. The Supreme Court has done
little to unsettle the principle that territorial sovereignty includes the
absolute right to exclude or deport foreigners.2"2

The Chinese exclusion cases established the modern deportation regime, rooting
the deportation power-and the lack of judicial review over such power-in a
defense of sovereignty that remains good law today.
The tendency to take the nation-state as currently configured for granted
underlies much immigration scholarship and advocacy. 23 While the role of the
Chinese exclusion cases is often commented on, the overlapping histories of
subordination that created the current landscape deportations take place in today
are often occluded, except as a historical note.28 4 Immigration scholars do cite
Indian removal laws as historical antecedents to U.S. deportation laws and
policies,285 but for the most part, the past is considered past in immigration
scholarship and advocacy. Citing Carole Bateman, critical immigration scholar
Leti Volpp notes that "this tendency to presume borders are fixed over time is
common to political theory: 'discussions of the legitimacy of the modern state
([which is] always taken for granted) have said nothing about the land on which

281. Volpp, supra note 280, at 290.
282. Sherally Munshi, Race, Geography, andMobility, 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 245,276 (2016).
283. Volpp, supra note 280, at 294 ("[Immigration scholarship] unreflectively reflects the
tradition of Westphalian territorial sovereignty, whereby a single sovereign controls
absolutely a defined territory and its associated population.").
284. See Sherally Munshi, Immigration, Imperialism, and the Legacies of Indian Exclusion, 28
YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 51, 78 (2016) ("Exclusion narratives focus too narrowly on the
actions of government, tending to reify the apparent givenness of the nation-state in its
current configuration, effacing the contingencies that gave rise to its creation. In turn,
they often render the nation-state a relative constant through history, permanent and
immovable, resistant to the creative actions and political agency of individuals and
collectivities.").
285. E.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 41, at 63-90 (describing the Trail of Tears as well as fugitive
slave laws as the "[a]ntecedents" of American deportation policy).

1100

68 UCLA L. REV. 1040 (2021)

the state is created.' In immigration law, states are fixed, and people are in

motion.""6
Indigenous scholars reveal the limits of considering states-and the histories
that created them-as fixed. They urge reconsideration of U.S. sovereignty as a
given, not just based on historical antecedents, but on the ongoing experience of
Indigenous people. Indigenous anthropologist Audra Simpson cautions: "The
cornerstones of democratic governance-consent, citizenship, rule by
representation-are revealed to be precarious at best when the experiences of
Indigenous peoples are brought to bear on democracy's own promises and
tenets." 8 7 Pointing to "complicated relationships to the past, to territory, and to
governance," Simpson asserts "that Indigeneity is quite simply a key to critical
analysis, not as a model of an alternative theoretical project or method (as
interesting and valuable as this is) but simply as a case that, when considered
robustly, fundamentally interrupts what is received, what is ordered, what is
supposed to be settled."28 8 For Simpson, the ongoing survival and experience of
Indigenous people in North America and their assertion of Indigenous
sovereignty "call[s] up both the impermanence of state boundaries and the
precarious claims to sovereignty enjoyed by liberal democracies such as the
United States."28 9 The precarity of the United States's claims to sovereignty, when
viewed from the point of view of Indigenous people whose very survival proves an
ongoing challenge to the United States's existence, indicates cracks in the edifice of
an unquestioned sovereignty as a justification for deportation.2 9
These cracks in sovereignty's facade are acknowledged by scholars and
activists who point to the complexity of attempting to resolve the status of
immigrants with calls for membership on lands wrested from Indigenous

286. Volpp, supra note 280, at 296 (alteration in original) (quoting Carole Pateman, The
Settler Contract, in CONTRACT & DOMINATION 35, 36 (Carol Pateman & Charles W.
Mills eds., 2007)).
287. Audra Simpson, Settlement's Secret, 26 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 205,209 (2011).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 211.
290. Alyosha Goldstein, Introduction: Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present, in
FORMATIONS OF UNITED STATES COLONIALISM 9-10 (Alyosha Goldstein ed., 2014) ("As Jodi
Byrd points out, the 'settler colony's national construction of itself as an ever more perfect
multicultural, multiracial democracy' depends on relegating colonialism and slavery to the
past while adamantly denying their continued significance-as the ongoing exploitation of
land and resources and the racialized justification for dehumanization and expendabilityas the material foundation for U.S. global empire. Thus to emphasize colonialism is to
acknowledge that continental conquest and the diverse forms of unincorporation,
inclusion, and partial sovereignty perpetuated by the United States remain incomplete,
unsettling, unresolved, and ongoing." (footnote omitted) (quoting JODI A. BYRD, THE
TRANSIT OF EMPIRE: INDIGENOUS CRITIQUES OF COLONIALISM 123 (2011)).
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people. 291 In The Indigenous as Alien, Volpp examines the liberal consensus of the
United States as a "nation of immigrants," with people from around the world
choosing as individuals to migrate and pursue the American dream:
[This] obscures the nonconsensual bases of American democracy-if
American is a product of free choice, there is no slavery, colonial
possession, conquest, and genocide; the violent sources of the
republic are recentered on the idea of voluntary choice continually
reaffirmed by the figure of the immigrant consenting to membership
in the regime . . .. The desiring of America eclipses the dispossession
by America. This dispossession disappears, "buriedunderneath" the
vision of America as a land of equality and liberty. The nation thus
appears as an ethical community, rather than as the product of
violence, or as an accident.292

Other scholars have pointed to the need to theorize the complexity of
mass displacement of Indigenous peoples across the Americas, many of whom are
now arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border only to face incarceration and
deportation to countries with which they have contested relationships.293 As these
scholars show, U.S. sovereignty, as a coherent and absolute reason to uphold the
continued existence of deportation, does not survive an intellectually honest
encounter with ongoing Indigenous survival and struggles for self-determination.
The assertion that sovereignty extends to the control of immigration is
contradicted by the refusal of the U.S. government to recognize its present failure

291. As Sherally Munshi puts it, "[i]n the past few years, scholars working across fields of
[I]ndigenous studies, ethnic studies, and immigration law have begun to interrogate the
relationship between the demand for inclusion issued by racialized immigrants, on the one
hand, and the ongoing and unredressed violence of settler colonialism, on the other."
Munshi, supra note 284, at 80 n.146; see also Volpp, supra note 280, at 289 ("Immigration law,
as it is taught, studied, and researched in the United States, imagines away the fact of
preexisting [I]ndigenous peoples."); Amar Bhatia, We Are All Here to Stay? Indigeneity,
Migration, and 'Decolonizing'the Treaty Right to Be Here, 31 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST.,
no. 2, 2013, at 39. (examining how migrant rights and treaty relations might interact when
informed by Indigenous law and legal traditions); DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 58 (arguing
that positing the United States as a "nation of immigrants" promotes a benign narrative of
progress that obscures that the country was founded in violence as a settler state, imperialist
from its inception).
292. Volpp, supra note 280, at 321-22 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Philip P. Frickey, (Native)
American Exceptionalism in FederalPublic Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. 433,434 (2005)).
293. See, e.g, Megan Ybarra, Why Are Indigenous Children Dying at the US Border? Transnational
State Violence and Indigenous Erasure in Asylum Bureaucracies, SOC'Y & SPACE (Jan. 16, 2019),
http://societyandspace.org/2019/01/16/why-are-indigenous-children-dying-at-the-us-bordertransnational-state-violence-and-indigenous-erasure-in-asylum-bureaucracies
[https://perma.cc/2VGQ-3SZT]; Megan Ybarra, "We Are Not Ignorant": Transnational
Migrants'Experiences of RacializedSecuritization, 37 SOC'Y & SPACE 197 (2019).
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to uphold treaties with American Indian tribes that nominally granted land in the
first instance.
2.

Inverting the Burden: Imperial Interconnection

If and when grappling with U.S. sovereignty enters discussions about
immigration enforcement policy, it is often in terms of an exhortation to
consider "root causes" ofmigrant flows. 294 The U.S. public is urged to consider the
context for the arrival of those coming to the territory, particularly in terms of
reckoning with the United States's role in developing the conditions that led
people to arrive here to begin with. This is vital work. As scholar Eddie Bruce Jones
suggests, in the context of calling for a new way of teaching law:
[W] e should present refugee law, and immigration law more generally,
within the broader context of global power relations in order to
properly identify its limits, if we are indeed concerned with the
transformative potential that decolonial thinking promises. We should
do this in a way that takes historical developments into account,
including and indeed especially racialized colonial relations.2 95

When viewed in light of a commitment to ending deportation, however,
work to elevate the root causes of migrant flows can take on a different cast.
Questioning the United States's sovereign territoriality and historic and ongoing
practice of interventions with other nations' affairs can act as more than a call to
remind the United States about its obligations to people impacted. Instead, it can
undermine the very capacity of the United States to claim the right to deport
anyone. In this telling, the United States is not a benevolent superpower which, in
looking out for the world's stability, sometimes contributes to refugee flows which
it acknowledges and deals with humanely. Instead, the United States's repeated
and well-documented violations of the sovereignty of other nations can be wielded
to dismantle the notion that U.S. sovereignty should remain sacrosanct in its
expression in the practice of deportation.
International law scholar E. Tendayi Achiume has taken these root cause
arguments in a new and provocative direction, providing necessary analysis that
helps build toward the end of deportation by refusing to accept sovereignty as an

294. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Thinking Broadly About Immigration Reform by Addressing Root
Causes, in 1 LEGAL BRIEFS ON IMMIGRATION REFORM FROM 25 OF THE TOP LEGAL MINDS IN THE
COUNTRY 224,236 (Deborah Robinson & Mona Parsa eds., 2011).
295. Bruce-Jones, supranote 162, at 183.

The End of Deportation

1103

excuse for the violent regulation of migratory flows.2 96 Her paradigm-shifting
construction of migration as decolonization challenges the accepted relationship
between migrant sending and receiving countries. Achiume reconceptualizes
migration by describing decolonization as:
[T]he pursuit of a long overdue geopolitical reordering of benefits
of a global order defined by interdependence forged in the colonial
era. As people move across international borders fleeing or rejecting
severe political-economic conditions and the fallout of these
conditions, the movement of these individuals can be understood to
enact an important step in the process of decolonization.
If
colonialism was a mandatory invitation to co-depend in a
relationship characterized by asymmetric benefits, decolonization
as I conceive of it here is the pursuit of a more equitable marriage
between the geopolitical center and the periphery.297

This reconceptualization of migration-which necessarily includes a
reconceptualization of deportation-represents an important departure from the
sovereignty-based arguments for migration control. Achiume's description ofthe
"mandatory invitation to co-depend" describes not only colonial relationships,
but also the current relationship of the United States to much of the world,
rendering her analysis even more pertinent to the U.S. context. 29 Achiume's work
seeks to "supplant the extant international legal fiction and logic of formally

296. E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REv. 1509 (2019) [hereinafter
Achiume, Migration as Decolonization].
297. E. Tendayi Achiume, Reimagining InternationalLaw for Global Migration: Migration as
Decolonization?, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 142, 145 (2017) (emphasis omitted)
[hereinafter Achiume, Reimagining International Law]. In another Article, Achiume
summarizes her intervention:
First and Third World peoples are not political strangers. They are quite the
opposite: Due to neocolonial interconnection, First and Third World
peoples are bound in a relationship of co-sovereignty that makes Third
World peoples political insiders to First World nation-states. Corrective
distributive justice considerations give Third World migrants entitlements to
national admission and inclusion in the First World. Where Third World
migration is responsive to neocolonial subordination, it should be understood
as decolonial insofar as it enhances political equality, even if only as a formal
matter. The migration as decolonization thesis foregrounds the political
agency of migrants, and presents neocolonial interconnection and
subordination as the baseline from which the ethics of immigration
restrictions should be assessed, and from which these restrictions should be
negotiated. First World nation-states have no right to exclude Third World
peoples, and creating a world that reflects this fact requires a complete
reimagining of national borders and the institutions of political inclusion.
Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, supra note 296, at 1573-74.
298. Achiume, ReimagininglnternationalLaw, supra note 297, at 145.
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independent, autonomous nation-states (each with a right to exclude
nonnationals as a matter of existential priority), with the logic and ethics of
imperial
interconnection
(specifically,
colonial
and
neocolonial
interconnection) .... "299
In line with an abolitionist ethic, Achiume specifically reconfigures
sovereignty from the point of view of displaced migrants.3" From the vantage
point of the deportable, migration is a manifestation of a redistributive politics;
every attempted move to the United States by an unauthorized migrant represents
an attempt at "reordering [the] benefits" of the global order, if only for survival."'
The apprehension and deportation of such individuals involves reinforcing the
United States's prerogative to resist the individual attempts to reorder the
distribution of life chances and rebalance the asymmetrical harms of empire and
colonization.
Considering challenges to deportation in light of the migration as
decolonization framework "invert[s] the burden" in the Bosniak sense,3 2 forcing
the United States to justify its project of reinforcing vastly uneven relations
through deportation. For those displaced migrants just arriving in the United
States after their initial displacement from their countries of origin, the act of
deportation is a secondary displacement. If their act of arriving in the United
States can be conceptualized as part of a process of decolonization, the United
States's insistence on deporting them not only undermines their life chances
because of the violence of deportation, but also reinforces the asymmetrical,
neocolonial relationships between the United States and the migrants' home
countries, by forcing people whose survival in the home country is at risk
(economically, politically, socially, or otherwise) to nonetheless be banished there.
Achiume's intervention decisively destabilizes the category of sovereignty as
a defense to deportation. The usual defense of sovereignty as an excuse for
deportation has at its root the existential threat that noncitizens are thought to pose
to the United States if the government did not have the power to exclude and
deport them. By focusing on the experience of migrants and on the unequal
299. Achiume, Migrationas Decolonization,supra note 296, at 1520-21 (footnote omitted).
300. Id. at 1569 ("The second yield is to center migrants and the political equality ambitions of their
movement as capable of suggesting more ethical, and perhaps more sustainable, contours of
territorial and political borders. In other words, contrary to an a priori stipulation of an openborders regime between the First and Third Worlds, the call is to look to the agents, impetus,
and patterns of decolonial migration as vital sources of information about border regime
institutional design. Third World migrants-including unauthorized economic migrantsemerge as a vital new 'epistemological source."' (quoting Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies andReparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 325 (1987)).
301. Achiume, ReimagininglnternationalLaw, supranote 297, at 145.
302. Bosniak, supra note 18, at 453.
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relationships imposed by countries like the United States on migrant-sending
countries, Achiume reveals that "to the extent Third World migrants are seen as
a threat to First World nation-states, they are more properly understood as
only truly threatening the continuing and illegitimate First World
subordination of Third World peoples, with whom they share the neocolonial
empire that remains in effect today."" 3 Thus, in Achiume's account, the supposed
sovereignty threat is a long-overdue reordering of the United States's unequal
relationships of subordination with Third World countries. When viewed in this
light, sovereignty as an excuse for deportation becomes much less defensible. In
fact, in this telling, those who seek justice for migrants are invited to assist in
sovereignty's undoing.
3.

Inverting the Burden: Slippery Borders

A separate but related claim to the limits of sovereignty in justifying
deportation is the way that this argument occludes the incoherence of the United
States as a territory bounded by definable borders. The perennial debate on the
construction of a U.S.-Mexico border wall..4 reinforces the sense in the public's
imaginary that there is a distinct and bounded entity, the United States of
America, which can be demarcated with a physical barrier. The arguments for and
against the wall debate the effectiveness of such a barrier, but there is little public
debate over where the wall would be built if funded. These arguments assume
there is a "there" that is the United States, and that there is a world outside U.S.
borders that is not the United States. 05 The scope of the debate is limited to
whether the exercise of U.S. sovereignty requires a physical barrier, or whether the
existing infrastructure along the border is a sufficient deterrent to those who seek
to penetrate the United States's clearly demarcated territory.
This view ofthe United States as a sovereign territory with coherent edges has
been persistently challenged by scholars in fields outside immigration law. As
Alyosha Goldstein points out:

303. Achiume, Migrationas Decolonization,supra note 296, at 1568.
304. See, e.g., Rebecca Ballhaus & Peter Nicholas, Trump Seeks to Reset Border-Wall Debate,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2019, 12:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ president-trumpstate-of-the-union-2019-11549390001 [https://perma.cc/YSZ3-GSHR]; Jordain Carney,
GOPBristles OverPlan to Shift Military Fundingto Border Wall, HILL (Mar. 1, 2019,6:00 AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/432129-gop-bristles-over-plan-to-shift-militaryfunding-to-border-wall [https://perma.cc/KQ65-4Z3V]; Glenn Thrush, He Says 'Wall,' They
Say 'Border Security' A Glossary of the Border Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/us/
politics/border-wall-types.html
[https://perma.cc/82YW-GD74].
305. See Volpp, supra note 280, at 294.
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The United States of America has never been a uniform or unequivocal
geopolitical entity. This is not merely a consequence of prevailing
forms of federalism, demographic heterogeneity, or regional
particularity. This is not simply a matter of an unavoidable gap
between empirical description and the ideal form of the nation-state.
Rather, the United States encompasses a historically variable and
uneven constellation of state and local governments, [I]ndigenous
nations, unincorporated territories, free associated commonwealths,
protectorates, federally administered public lands, military bases,
export processing zones, colonias, and anomalies such as the District of
Columbia that do not comprehensively delineate an inside and outside
of the nation-state.306

The incoherence of the United States's boundaries is exacerbated by the
country's political interconnectedness with other nation-states, notably those with
whom it shares a continent. Rather than consider the United States a discrete
autonomous political community, Achiume's work suggests that scholars and
policymakers consider how the brutal and ongoing initiation of other countries
into the United States's political community challenges any suggestion that the
boundaries of the United States coincide with its national territorial borders.307
The claim for strong borders-and for a deportation regime premised on the need
to maintain such borders-is undermined by analyzing how the United States as a
project far exceeds its traditional territorialborders.308
This is not to say the traditional map of the United States holds no meaning.
For noncitizens, the effect of deportation could not be clearer in terms of
territoriality (you are either allowed to remain on land marked U.S. soil or you
are not), and as a result, much writing and advocacy on deportation remains
likewise limited to discussing the process of deportation in the United States and
the effects on those facing deportation and their families and communities. There
is also a burgeoning literature on what happens to people after they are deported,

306. Goldstein, supra note 290, at 1.
307. See Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, supra note 296, at 1533.
308. Leti Volpp points to how exercises of governance outside of territorially marked borders have
always been the rule, rather than the exception, leading to the "fracturingof the Westphalian
model, though legal fictions." Leti Volpp, Commentary, Imaginings of Space in Immigration
Law, 9 LAw, CULTURE & HUMANITIES 456, 461 (2013). Citing the work of Kal Raustiala and
Teemu Ruskola, Volpp points to spaces even within the traditional borders of the nation state
where "the territorial sovereign's power did not reach" (including sanctuaries and
ambassador's residences), and spaces outside the nation state where the sovereign's power did
reach (through colonial governance and extraterritorial jurisdiction). Id. Modern day
manifestations of such exercises of governance abound, with the ongoing debates about the
legitimacy of the incarceration and prosecution of Guantanamo detainees as one prominent
example. See id. at 458.
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which explores the impacts of deportation on people who have been banished to
their countries of origin. 309 These still take for granted that there is a place
where deportation occurs (on U.S. territory), and there is a place where
deportees go (away from U.S. territory), and that maintaining the integrity of the
United States as a territory depends on the U.S. government's ability to continue
to banish people outside of its territory at will.
Looking at the United States's presence in other countries quickly calls this
common sense division into question. The vast amount of space the United States
exercises control over (both literally and in a political sense) outside of its
territories undermines the claim that deportation is necessary to maintain the
integrity of U.S. territorial borders. The enormous reach of U.S. interventionism
calls into question any notion of the United States as having fixed, definable
borders to begin with, and undermines any claims to the integrity of such borders
in every sense of the word. The notion of a bounded U.S. sovereignty is
contradicted by fact that the United States's actual borders can be difficult to
pinpoint, given the terms ofits territorial reach across the globe. The United States
currently has about eight hundred military bases in seventy countries, with about
200,000 troops stationed abroad.310 While some of these bases are small, others
constitute entire cities within the countries hosting the bases, with their own
hospitals, schools, and other infrastructure, including 194 military-run golf
courses outside the United States." At their core, these bases demonstrate an
incursion into another country's sovereignty, and represent one of the most
prominent indicators of the United States's exceptional relationship to the
rest of the world.
Attempting a thought experiment in which the United States invites or even
tolerates another country having a military base on U.S. land illuminates this
exceptionalism. The disbelief that greeted Ecuador's suggestion that they open a
military base in Miami in exchange for the U.S. military continuing to use an air
base in that country highlights the deeply worn groove that U.S.

309.

See,

e.g.,

BETH C. CALDWELL, DEPORTED AMERICANS: LIFE AFTER DEPORTATION TO MEXICO

(2019); GOLASH-BOZA,supra note 242; KANSTROOM,supra note 169.
310. David Vine, Where in the World Is the U.S. Military?, POLITICO MAG. (July-Aug. 2015),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/us-military-bases-around-the-world119321 [https://perma.cc/4JYT-7YU3]; Thomas Gibbons-Neff& Eric Schmitt, Despite Vow to
End 'Endless Wars,'Here's Where About 200,000 Troops Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 10/21/world/middleeast/us-troops-deployments.html
[https://perma.cc/W329-PMKP].
311. Vine, supra note 310; AJ Vicens & Eric Wuestewald, Green Zones: A Map of the US Military's
Golf Courses, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.mothejones.com/
politics/2014/01/pentagon-military-golf-courses-map [https://perma.cc/DP2Q-CQUK].

1108

68 UCLA L. REV. 1040 (2021)

exceptionalism has worn.3" The current global status quo involves U.S. military
presence abroad going not just unchallenged, but mostly unremarked on by
people who live in U.S. territory, with bipartisan support of an ever-growing
military budget being the norm rather than the exception. 313 This status quo could
instead be reframed as the United States's anomalous disregard of internationally
accepted norms of sovereignty (which involve the norm of not having a military
base on another country's territory). The claim of the United States as one
among a group of equal sovereign nations, all of whom have the right to
exclude and deport, is seriously undermined when considering the United
States as an international anomaly-a superpower that wields disproportionate
weight in the international arena by dint of its unmatched ability among nations
to exert control backed by the threat of its deadly arsenal. 314
The lack of coherent borders to U.S. territory (and to the country's influence)
undermines the claim that sovereignty justifies deportation. Likewise, the United
States's outsized borders of influence are not a mere historical accident-they are
continually maintained and strengthened in order to maintain advantages. "The
United States nevertheless remains reliant on the ever-expanding dispossession
and disavowal of [I]ndigenous peoples, global circuits of expropriated labor,
economies of racialization, and its expansive network of military bases-that is, on
people and places remade as things in the service of the accumulation of wealth
and the exercise of geopolitical power."" Thus an uncritical adoption of
sovereignty as excusing deportation occludes the unjust advantages-in the form
of political and economic subordination of other nations-that the United States's
outsized borders create and maintain.
What's more, the maintenance of these advantages is part and parcel of a
project of preemptive deportation through exclusion that exceeds the traditional
boundaries of nation-state sovereignty. As Ayelet Shachar has posited, "[t]he
border has broken free ofthe map; it may extend well beyond the edge of a territory
or well into its interior."316 She calls for a new paradigm-the shifting border-to

312. See Phil Stewart, EcuadorWants MilitaryBase in Miami, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2007, 7:43 AM),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/ecuador-base/ecuador-wants-military-base-in-miamiidUKADD25267520071022 [https://perma.cc/EVB2-CTR7].
313. See BenWerner, Pentagon to StartFY2019 With Defense SpendingBill Signed Into Law, USNI
NEWS
(Sept.
28,
2018,
6:19
PM),
https://news.usni.org/2018/09/28/36944
[https://perma.cc/974P-HZ2V].
314. See Daniel Cebul, US Remains Top Military Spender, SIPRI Reports, DEF. NEWS (May 2,
2018),
https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/05/02/us-remains-top-militaryspender-sipri-reports [https://perma.cc/6R43-ZHBB].
315. Goldstein, supra note 290, at 1-2.
316. Ayelet Shachar, Beyond Open and Closed Borders: The Grand Transformation of Citizenship,
11 JURus. 1, 5 (2020).
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describe the unmooring of state power from a fixed geographical marker.
Prefiguring this theoretical move, a 2016 article in the Journalon Migration and
Human Security defined the collection of actions the United States is taking
beyond its traditional borders to prevent migrants from entering U.S. territory as
the "externalization of migration controls."' These actions can be taken by one
state or several states acting in concert, and also enlist the services of private
actors. 318 One particularly salient example of external migration control in action
is the United States's ongoing efforts to control Haitian migration. In the aftermath
of the disastrous January 2010 earthquake, the U.S. Coast Guard patrolled the
waters outside Haiti to ensure that Haitians could not escape the widespread crises
of disease, homelessness, and food insecurity that followed the humanitarian
disaster by attempting to flee to the United States. 319 A recording of Haiti's
ambassador to the United States was played over loudspeakers from a U.S. Air
Force cargo plane that flew over the island, directing Haitians not to attempt to
come to the United States. 2 ' This type of activity dates back to the 1980s, when the
U.S. Coast Guard apprehended 22,000 Haitians attempting to seek political
asylum.321 Of these 22,000, fewer than a dozen were brought to the United States
to allow them to pursue asylum claims.3 22
Outside of directly engaging with Haitians to block any attempt at passage to
the United States, the United States has also built up the capacity of Haiti's nearest
neighbor, the Dominican Republic (the two nations share one island), to arrest and
deport Haitians. 323 The U.S. government facilitated the initial creation of a border
patrol-style agency for the government of the Dominican Republic, and the U.S.
Border Patrol subsequently engaged in extensive training for the newly-created

317. Bill Frelick, Ian M. Kysel & Jennifer Podkul, The Impact of Externalization of Migration
Controls on the Rights ofAsylum Seekers and OtherMigrants, 4J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC.
190,193 (2016).
318. For example, people employed by international airline carriers are now mandated to provide
information on passengers boarding planes to the United States. Anil Kalhan, Immigration
Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REv. 1, 15 (2014).
319. Todd Miller, Wait-What Are US Border PatrolAgents Doing in the DominicanRepublic?,
NATION (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/wait-what-are-us-border-patrolagents-doing-dominican-republic [https://perma.cc/2DE8-GHQ2]
[hereinafter Miller,

Wait-What?].
320. Id.
321. Frelick, Kysel & Podkul, supranote 317, at 199.
322. Id.
323. Todd Miller, How the US Militarized the Haiti-Dominican Republic Border, MOTHER JONES
(Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.mothejones.com/politics/2013/11/border-patrol-us-haitidominican-republic [https://perma.cc/3AC7-DZUQ] [hereinafter Miller, U.S. Militarized];
Miller, Wait-What?, supra note 319.

1110

68 UCLA L. REV. 1040 (2021)

Dominican border patrol agency.324 This new agency's primary target is the
Haitian migrants who attempt to cross into the Dominican Republic. The
Dominican Republic is just one example of the export of U.S.-benefitting
migration control-between 2002 and 2013, the U.S. Border Patrol trained 15,000
foreign border officers in over one hundred countries.3 5
Beyond simply preventing migrants from entering the legal jurisdiction of
the United States, the United States's efforts at external migration control can be
viewed as part of a larger project not just of controlling migrants, but of enforcing
the very divisions that mark the dividing line between the wealthy global north and
the countries of the global south and their populations, what some term "global
apartheid." 32 6 The problem with the externalization of migration controls is not
just that it makes it harder for deserving asylum seekers to make it to the United
States to seek protection (which it undoubtedly does), but that it reinforces the
notion that the part of humanity that employs migration as a survival tactic is the
problem to be managed. Addressing the role of informal U.S. imperialism in
creating the vast inequalities that feed migrant flows is ignored in favor of an
approach that interdicts those that do attempt to survive their subordination by
migrating. The fact that countries of the global south host 80 percent of the
world's refugees highlights the success the United States and other countries
of the global north have had in keeping displacement-that they often had a
direct hand in creating-far from their shores, all in the name of sovereignty.327
From the point of view of those who are dominated and marginalized, the
United States is experienced as exclusion, no matter what promise it holds as a
rhetorical beacon of democracy. For most ofthe people ofthe world, including the
majority of residents of the global south, exclusion and deportability defines their
relationship to the United States. This is not to say that the rest of the world exists
in relationship to the United States, but rather that U.S. imperialism forces a
relationship with much of the world-whether in the form of military bases, the
militaryincursions these bases support, or the export of criminal and immigration
policy,328 to say nothing of the United States's coercive economic relations with
other nations. That relationship is not one that welcomes the people of most of
the world as potential citizens of the United States, or even potential visitors, but
rather as deportable subjects the United States must surround and control even

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Miller, US. Militarized,supra note 323; Miller, Wait-What?, supra note 319.
Miller, Wait-What?, supra note 319.
Eg., GoLASH-BozA,supra note 242, at 261.
SASSEN, supra note 266, at 61.
See generally Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 83 (2010).
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before they attempt passage to U.S. territory. Bosniak writes that her critical
approach to citizenship is motivated "less by liberal universalism than by an ethical
desire to combat domination and marginalization wherever they occur. "329 Most
scholars and advocates who critique twenty-first century deportation policy would
likely identify their work as in line with combatting domination and
marginalization. Yet until scholars and advocates fully embrace the task of
challenging sovereignty as a cover story for legitimating deportation and
exclusion, deportation as an exercise of subordination of marginalized people will
remain undisturbed.
Even those who are willing to question sovereignty's limitations as a
justification for deportation might be unwilling to question the promise of liberal
nationalism. As Michael Walzer and others have argued, hardened borders (and,
thus, deportations) are necessary not only to define the polity (they are what create
the "we"), but also to allow for liberal values and rights within the state."' In this
view, the liberal state is the "ultimate embodiment of the values that enable and
guarantee equality."" The embrace of liberal nationalism is what allows many
scholars and advocates to be pro-migrant but not necessarily anti-deportation.
The logic of liberal nationalism presumes the violence of deportation is an
acceptable and inevitable sacrifice to maintain a coherent national community
that can protect those who maintain membership. Theorizing deportation
abolition requires challenging the promises of liberal nationalism, and of
membership and belonging.
Those challenges have already been taken up in other contexts, and include
arguments that a person's place of birth should be treated as morally irrelevant as
a feature for differentiating between persons. 3 2 Another challenge has come from
the work of Ayelet Shachar, who posits a "shifting-border" framework to describe
the ways in which "the long arm of the state to regulate mobility" extends "half a
world away while also stretching deep into the interior," thus destabilizing the
"familiar dichotomous categorization of a 'soft' inside (where rights are extensively

329. Bosniak, supra note 18, at 502.
330.

See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 29-32

(1983). For Walzer, membership is "the most important good," which defines access to
all other goods and should be distributed by those who are already members. Id. at 29; see
also Bosniak, supra note 18, at 502 ("Many liberal nationalists, for example, ague that a
high degree of solidarity among members of a national community is a necessary
precondition for the kinds of redistributive policies in the advanced capitalist countries
that liberals usually support.").
331. REDDY,supranote 231, at8.
332.

Martha C. Nussbaum, Reply, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM

131,133 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
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protected) and a'hard' outside (where protections typically do not apply)."333 On
a related note, Bosniakhas argued that the costs ofgranting rights and privileges to
members depends "upon the policing of territorial boundaries against outsiders
far more desperately needy than those who are able to enjoy" the benefits of insider
status.33 4 Her arguments dovetail with Achiume's, in calling attention to the way
that the benefits of membership provided by wealthy nations like the United States
require enormous economic resources that are "amassed at the expense of
nationals of former colonies and less developed countries."" Along the same
lines, Soya Jung argues against "belonging" as the ultimate goal, stating that "[t]he
failures of capitalism and modern liberal democracy stem from their reliance on
belonging as the basis for differential valuations of human life."336
When viewed from the point of view of the deportable, demands for
inclusion or membership are likely to fail. For this population, the move most
aligned with their survival would be to challenge the legitimacy of a nation-state
committed to ongoing violence against nonmembers to secure freedoms for its
members. That challenge could take many forms, and will require not a renewed
commitment to inclusion for some at the cost of permanent banishment for
others, but rather a replacement for the rivalries of membership, a shift in how we
relate to each other.3" A politics of deportation abolition embraces this shift. As

333. Shachar, supra note 35, at 217-18.
334. Bosniak, supra note 18, at 502.
335. Id.
336. Jung, supra note 212, at 52.
337. Soya Jung's formulation informs this argument:
Antiracist struggle requires not a reshuffling of categories but a replacement for
the rivalries of capitalism, a new common sense and practice for how we live on
this earth.
I believe that the transformative potential we need lies in the growing global
ranks of the dispossessed, who are not all the same and are not all experiencing
the same things, but who are prey to the outcomes of an economic system that
so few ofus understand. This has always been true, but it has reached a different
scale and pace.
This is where a new kind of human identity can emerge, not from an invitation
to join the hegemon, not at the doorstep of the living. It will emerge from the
knowledge among the dispossessed that I am not you, and you are not me, and
that this is only a problem if our differences result in consequentially different
life outcomes and if they determine the ability of one of us to eat, to live free of
violence, to have adequate shelter, to form intimate human relationships, to be
healthy, and to imagine and create. The truth is that we need one another to do
these things.
Id. at 55, 62-63.
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discussed in the next Part, it seeks at once to dismantle and remake the conditions
of deportability that give rise to the immigration enforcement system.338

IV.

ENDING DEPORTATION IN PRACTICE

The full embrace of the common sense of deportation by the majority of
pro-immigrant lawyers, advocates, and academics means that even as the
violence inherent to deportation reaches new heights, responses to this crisis
remain restricted to mitigating deportation's harm to individual noncitizens. The
common sense of deportation-the idea that deportation is an inevitable and
necessary practice of immigration enforcement-creates this trap for proimmigrant advocacy efforts. In an effort to address the crisis of mass deportation,
and in the absence of being able or willing to argue against deportation itself, proimmigrant forces are instead limited to arguing that deportation is being
maldistributed-that there is a contradiction between what the rule oflaw requires,
what due process requires, and the way that deportation is currently being meted
out. Resolving this contradiction thus establishes the limits of pro-immigrant
efforts.
Attempts to resolve this contradiction take various forms. Some focus on
arguing for procedural protections, seeking to resolve the contradiction by making
sure those deported to a premature death only suffer such a fate after receiving the
most robust procedures available. Advocacy for universal representation of those
facing deportation proceedings falls in this category.339 Some focus on the
substantive remedies available within immigration law, seeking to resolve the
contradiction by proposing reforms to the immigration statute that would provide
expanded routes to lawful status to avoid deportation. Advocacy for expanded
forms of asylum relief, or for granting greater discretion to immigration judges,
prosecutors, and others to consider the equities in an individual's case, fall in this

338.

Cf BRETT STORY, PRISON LAND: MAPPING CARCERAL POWER ACROSS NEOLIBERAL AMERICA 22

(2019) ("An abolitionist politic is, at its core, transformative, seeking to remake the social
relations and power inequities that give rise to the prison system and for which the prison
system does work.").
339. See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon:
Immigration, Deportation, and the Right to Counsel, 39 HuM. RTs., no. 4, 2013, at 14, 14
(arguing that immigrants in removal proceedings should be entitled to counsel because of
the fundamental unfairness that faces unrepresented immigration defendants, and that the
due process rights ofnoncitizens today are less robust than those of criminal defendants preGideon); Johnson, supra note 230 (arguing that there should be a right to counsel in
deportation proceedings for lawful permanent residents because the proceedings implicate
life and liberty interests similar in kind to those at stake in criminal prosecutions).
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bucket.34 0 Some focus on the form of the immigration court itself, seeking, for
example, to transform the decisionmakers into judges ruled by Article I or III of
the U.S. Constitution, rather than decisionmakers employed at the will of the
attorney general of the United States. 4
What these efforts have in common is an inability to question "[t]he
legitimate limits of deportation."4
When considered through these reforms,
deportation is illegitimate because it is happening without the proper procedure,
or without the proper escape mechanisms, or in the wrong type of courtroom.
Reformers share a concern that the integrity of the immigration system is at risk.
The legitimacy of deportation as a practice of immigration enforcement is taken
as a given, and it is simply the form it takes that is the problem. This concern about
legitimacy and integrity is ultimately a concern about reconciling the United
States's idea about itself as a nation ofimmigrants committed to the rule oflaw with
the reality of deportation's inevitable and irremediable violence.43 The belief in the
ability of the rule of law and application ofthe Constitution to temper the harms of
deportation runs through these efforts to address deportation.
The process of attempting to resolve the contradiction between the violence
of deportation and a nation governed by the rule of law leads us away from the
necessary task of questioning deportability itself.4 The preceding Parts have

340. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 130, at 3 (discussing expedited removal, reinstatement of
removal, and administrative removal through the lens of prosecutorial discretion, and
suggesting that "the government has discretion to give individuals who present compelling
equities, including eligibility for relief, a more complete court proceeding before an
immigration judge"); Hing, supra note 230; Maritza I. Reyes, ConstitutionalizingImmigration
Law: The Vital Role of Judicial Discretion in the Removal of Lawful PermanentResidents, 84
TEMP. L. REV. 637 (2012); Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretionand the Need
for New Narrativesin the U.S. ImmigrationSystem, 26 GEO.IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012).
341. Stephen H. Legomsky, RestructuringImmigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010)
(proposing the creation of an Article III immigration court, and discussing proposals for an
Article I immigration court).
342. KANSTROOM, supranote 169, at 226.
343.

See MARC R. ROSENBLUM, DORIS MEISSNER, CLAIRE BERGERON & FAYE HIPSMAN, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST., THE DEPORTATION DILEMMA: RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT

1-2
(2014),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/RemovalsOverviewWEBFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/48FY-2KCB].
344. Others have noted this contradiction, and labeled it the "deportation dilemma"-that is,
the challenge of how to reconcile enforcement that is both tough and humane. Id. at 2.
This Article stakes out different normative ground, asserting that the contradiction, or
dilemma, cannot be resolved, but rather, that deportation should be ended altogether.
Hiroshi Motomura has labeled the contradiction "the most basic dilemma of immigration
and citizenship law in American political culture-or in any liberal democratic society
organized as a nation." Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law
and the Idea ofAmericans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 363 (2012).
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introduced critiques that destabilize deportation and lay the groundwork for
deportation abolition. This Part proposes a framework to guide deportation
abolition strategy, and to distinguish between proposals that try to resolve the
contradiction and those that actually challenge deportability.
While they may take many different forms, efforts to abolish deportation
share some normative commitments. Their end goal is to target one or more of
the conditions producing deportability. Their demands are collective, ratherthan
individual (even as they engage in fights on individual cases). They understand
state power (and thus, the power to deport) as an ensemble of structures, rather
than something held by one group to be seized by another, and engage accordingly
with public actors at all levels of governance, as well as private actors. Finally, the
politics underlying deportation abolition efforts are based on the refusal of social
value (the refusal to assign value to a person's life based on their potential social
contributions in any sphere)."'
Efforts in line with a commitment to deportation abolition reorient
allegiance toward the populations traditionally disavowed by law and away from
an unquestioning attachment to the abstraction of the rule of law. While the
politics challenging liberal nationalism may be far from mainstream, they
nevertheless inform interventions that prefigure the end of deportation. These
interventions redirect advocacy efforts toward those for whom a relationship to
the United States is defined by their deportability. This requires having an
allegiance toward those already living on U.S. territory (from recent arrivals to
longtime lawful permanent residents), those on their way (including those
apprehended by Mexican security forces and other U.S.-funded and trained
border forces before ever entering the United States), and those yet to come
(including those whose displacement has not yet occurred). It is an
allegiance that refuses geographic and temporal boundaries.
Part of opening the door to the end of deportation is having a practice of
discerning, in the present time, whether a proposed reform or existing practice
aligns with a politics of deportation abolition. The task of discerning which efforts
bring us closer to deportation abolition can take a page from efforts to abolish
prisons, where distinguishing between reforms that further entrench the carceral
landscape and nonreformist reforms-"those measures that reduce the power of

345.

See LISA MARIE CACHO, SOCIAL DEATH: RACIALIZED RIGHTLESSNESS AND THE CRIMINALIZATION
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an oppressive system while illuminating the system's inability to solve the crises it
creates"-is key.346 One set of discerning questions could include:
1. Does the effort/reform/practice take deportation's indefinite
continuation for granted?
2. Does it help build the infrastructure for managing continued
deportation?
3. Does it seek to dismantle a condition of deportability? In other
words, does it attack any of the underlying reasons that people
become targets of the immigration enforcement apparatus to begin
with, or any of the structures of the immigration enforcement
apparatus itself?.
In this formulation, a wide set of practices could be considered in line with
deportation abolition. Some will appear directly linked to immigration
enforcement (such as efforts at shutting down or preventing the construction of
new immigration detention centers 348 or targeting tech companies that contract
with ICE and CBP). 349 Some may appear, at least at first glance, to have a more
tenuous nexus (such as the effort to delete gang databases described below).
Sometimes the efforts will involve simply holding the line-not adding more
grounds for criminalizing immigrants to an immigration statute already bloated
with reasons to detain and deport, or calling to reverse existing laws that facilitate
deportation.350

346. Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba & David Stein, What Abolitionists Do, JACOBIN MAG. (Aug.
24,
2017),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/prison-abolition-reform-massincarceration [https://perma.cc/49JF-TC6X].
347. For an argument that a similar set of discerning questions are necessary when considering
comprehensive immigration reform proposals, see generally Chdzaro, supra note 232.
For a related set of criteria to assess whether a reform is in line with abolition, see ShiuMing Cheer, Abolitionist Reforms and the Immigrants'Rights Movement, 68 UCLA L.
REv. DISCOURSE (2020), https://www.uclalawreview.org/ abolitionist-reforms-and-theimmigrants-rights-movement [https://perma.cc/3LBY-LJQN].
See also DET. WATCH
NETWORK, ENDING IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ABOLITIONIST

STEPS VS. REFORMIST

REFORM,
https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/
files/DWN_Abolition%20vs%2OReform_ENG_2021_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FTA9QVTT] (delineating criteria for distinguishing between abolitionist and non-abolitionist
reforms as related to immigration detention).
348. See, e.g., #CommunitiesNotCages, DET. WATCH NETWORK, https://web.archive.org/
web/20191114215018/https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/take-action/
communitiesnotcages [https://perma.cc/8YL8-JUGQ] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019); Why
Shut Down? FAQ's, LA RESISTENCIA (Feb. 1, 2020), http://laresistencianw.org/why-shutdown-faqs [https://perma.cc/5KFW-SJYR].
349. #NOTECHFORICE, https://notechforice.com [https://perma.cc/A9YQ-A3JR] (last visited
Jan. 9, 2022).
350. See IMMIGRANT JUST. NETWORK ET AL., A NEW WAY FORWARD FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE:
DISMANTLE THE 1996 IMMIGRATION CRIMINALIZATION LAWS (2019), https://www.ilrc.org/
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Some might argue that on the heels of the spectacular anti-immigrant
violence ofthe Trump administration, now is the time to reinforce the rule of law
and constitutional norms both in the immigration realm and beyond.351 This
would mean losing a valuable opportunity. The exposed violence of deportation
provides an opening to question the limits of managing deportation and to
consider what it might mean to reject deportation-and its necessary corollary,
deportability-altogether. The purpose of this Part, as it is with this entire project,
is to lay the groundwork for imagining ourselves out of the common sense of
deportation. Pointing to the ways the common sense of deportation shapes-and
dangerously limits-reform proposals from pro-immigrant scholars and
advocates is a necessary part of that project. Pointing to efforts that defy the
common sense of deportation and embrace the possibility of deportation
abolition is likewise necessary. Ignoring this task means resigning ourselves to
reforms which, at best, merely manage deportation, and at worst, actually
reinforce deportability by hardening its edges. In order to illustrate the end of
deportation in practice, the analysis below contrasts a law reform proposal that
presumes indefinite deportation (injecting proportionality considerations into
deportation adjudication) with one in line with ending deportation (dismantling
gang databases).
A.

Case Study 1: Proportionality Reforms

Immigration scholars and advocates have approached the question of
injecting proportionality through distinct lenses, but they have in common a
commitment to decreasing deportation by mandating that a government

sites/default/files/resources/2019.06_ilrc_newway_forward.pdf [https://perma.cc/ VV4ETB4V].
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[https://perma.cc/YHB7-WPGR]; Liam Brennan, Trump's Disrespectfor the Rule of Law
Spreads, JUST SEC. (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 60663/trumps-disrespectrule-law-spreads [https://perma.cc/PJ8K-PZF4]; Annie Correal, Why Big Law Is Taking on
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N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 11/21/nyregion/president-trump-immigration-lawfirms.html [https://perma.cc/YPG5-GLFC]; Shikha Dalmia, Opinion, Trump's Asylum Order
Is a Dastardly Assault on the Rule of Law, WEEK (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://theweek.com/articles/806663/trumps-asylum-order-dastardly-assault-rule-law
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Law
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WASH.
POST
(Dec.
20,
2018),
https://
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decisionmaker consider an individual immigrant's circumstances. In the
immigration context, proportionality references "a constraint on power that
mandates consideration of certain extraneous factors in order to justify
removal."" It relates to the use of proportionality in criminal law, and to the idea
that a sanction's severity should not exceed the gravity of an offense."3
For Juliet Stumpf, proportionality as applied to deportation means creating
a graduated system of penalties for noncitizens up to and including
deportation." 4 In this system, Stumpf admits, deportation may be required
when a serious crime is committed by a noncitizen with few ties to the United
States.35 5 Michael Wishnie finds proportionality review to be "not merely
advisable," as proposed by Stumpf, but constitutionally mandated, given
deportation's punitive nature. 356 Wishnie imagines that such an intervention will
only infrequently result in invalidation of a removal order, and should be reserved
for the "rare case where the punishment of the removal order is grossly
disproportionate to the underlying misconduct."35 7 Thus, most noncitizens
would still face deportation, but their deportations would hew to the
constitutional requirement for proportionality review. Other immigration
scholars focus on specific populations of immigrants when considering the
applicability of proportionality. Angela Banks argues for proportionality
review based on recognizing successful integration into the United States,
making well-integrated lawful permanent residents more difficult to deport,
and focusing deportation on cases when it is a "proportionate response to
criminal activity. "358
Embracing the possibility of deportation abolition offers a different
interpretation of the injection of proportionality review as a necessary or
even desirable pursuit in the deportation reform arena. One central premise
of the justification for proportionality reforms is that every individual should
have access to an adjudication of their particular circumstances, and that a
decisionmaker should meaningfully adjudicate the individual's right to remain
on U.S. soil based on reasoning grounded in the actual facts of person's case.
But proportionality, by grounding a person's ability to remain in the United

352. Kanstroom, supra note 6, at 482.
353. Michael J. Wishnie, ImmigrationLaw and the ProportionalityRequirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 415,416 (2012).
354. Juliet Stumpf, FittingPunishment, 66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1683,1689 (2009).
355. Id. at 1736.
356. Wishnie, supra note 353, at 417 n.19.
357. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
358. Angela M. Banks, The Normative andHistoricalCasesfor ProportionalDeportation,62 EMORY
L.J. 1243, 1246 (2013).
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States on an individualized determination by U.S. courts, individualizes review.
By individualizing review, while at the same time imbuing that review with
the legitimacy that comes from having proportionality norms rule the day,
negative outcomes for immigrants-that is, deportations-are naturalized.3 9 In a
system that fully applies proportionality review (ideally with counsel present to
argue on behalf ofimmigrants), anyone being deported must clearly deserve such
an outcome, and having had their fair chance at remaining in the United States,
should be willing to accept deportation. In this world, those who resist these
adjudications by not leaving the United States, or by being deported and
returning to the United States, should be candidates for repudiation and
abandonment, as they were found undeserving of remaining in the United
States, were ordered deported with appropriate safeguards for efficient use of
government resources and the rule of law, and nonetheless are resisting the
fair outcome. 360
Proportionality reforms end up valuing the violent sorting of migrant life by
endorsing the continuation of immigration adjudications on the basis of a person's
supposed equities. These equities, and the way they are deployed, may vary on the
basis of the relief sought. But they all have in common the U.S. government's role
in dividing the deportable into those who are worthy of being saved and those who
can be discarded or exiled. 361 The reason for any given individual triggering
deportability will depend on a multitude of factors, but ultimately, the current
practices of immigration enforcement mean that, in the words of Nicholas De
Genova, "[i] n deportation, the whole totalizing regime of citizenship and alienage,
belonging and deportability, entitlement and rightlessness, is deployed against

359. Proponents of the right to counsel, for example, make claims about the value of a deportation
process that ends in deportation but includes an attorney. See, e.g., Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia
Herndndez, FundingLawyersforlmmigrantsIs a Path Forwardin theAge of Trump, HUFFPOST
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ funding-lawyers-for-immigrants-isa-path-forward-inus_58ee61a4e4b0a3bddb60a637 [https://perma.cc/4UK9-TQ86] ("To the
immigrant with no chance of staying in the United States, a cold dose of reality can dispel
lingering hopes and encourage agreeing to deportation.").
360. Arguments for the right to counsel premised on upholding the purported legitimacy of the
immigration system also bolster this line of thinking. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon's
Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282,2307 (2013).
361. One article argues for legal counsel for those facing deportation by pointing to the relatively
low number of cases heard by the immigration courts each year, coupled with the fact that
"many may need only fairly perfunctory representation that does not involve a great
expenditure of legal resources." Guttentag & Arulanantham, supra note 339, at 16. The
low expenditure of legal resources comes from the fact that many immigrants have no route
to avoiding deportation, and thus attorneys would be doing nothing more than helping the
court process their clients for deportation.
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particular persons in a manner that is, in the immediate practical application,
irreducibly if not irreversibly individualizing."" 2
This may just seem like more common sense. Individuals face deportation,

individuals should be adjudicated, individuals will hopefully find a way out of
the dilemma. This view hides the way that deportation itself is taken for granted
in this individualizing regime. The fight for proportionality, alongside the fight
for access to counsel, is the fight to get one lawyer for one person to present
positive equities (over and over again), not to challenge deportability itself.
Fighting individual deportations using the language of proportionality
ultimately makes a statement that this particular person should not be subject to
these laws, but that the laws themselves-and by extension, the values underlying
the laws-are the right ones.
The values assumed by proportionality are particularly helpful to unpack to
understand the limits of the common sense of deportation.
To apply
proportionality to individual cases means that immigration enforcement officers
are invited to construct a mythical immigrant deserving of avoiding deportation,
and then to measure people's lives against this mythical immigrant. As presented
in the U.S. imaginary, this deserving immigrant is "hard-working,"363 has gotten
by without using any public benefits for themselves or their children,364 has
managed to avoid all law enforcement contact,36 is married and has children,
preferably U.S.-born ones,366 and preferably not so many as to raise concern.367
Proportionality reforms require lawyers to be able to present arguments, on behalf
of the hundreds of thousands who face deportation, for how each individual
deportable person falls more closely in line with the mythical deserving immigrant

362. Nicholas De Genova, The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of
Movement, in THE DEPORTATION REGIME: SOVEREIGNTY, SPACE, AND THE FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT 33,34-35 (Nicholas De Genova & Nathalie Peutz eds., 2010).
363. Chizaro, supra note 232, at 382-84.
364. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995).
365. See Chizaro, supra note 232, at 377-82.
366. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft (June 17,
2011),
http://www.ice.gov/docib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E8W-JGTQ] (urging the use of prosecutorial discretion for
persons with a U.S. citizen child); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (providing that the
attorney general may cancel removal if the undocumented person establishes "that
removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence").
367. See generally Leo R. Chavez, "Illegality"Across Generations: Public Discourse and the
Children of Undocumented Immigrants, in CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANT "ILLEGALITY":
CRITIQUES, EXPERIENCES, AND RESPONSES 84 (Cecilia Menjivar & Daniel Kanstroom eds.,

2014) (discussing the threat of Mexican fertility to American society).
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than with the underserving "criminal alien" who presents a threat to the United
States and should be deported.
Making these arguments, individually, over and over again, means that the
role that race and other vectors of social vulnerability play in determining who
ends up in removal proceedings is obfuscated. This is tied to the assumptions
around shared values-many of the proposed reforms seem to assume that the
positive equities any particular immigrant might have will outweigh the negative
aspects in their case (usually their criminal record), without any discussion of how
the criminal record itself is of questionable value, and how the perfect storm of
racial identity, illegality, and the resulting profiling might have landed a person in
removal proceedings to begin with. The devaluation of the "criminal alien" forms
the necessary backdrop to proportionality reforms: If judges should consider
someone's value, then they must consider that value against someone else's
value-someone else whose banishment is the prerequisite for proportionality
being applied.3 68 When applying a deportation abolition lens, such a judgment is
indefensible. Hewing to deportation abolition means acknowledging that there
can never be a proportionate deportation, and thus focusing instead on
dismantling the conditions that produce deportability. The task becomes to
attack the general system through which deportation proceeds, rather than calling
for greater attention to immigrant deservingness. 369
B.

Case Study 2: Erase the Database

An immigrant-led campaign in Chicago to dismantle a gang database
provides a useful analytical contrast to the efforts to inject proportionality review
into deportation proceedings.3 70 Those who would benefit from the dismantling
of the gang database-presumed gang members-are precisely those who would
be least likely to benefit from proportionality reforms. Local law enforcement

368. See CACHO, supra note 345, at 33.
369. Exploring the current deportation regime's obsession with the distinction between
"innocent" victims and those who deserve deportation, Harsha Walia notes "[i]nnocence
is a limiting political stance since criminality, like illegality, is a political construction.
Criminality is made through shifting definitions of crime and policed as a race-making
and property-protecting regime. Gilmore thus informs us that our political task is not to
prove innocence, but 'to attack the general system through which criminalization
proceeds."' WALIA, supra note 36, at 83.
370. About Erase the Database, ERASE DATABASE, http://erasethedatabase.com/about
[https://perma.cc/P397-E96V] (last visited Jan. 9, 2022); April Lane, Know Your Movements:
The
#EraseTheDatabase Campaign,
S.
SIDE
WKLY.
(Oct.
16,
2018),
https://southsideweekly.com/know-your-movements-the-erasethedatabase-campaign-gangdatabase [https://perma.cc/63DM-EWK3].
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agencies defend the gang databases as a necessary tool for tracking people marked
as "gang members," in theory for the purposes of increasing public safety.7
Federal immigration enforcement agencies rely on the designations in these
databases to identify noncitizens to deport, to provide a reason for
deportation, and to provide grounds for denying relief from deportation to
those apprehended.3 7 2 Underlying the reliance by both local and federal law
enforcement on gang databases is the idea that such tools offer a more efficient way
of arresting, incarcerating, and ultimately deporting undesirable people."3
The "Erase the Database" campaign is a collaboration between immigrantled and Black-led grassroots organizations. The campaign has engaged in a
variety of tactics to achieve its goal of eliminating the Chicago gang
database.374 The campaign coalition emerged following the 2016 election of
Donald Trump, in part as a response to Chicago's claim that it was a "sanctuary
city," while maintaining carve-outs in its "Welcoming City" ordinance that
excluded alleged gang members from protection from deportation." 5 Immigrant

371

E.g., Chicago Police Department Defends Use of Watch List, AP NEws (May 16, 2017),
https://www.apnews.com/bc64e72be20a48c7aa3a98a81084a41f
[https://perma.cc/ 7GB63Q7N]; Annie Sweeney & Paige Fry, Nearly 33,000 Juveniles Arrested Over Last Two
Decades Labeled as Gang Members by Chicago Police, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2018, 5:00
AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-chicago-policegang-database-juveniles-20180725-story.html [https://perma.cc/ T7BN-L2AP].

372.

LAILA L. HLASS & RACHEL PRANDINI, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RSCH. CTR., DEPORTATION BY
ANY MEANS NECESSARY: How IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS ARE LABELING IMMIGRANT
YOUTH
AS
GANG
MEMBERS
4-5
(2018),

https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/deport_ byanymeansnec-20180521.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3JM-NM9Z]; see also SEAN GARCIA-LEYs, MEIGAN THOMPSON
CHRISTYN RICHARDSON, MISLABELED: ALLEGATIONS OF GANG MEMBERSHIP AND THEIR

IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES (2016), https://www.law.uci.edu/ academics/real-lifelearning/clinics/ucilaw-irc-MislabeledReport.pdf [https:// perma.cc/W3QV-UFHV].
373. See Laila Hlass, The School to DeportationPipeline, 34 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 697, 70507(2018).
374. The "Erase the Database" campaign is led by Organized Communities Against
Deportation (OCAD), Black Youth Project 100 (BYP100), and Mijente. About Erase the
Database,supra note 370. OCAD is an undocumented-led group that organizes against
the deportation and criminalization of Black, Brown and immigrant communities in
Chicago and surrounding areas. About Us, ORGANIZED CMTYS. AGAINST DEPORTATIONS,
https://organizedcommunities.org/about [https://perma.cc/ S9H2-JJZV] (last visited
Jan. 9, 2022). BYP100 is a member-based organization of Black eighteen to thirty-five year
old activists, dedicated to creating justice and freedom for all Black people. About BYP100,
BYP100, https://www.byp100.org/ about [https://perma.cc/3W5T-A7UW] (last visited
Jan. 9, 2022). Mijente is a national political home for Latinx and Chicanx grassroots
organizing that comes out of the "#NotlMore" campaign. See supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
375. Lane, supra note 370. Carlos Ramirez-Rosa & Xanat Sobrevilla, Opinion, How
Undocumented Chicagoansare Ensuringa True Sanctuary City, S. SIDE WKLY (Feb. 23,
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organizers sought to redefine sanctuary under the Trump regime as requiring
"cities to dismantle the current policing apparatus that acts as a funnel to mass
incarceration and the deportation machine," and challenging the gang database
became a way to operationalize the demand to expand sanctuary.376
"Erasethe Database" has successfully waged a public education and advocacy
campaign that reveals the existence and broad-ranging effects of the gang
database. 3" By partnering with university-based researchers, the campaign has
revealed the database to be highly racialized-it is primarily a list of Black and
Latinx men. Ofthe 128,000 adults in the Chicago Police Department's database,
70 percent are Black and 25 percent are Latinx. 378 Children and elders are also
disproportionately represented on the list. Those on the list face dire
consequences due to their inclusion on the database, ranging from deportation,
denial of employment and housing, denial of bond in both criminal and
immigration court, and harsher sentences. 379
The criteria for inclusion on the database remain murky.380 There is no
process for being informed that one has been placed on the database, and no
process for being deleted from it.381 Partnering with movement lawyers, the
campaign filed a class-action lawsuit challenging the Chicago Police Department's
unconstitutional policies and practices related to the gang database.38 2 The fight

2021), https://southsideweekly.com/op-ed-how-undocumented-chicagoans-are-ensuring-atrue-sanctuary-city) [https://perma.cc/8GKY-7QGW].
376.

TANIA A. UNZUETA,

MIJENTE, EXPANDING

SANCTUARY: WHAT MAKES A CITY A

SANCTUARY Now? 1 (2017), https://www.ctulocall.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/201701-30-sanctuary-expanded-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NWY-GVT2].
377.

See generally UIC POLICING IN CH. RSCH. GRP., EXPANSIVE AND FOCUSED SURVEILLANCE:
NEW FINDINGS ON CHICAGO'S GANG DATABASE (2018), http://erasethedatabase.com/

wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expansive-and-Focused-Surveillance-June-2018_final

.pdf

[https://perma.cc/8R98-E3GE] [hereinafter EXPANSIVE AND FOCUSED]; JANAB BONSU
ANDY CLARNO, UIC POLICING IN CHI. RSCH. GRP., TRACKED AND TARGETED: EARLY
FINDINGS ON CHICAGO'S GANG DATABASE (2018), http://erasethedatabase.com/wp-

378.
379.
380.
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382.
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[https://perma.cc/BBY4-UFLN]
[hereinafter TRACKED AND TARGETED]. The UIC Policing in Chicago Research Group is
a collaboration between academics, researchers, and social movement organizations who
are part of the "Erase the Database" campaign.
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(June
20,
2018,
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TRACKED AND TARGETED, supra note 377, at 9.
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extended successfully to Cook County, where the Cook County Board of
Commissioners approved an ordinance in February 2019 to prohibit the Cook
County sheriff from using or sharing the Cook County database, and eventually
requiring it to destroy the database.383
The campaign and its tactics map neatly onto the normative commitments of
deportation abolition. By attempting to eliminate a list primarily composed of
criminalized men of color, it targets one of the primary conditions producing
deportability. 384 While the campaign has focused on individual cases to highlight
the injustices of the database, the demands generated are collective ones.3 85 In
seeking to dismantle one of the pipelines to deportation, the campaign looks
beyond targeting the federal immigration enforcement agencies, and focuses on
local city and county council members, the Chicago Police Department, the Cook
County sheriff, and the Chicago mayor. The campaign has avoided pushing a
narrative of opposing the database on the basis of innocent Chicagoans being
included in it, a move which would open the door to the undeserving remaining
on a perfected database, and the deserving being removed. Instead, members of
the campaign have pushed for its elimination as a tool of racial subordination
rather than its improved management.
While focusing on local decisionmakers, the campaign to eliminate the
gang databases takes place in the context of the work the immigration agencies
have done in the past three decades to enable the tracking of all immigrants. Anil
Kalhan unmasked this process in his article Immigration Surveillance,
highlighting different ways the immigration-related government agencies are now
gathering information about every noncitizen possible, as well as U.S. citizens who
leave and reenter the territorial United States, creating what Kalhan terms an
"immigration surveillance state."386 This approach to governance involves
enabling and routinizing "the collection, storage, aggregation, processing, and

polices-inaccurate-racially-discriminatory-gang-database
[https://perma.cc/ V9GTZWN9].
383. Mick Dumke, Cook County Takes Steps to EraseIts Regional GangDatabase, PROPUBLICA
(Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/aricle/cook-county-sheriffs-office-databasenew-ban-law [https://perma.cc/4YMA-UQSJ].
384. See Sharpless, supra note 222, at 731. The decision to focus on a database primarily targeting
Black men and to partner with a Black-led racial justice organization reveals the "Erase the
Database" campaign as building from an understanding that "immigrant justice is inexorably
linked to the racial justice movement to dismantle the carceral state." Id.
385. See, e.g., City of Chicago Admits Error in Immigrant Father's Inclusion in Gang Database,
ORGANIZED CMTYS. AGAINST DEPORTATIONS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/

20181127074138/http://organizedcommunities.org/city-of-chicago-admits-error-inimmigrant-fathers-inclusion-in-gang-database [https://perma.cc/5RH2-6WZ7].
386. Kalhan, supra note 318, at 27 (emphasis omitted).
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dissemination of detailed personal information for immigration control and
other purposes on an unprecedented scale and facilitat [ing] the involvement of an
escalating number of federal, state, local, private, and non-U.S. actors in
immigration control activities."387
The growing immigration surveillance state has led Kalhan and others to
sound the alarm, and to suggest that the data gathered, which can be
"inaccurate, outdated, or irrelevant," violates principles that data should be
"accurate, complete, and current."388 Kalhan points to examples of inaccurate
data leading to "[i] mproper deprivations ofliberty"389 and raises concerns as to the
bias inherent in the data gathered: "[T]he nature of the data generated and
distributed by government database systems-coupled with the opaque nature of
the criteria for inclusion-can mask the subjective and evaluative judgments that
underlie that information, making it seem more objectively factual to enforcement
actors relying upon it than may be warranted." 390 An immigration ethic that
prioritizes allegiance to those whose data is gathered might go even further, and
propose resisting surveillance and interoperability altogether, rather than just
balancing them against concerns for fair application of existing criteria for
criminalizing people. This is precisely what the Chicago gang database challenges
do, calling for the full destruction and elimination of the gang databases, rather
than settling for calling for their accurate application to a properly criminalized
population. 391
Deportability is enhanced by interoperability, whether referring to the
automated sharing and gathering of information about a person that renders their
deportation more likely (as in the gang databases), or the tendency for low-tech
interoperability, in terms of public actors across all levels of government
cooperating with each other to share data. Resisting interoperability is thus in line
with dismantling one of the preconditions of deportability-the ability of the
government to track down and apprehend noncitizens. This may seem
counterintuitive to much of current immigrant rights advocacy-the exhortations
to legalize the undocumented population often frame the project as bringing
immigrants out ofthe shadows, whereas resisting surveillance and interoperability

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66 & n.272.
Id. at 67.
This is not to say that calls for accuracy are not part of the campaign; a key way of drawing
attention to the databases has been to highlight cases where those with no conceivable ties to
gangs have been placed on them.
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seeks instead to keep noncitizens relatively anonymous. 392 For the many
noncitizens who currently live in the shadow of deportability, a call to shrink
surveillance and interoperability is one that seeks to avoid having their value
adjudicated in a deportation proceeding. For those labeled gang members, the
strongest defense to deportation is never being turned over to ICE to begin with.393
People placed on gang databases become fair game for being apprehended and
questioned not just by local law enforcement, but by federal immigration
enforcement agencies who take their appearance on such a database as proof
positive of their suitability for apprehension, incarceration, and deportation. For
this population, the elimination of the gang database would result in the
elimination of one primary vector of deportability. Disrupting the efficiency ofthe
deportation system by dismantling the database might ultimately prove the
strongest defense from deportation for such individuals.
When ending deportation becomes the goal, any efforts that expand the
ability of the state to track and control people facing deportation become
unacceptable. When the question becomes not how to best maintain allegiance to
the rule of law but how to best maintain allegiance to those fighting deportation,
the answer may look somewhat different than those proposals usually
embraced by liberal pro-immigrant advocacy groups and scholars. For example,
for people detained as a result of inclusion on a gang database, their very presence
on the database might preclude them from qualifying for deportation relief, and
may make a judge much less likely to grant them bond and release them from
immigration detention. 394 For this group, the application of proportionality
norms may not make much of a difference to the outcome of their case, because
gang members are considered proper targets for automatic detention and
deportation. Even having the right to appointed counsel in their bond and
detention hearings may not be enough to save them from deportation, given the

392. See Kalhan, supra note 318, at 57. Kalhan points out that a possible outcome of a mass
legalization campaign could be the consolidation and extension of the reach of the
immigration surveillance state, given that such a campaign would involve capturing the
information of the millions expected to step forward to apply for status if such an opportunity
arose. Id.
393. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Criminalizing Immigration, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTRODUCTION AND CRIMINALIZATION 205, 216 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) ("Immigration

judges hear only about 17% of removal cases and have very little discretion to stay removal
in the cases that they do hear. Once individuals enter the removal system through the
criminal justice system, there are few exit ramps." (footnote omitted)).
394. Hlass, supra note 373, at 702 ("If immigration adjudicators choose to credit the allegations,
as many do, devastating consequences are likely to follow. Specifically, the young person
will likely be refused the opportunity to post bond, subjected to detention for the pendency
of removal proceedings, and, ultimately, denied any immigration benefits that he or she
would otherwise be entitled to, resulting in the issuance of a deportation order.").

The End of Deportation

1127

deep consequentiality of a gang designation. Thus, for this group, efforts that aim
to dismantle deportability by erasing the gang database may be their best hope for
avoiding the violence of deportation.
With over 80 percent of deportations happening without a hearing before an
immigration judge, the fight to end deportability must also grapple with the fact
that the majority of deportations are immune to legal and policy reforms that
involve bolstering the rule oflawin the immigration setting. 395 A politics that seeks
to end deportation must grapple not only with those who might be caught up in
the immigration court system, but with those who will not have the relative
privilege of choosing to fight their case in front of a judge. A policy reform like the
elimination of the gang database does not distinguish between those who will have
a chance to present a viable deportation case before an immigration judge and
those who will face nearly guaranteed removal. Instead, it aims to target one of the
conditions that produce deportability-the designation as a gang member. It
prevents deportability, rather than trying to make the system of deportation fairer
for those who do get a hearing.
For the nearly one million people with outstanding removal orders (people
who have been ordered deported but have not left),396 for the almost 800,000 that
have been approved for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (as of2018)397 and
whose updated location and biometrics the immigration service has on file, and for
the 400,000 who have temporary protected status (as of 2022),398 one of their best
hopes for survival is that the local systems they interact with refuse to hand them
over to ICE. The "Erase the Database" campaign demonstrates the possibility of
pursuing the abolition of deportation by dismantling deportability through a
direct challenge to the ability of the state to track, label, and deport noncitizens.
CONCLUSION

The violence of the Trump era exposed cracks in the common sense of
deportation. By introducing deportation abolition, this Article has sought to
examine those cracks, confronting the common sense that deportation serves
legitimate moral and political ends. What if immigration reform efforts were not

395. See Koh, supra note 13, at 184.
396. Madan, supra note 135.
397. Lori Robertson, The DACA Population Numbers, FACTCHECK.ORG (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.factcheck.org/2018/01/daca-population-numbers
[https://perma.cc/ EX2GWHHY].
398. Fact Sheet:
Temporary Protected Status
(TPS),
NAT'L
IMMIGR.
F.,
https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-temporary-protected-status
[https://
perma.cc/79YN-EFCL] (last visited Jan. 9, 2022).
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focused on improving the current management of deportation, but on ending
deportation altogether? What if legal scholars began to divest from addressing the
excesses of deportation, and instead sought to develop the frameworks that could
help bring about its demise? What if, in the face of the suffering and violence at the
heart of deportation, we focused on shifting the legal and regulatory landscape
toward dismantling the conditions of deportability? In beginning to offer
answers to these questions, this Article has sought to provide a new horizon for
immigration scholarship and advocacy, opening the door to the end of
deportation.

